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Strong states use foreign aid as side payments to form and maintain military alliances with small 
and poor states, to a degree not adequately appreciated in the international relations literature. The 
amount of aid necessary to form and sustain alliances with strong ones is affected by small states’ 
domestic politics—such as regime type (coalition size) and stability—and the divergence of their 
strategic interests with the strong power.  The alliance and foreign aid literatures, however, have 
generally downplayed the importance of foreign aid in the formation of asymmetric alliances, have 
not explained when and why foreign aid matters for asymmetric alliances, have not adequately 
explained how domestic politics and strategic interests affect the aid levels needed to form and 
maintain asymmetric alliances. The dissertation fills these gaps in the literature. It probes why 
asymmetric alliances are formed and the role side payments play in the formation and maintenance 
of asymmetric alliances. A view that starts from the perspective of a leader’s interests in their 
domestic setting can give us a way to understand when the costs of an asymmetric alliance are 
offset by the gains and how side payments can serve as a mechanism to make the formation and 




The dissertation offers a trade-off theory of asymmetric alliances which contends that 
leaders in weaker states are motivated to form alliances with great powers to enhance their 
potentials for domestic political survival. External alliances may provide small state leaders access 
to external resources that will help them to rely less on expensive extraction from the society and 
to alleviate risky guns-and-butter trade-off in domestic distribution of resources. As prospective 
allies sometimes have interest divergence in forming an alliance, weaker parties may experience a 
deficit in utility from the alliance. The theory predicts that having interest divergence between 
prospective allies increases the likelihood that a great power uses side payments to cement an 
alliance with a small state. Side payments provide a compensation mechanism: a great power can 
offer a potential ally an increase in security through an increased level of side payments, such as 
economic aid, military equipment, arms or other logistical support. In return for side payments the 
small state offers concessions (such as changes in its internal policies or granting military bases) 
to the great power ally. The amount of side payments a small state leader needs as a compensation 
for his policy concessions depend on political institutions and constraints the leader faces to his 
political survival. Political institutions affect the bargaining options for leaders. The theory 
contends that the amount of side payments needed to compensate for policy concessions is likely 
to be smaller for small coalition leaders (typically seen in autocratic polities) than it is for large 
coalition leaders (usually seen in liberal democracies).  
During the maintenance phase of the alliance, the parties engage in a process of bargaining 
to continue the flow of benefits from the alignment as well as to minimize one’s costs and risks 
associated with the alliance commitments. Accordingly, the trade-off theory predicts that interest 
divergence between recipient and donor, as well as the availability of alternative donors, affect the 




interests leads either to alliance termination or to donors increasing the side payments made to a 
small state for its policy concessions. If there are substitute great powers who are willing to offer 
more side payments than the small state is getting (or expected to get) from the existing alliance 
and the expected costs for small states are equal to (or less than) the existing level, then the net 
value of realignment with another great power will increase. Thus, the theory predicts that a small 
state leader chooses to realign with another great power when the leader expects a higher payoffs 
of net value from the new alliance. Important domestic political changes in small states, such as 
changes in the existing political regime or leadership may affect the state’s alliance policies. The 
theory contents that, all else equal, a regime change in small states will be likely to cause one of 
the following outcomes: a) the new regime may terminate the existing alliance or b) the alliance 
remains intact in exchange for an increased level of side payments. If the alliance remains 
important to the great power, it will survive albeit for a higher price; otherwise, the alliance will 
be terminated.  
Lastly, the theory predicts that leadership changes, both in democratic and non-democratic 
small states, will have minimal impacts on the continuation of asymmetric alliances in the short 
run. Because most democratic leaders are constrained by domestic political institutions and rely 
on the support from different segments of society, it is difficult for them to make drastic changes 
in policy. Thus, an asymmetric alliance is likely to survive, at least in the short run, after a 
leadership change in a democratic small state. In the absence of any alternative great powers (as a 
prospective ally), a small coalition leader has incentives to continue the existing alliance, at least 
in the short run, which can provide him access to much needed external resources, such as military 
and economic aid. These resources enhance the new leader’s ability to produce private goods and 




The dissertation makes important contributions in the international relations scholarship. 
First, it presents a systematic study of alliance relations between asymmetric powers that focuses 
on leaders’ domestic political survival in weaker developing countries as a primary motivation for 
alliance formation with stronger states.  Second, contrary to the existing theories of alliances in 
the literature, the dissertation shows that various forms of foreign aid, which I term side payments 
in the context of alliance bargaining, play an important role in the formation and maintenance of 
asymmetric alliances. Third, the dissertation offers a dynamic and process oriented approach that 
emphasizes that alliance agreements and accompanying security arrangements between strong and 
weak states are a result of bargaining processes. The trade-off theory is a process-oriented theory 
that probes not only why asymmetric alliances are formed but also how they are maintained. The 
theory underscores domestic political processes shaping small state leaders’ perception of threat 
and dynamic bargaining between allies and traces changes in alliance relations over time in 
response to changing strategic interests of allies. The dynamic nature of the theory provides a 
useful theoretical framework for the future research on not just alliances but on interstate 
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Alliances are a central feature of international politics and an indispensable part of a state’s foreign 
policy. The role of alliances in statecraft has long been recognized by statesmen, scholars, and 
philosophers. Kautilya, an Indian statesman-philosopher, stipulated in Arthasastra—an ancient 
Indian treaties on statecraft, economic policy, and military strategy—six patterns of interstate 
relations, one of which is alliances.  In Kautilya’s “Circle Doctrines of States” alliances have a key 
role in the defense of a kingdom.1 Arthasastra maintains that “contemplating and carrying out 
foreign affairs meant acting skillfully and strategically,” that requires “cultivating advantageous 
alliances, addressing internal problems, weakening enemy states, finding glory in conquest, and 
enriching the kingdom.”2  International relations scholars have noted the importance of alliances 
in world politics.  For example, George Liska pointed out succinctly: “it is impossible to speak of 
international relations without referring to alliances; the two often merge in all but name.”3  
The importance of alliances in world politics justifies a well-developed research agenda in 
the international relations literature. However, prominent theories of alliances posit a narrow 
                                                          
1 The “Circle Doctrine” is built on the idea that “my enemy’s enemy is my ally”: a king is encircled by enemy 
kingdoms (a ring of hostile states in the first circle). However, a second circle, concentric with circle of enemies, will 
be the king’s circle of allies. Because the kingdoms in the second circle share borders with the king’s enemies (the 
first circle), the king finds natural allies in kingdoms in the second circle. Mark McClish and Patrick Olivelle, The 
Arthasastra: Selections from the Classic Indian Work on Statecraft (Hackett Publishing, 2012). Pp. 119-20 
2 Ibid. P. 120 





purpose for alliances. For instance, a well-established hypothesis in the alliance literature is that 
states form alliances only to deter external threats.4 With few exceptions, the alliance literature 
focuses mostly on the alignment patterns among great powers. This observation applies not only 
to the realist tradition, but also to liberal and domestic politics oriented approaches. In general, the 
alliance literature has neglected disparate motivations of states for seeking external alliances and 
has paid relatively little attention to the patterns of alliances and alignment in less-developed and 
developing countries (which I referred to as small states in this study)—known collectively as the 
Third World.5 Strong states may use foreign aid as side payments to form and maintain military 
alliances with poor or weaker states, to a degree not adequately appreciated in the international 
relations literature. The amount of aid necessary to form and sustain alliances with strong ones is 
affected by weaker states’ domestic politics—such as regime type (coalition size) and political 
stability—and the divergence of their strategic interests with the strong power. The alliance and 
foreign aid literatures, however, have generally downplayed the importance of foreign aid in the 
formation of asymmetric alliances, have not explained when and why foreign aid matters for 
asymmetric alliances, have not adequately explained how domestic politics and strategic interests 
affect the aid levels needed to form and maintain asymmetric alliances.  
The dissertation fills these gaps in the literature by offering a trade-off theory of 
asymmetric alliances. It probes why asymmetric alliances are formed and the role side payments 
play in the formation and maintenance of asymmetric alliances. A view that starts from the 
                                                          
4 The literature is extensive, which I address in this chapter and in the theory chapter. For our purpose at this point, 
see the following important research in this tradition. Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International Politics (McGraw-
Hill New York, 1979); Stephen M Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Cornell University Press, 1987). 
5 I use the term “Third World” not to imply a strict stratification among states (such as the First World, Second World, 
and so on). I use this well-known term to refer to a set of countries that are generally understood as less-developed 
and developing in their stage of economic development and many of whom experienced European colonialism. In 





perspective of a leader’s interests in their domestic setting can give us a way to understand when 
the costs of an asymmetric alliance are offset by the gains and how side payments can serve as a 
mechanism to make the formation and maintenance of the alliance possible.  
The trade-off theory contends that leaders in weaker states are motivated to form alliances 
with great powers to enhance their potentials for domestic political survival. External alliances 
may provide small state leaders access to external resources that will help them to rely less on 
expensive extraction from the society and to alleviate risky guns-and-butter trade-off in domestic 
distribution of resources. As prospective allies sometimes have interest divergence in forming an 
alliance, weaker parties may experience a deficit in utility from the alliance. The theory predicts 
that having interest divergence between prospective allies increases the likelihood that a great 
power uses side payments to cement an alliance with a small state. Side payments provide a 
compensation mechanism: a great power can offer a potential ally an increase in security through 
an increased level of side payments, such as economic aid, military equipment, arms or other 
logistical support. In return for side payments the small state offers concessions (such as changes 
in its internal policies or granting military bases) to the great power ally. The amount of side 
payments a small state leader needs as a compensation for his policy concessions depend on 
political institutions and constraints the leader faces to his political survival. Political institutions 
affect the bargaining options for leaders. The theory predicts that the amount of side payments 
needed to compensate for policy concessions is likely to be smaller for small coalition leaders 
(typically seen in autocratic polities) than it is for large coalition leaders (usually seen in liberal 
democracies). 
During the maintenance phase of the alliance, the parties engage in a process of bargaining 





associated with the alliance commitments. Accordingly, the trade-off theory predicts that interest 
divergence between recipient and donor, as well as the availability of alternative donors, affect the 
flow of aid and the likelihood of alliance termination or realignment. Increasing divergence of 
interests leads either to alliance termination or to donors increasing the side payments made to a 
small state for its policy concessions. If there are substitute great powers who are willing to offer 
more side payments than the small state is getting (or expected to get) from the existing alliance 
and the expected costs for small states are equal to (or less than) the existing level, then the net 
value of realignment with another great power will increase. Thus, the theory predicts that a small 
state leader chooses to realign with another great power when the leader expects a higher payoffs 
of net value from the new alliance. Important domestic political changes in small states, such as 
changes in the existing political regime or leadership may affect the state’s alliance policies. The 
theory contents that, all else equal, a regime change in small states will be likely to cause one of 
the following outcomes: a) the new regime may terminate the existing alliance or b) the alliance 
remains intact in exchange for an increased amounts of side payments. Lastly, the theory predicts 
that leadership changes, both in democratic and non-democratic small states, will have minimal 
impacts on the continuation of asymmetric alliances in the short run. 
The dissertation makes important contributions in the international relations scholarship. 
First, it presents a systematic study of alliance relations between asymmetric powers that focuses 
on leaders’ domestic political survival in weaker developing countries as a primary motivation for 
alliance formation with stronger states.  Second, contrary to the existing theories of alliances in 
the literature, the dissertation shows that various forms of foreign aid, which I term side payments 
in the context of alliance bargaining, play an important role in the formation and maintenance of 





emphasizes that alliance agreements and accompanying security arrangements between strong and 
weak states are a result of bargaining processes. The trade-off theory is a process-oriented theory 
that probes not only why asymmetric alliances are formed but also how they are maintained. The 
theory underscores domestic political processes shaping small state leaders’ perception of threat 
and dynamic bargaining between allies and traces changes in alliance relations over time in 
response to changing strategic interests of allies. The dynamic nature of the theory provides a 
useful theoretical framework for the future research on not just alliances but on interstate 
negotiations for other security arrangements.  
The chapter is organized in the following order. The first section briefly discusses some 
shortcomings of some major alliance theories and the relevance of these theories in our 
understanding of asymmetric alliances. The second section clarifies and defines some terms used 
throughout the study. The subsequent sections then explains key assumptions, briefly summarizes 
main arguments of the trade-off theory, and explains research designs respectively.  
 
A. Why We Need a Theory of Asymmetric Alliances 
Most well-known theories of alliances are not well-suited to explain the patterns of 
alliances and alignments in the Third World. These theories are ill-equipped to explain what 
motivates small state leaders to form and maintain alliances with external powers. This is not 
surprising since these theories are tailored made to fit Western states, particularly European states.  
For instance, a fundamental assumption in neorealist theories of alliances is the idea that states are 
a coherent unitary actors. The unitary state, however, is a difficult condition to match in the context 





of these states are fragmented, they face contested sovereignty, and challenged authority structure. 
The sources of threats to small state leaders are often internal than external.  
 Neorealist theories posit that security-seeking states in an anarchic world form alliances 
solely to improve their military strength against hostile states. These theories are also known as 
the capability aggregation model of alliance formation because they suggest alliances allow states 
to augment their capabilities in order to deter shared threats. In general, the realist tradition does 
not pay much attention to the role of small and weaker states in international politics. In the balance 
of power theory small states are rarely given any importance except for a recognition that they do 
exists. Thus, Kenneth Waltz concludes that “so long as the major states are the major actors, the 
structure of international politics is defined in terms of them.”6 According to this formulation, 
when small states face external threats, they tend to bandwagon since they are too weak to balance 
against threats. This “one size fits all” proposition is narrow in scope and inadequate as an 
explanation of small states’ alignment patterns. We need a better and a more nuanced approach to 
small state alliances that are capable of capturing political dynamics in Third World States. 
The systemic approach to international politics, exemplified by the neorealist paradigm, 
suggests that a state's behavior is a response to the systemic constraints and incentives as well as 
its possession of aggregate power relative to others (i.e., the distribution of capabilities). Systemic 
pressures will override domestic interests, internal political struggles, and the internal 
characteristics of states in foreign-policy decision making.7  The anarchic nature of international 
                                                          
6 Waltz.pp. 93-94 
7 Ibid.; Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (Columbia University Press, 2001); "The Origins of War in 
Neorealist Theory," The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988); Robert J Art and Kenneth N Waltz, The 
Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics (Rowman & Littlefield Pub Incorporated, 2009); Kenneth N 
Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus 93, no. 3 (1964); "The Emerging Structure of International 
Politics," International security 18, no. 2 (1993); "Structural Realism after the Cold War," International security 25, 
no. 1 (2000). Some examples of the various applications of neorealist theories include Walt; Barry R Posen, The 





system makes states concerned about their survival, security, and independence. Small states, 
given their relative weak capabilities, are vulnerable units in the international system. Thus, their 
behavior is seen as a function of the international distribution of power. According to this line of 
argument, small states are more attentive to the constraints of the international system than they 
are to domestic political process. Unlike great powers, small states lack a “margin of time and 
error” when responding to external exigencies. Since the costs of being exploited are much higher 
for small states than they are for great powers, the former will be affected by anarchy to a greater 
extent. Consequently, statesmen in small states will need to be attentive to external constraints.8 
The effects of the international system on small states, however, is ambiguous in Kenneth Waltz’s 
view on the determinants of small state foreign policy. On the one hand, he argues that the security 
and foreign policy of small states will be dependent on structural constraints (such as the degree 
of great power competition), and they need to be more attentive to these external constraints due 
to their “narrower margin for error.” On the other hand, Waltz claims that small states are more 
likely to take international constraints for granted, since nothing it does can significantly affect the 
international system.9 Overall, small and weaker states have limited or no role in the international 
system shaped by great power politics. 
                                                          
1984); John J Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International security 15, 
no. 1 (1990); The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (WW Norton & Company, 2001); "The False Promise of 
International Institutions," International security 19, no. 3 (1994); Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why 
New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security 17, no. 4 (1993). For the classical version of realism, see Hans 
Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York, Alfred Kopf (1948).  
8 Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World politics 30, no. 02 (1978). 
9 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Some scholars argue that international system rather than domestic politics 
plays an important role in small states’ foreign policy choices. Small states are more “exposed to the vagaries of 
international security and economic competition.” Randall Schweller argues that domestic level explanations will be 
less useful when it comes to small states. Rather than being susceptible to domestic level influences, Schweller 
concludes that “extreme systemic constraints” can account for weak state foreign policy and military behavior. In their 
study of state behavior in the post-cold war era, Goldgeier and McFaul predict that while domestic politics will have 
an increasing influence on great power foreign policy, the behavior of small states on the periphery of the international 
system will continue to reflect systemic constraints: “structural realism is inadequate to explain the behavior of states 





An overemphasis on systemic imperative makes alliances largely great power affairs. 
According to neorealist theories, small states’ alliance strategies are limited due to their relatively 
weaker (in terms of power capabilities) position in the international system. The balance of power 
theory, which posits that imbalances of power cause states to form alliances against the most 
powerful state or coalition of states to prevent the rise of a hegemon,10 suggests that small states 
on the periphery has minor or no role in the maintenance or alternation of the balance of power in 
the system.  The  balance of threat theory (a modified version of the balance of power theory that 
argues that states form balancing alliances against a common threat, not just power) weak states 
are more likely to bandwagon with an aggressive great power than balance against it.11 
Bandwagoning is likely to be a preferred alliance strategy of small states due to their vulnerable 
position in international politics.12 In general, states form balancing alliances against a powerful 
state (rather than bandwagon with it) for two reasons: a) states do not want to put their survival at 
risk since it is the powerful state that threatens them, and b) joining the more powerful side tend 
to reduce their influence within the alliance since the weaker side has a greater need for assistance 
which leaves it vulnerable to the whims of the powerful ally.13 One might infer then that small 
                                                          
States in the International System (Routledge, 1990); Jack  Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and 
International Ambition (Cornell University Press, 1991). Also see Randall L Schweller, "Domestic Structure and 
Preventive War," World Politics 44 (1984); James M Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core 
and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992). Arnold Wolfers, Discord and 
Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Johns Hopkins Univ Pr, 1965).  
10 For the classical work on the balance of power, see Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Edward Vose Gulick, 
"Europe’s Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the Theory of One of the Great Concepts of European 
Statecraft," (New York: WW Norton, 1955); Francis Harry Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and 
Practice in the History of Relations between States, by Fh Hinsley (University Press, 1963); Inis L Claude, Power and 
International Relations (Random House New York, 1962). For modern versions of the theory, see Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics.Ch. 6; Morton A Kaplan, "Balance of Power, Bipolarity and Other Models of International 
Systems," The American Political Science Review 51, no. 3 (1957); Morgenthau. 
11 Walt. 
12 Eric Labs argues that whether weak states are more likely to balance or bandwagon against a great power threat is 
a function of systemic factors, such as geographic proximity and the availability of alternative alliance options. See 
Eric J Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (1992). 
13 Walt.pp. 18-19; on the second point, Waltz notes that “Secondary state, if they are free to choose, flock to the 
weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them. On the weaker side, they are both more appreciated and 





states, which are assumed to be driven by survival and independence just like any other states, are 
less likely to form alliances with great powers because of the twin risks mentioned above. Yet the 
claim that small states are likely to capitulate to great powers (bandwagoning) is contrary to the 
central theme in neorealist approach: states prioritize their survival and independence above 
anything else.  
Scholars in the neorealist persuasion use polarity—different configurations of power in the 
system (i.e. multipolarity, bipolarity, etc.)—to underscore the effect of the international system on 
the patterns of alliances and alignments among states. In a multipolar world, where great powers 
form alliances to aggregate capabilities of the allies in order to deter a common threat or an aspiring 
hegemon, small and weaker states will be regarded more as liabilities than as useful allies. This is 
because great powers need to form balancing alliances that can muster capabilities in parity with 
the power of a threatening power or an aspiring hegemon and its allies. In such a system it is more 
advantageous for great powers to influence the behavior of other great powers than to court the 
support of small powers since small states add little to the strength of an alliance and can do little 
to affect the outcome.14 In the struggle primarily among great powers, A. J. P. Taylor noted, “Every 
alliance with a small state meant an additional liability, not a gain. . .”15 The meager capability of 
small states is not worth any concessions on the part of great powers. Systemic incentives for great 
powers to form asymmetric alliances in a bipolar world are ambiguous.  One the one hand, the 
general insecurity of international anarchy leads states to worry not simply about how well they 
                                                          
14 Robert L Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (Columbia University Press New York, 1968). P. 190. Rothstein 
notes that the distinction between great powers and small powers arose in response to military necessities. According 
to the author, during the classical period of multipolarity, states’ formal status as a major powers was dependent on 
their ability to guarantee 60,000 troops in the field against a new French aggression. The inability of small powers to 
make such a commitment left them with an inferior status. See ibid. P. 196 
15 Alan John Percivale Taylor and Alan J Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (Clarendon Press 





fare themselves (absolute gains) but about how well they fare compared to other states (relative 
gains).16 The zero-sum logic should increase superpowers’ preoccupation with competition for 
allies and influence in the periphery. On the other hand, the superpowers in a bipolar world are so 
powerful that allies, especially small states, add little to their security.17 Thus, Waltz points out 
that the balance of power in bipolarity depends on the superpower’s internal efforts to generate 
power capabilities; small peripheral states are largely irrelevant.18 Lastly, in a unipolar system, 
generally referred to as the control of disproportionate share of the relevant resources of the system 
by a single state that has greater freedom of action than great powers do under either multipolarity 
or bipolarity,19  the systemic incentives for the formation of asymmetric alliances are minimal or 
do not exist. Because the unipole has a greater leeway to opt for its preferences,20 it has less need 
for allies and small and weaker powers have more reason to doubt the credibility of the 
commitments it makes. 
                                                          
16 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1981); The Political Economy of 
International Relations (Princeton University Press Princeton, 1987); Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third 
Images," International Organization 40, no. 01 (1986); Joseph M Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A 
Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International organization 42, no. 03 (1988); "Realist Theory 
and the Problem of International Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended Prisoner's Dilemma Model," Journal of 
Politics 50, no. 3 (1988); Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Cornell 
University Press, 1990); Joseph Grieco, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal, "The Relative-Gains Problem for 
International Cooperation," American Political Science Review  (1993); Joseph M Grieco, "Understanding the 
Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," 
Neorealism and neoliberalism: The contemporary debate  (1993); Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and 
Cooperation," World Politics 40, no. 3 (1988); Paul M Kennedy and Peter John Keating, The Rise and Fall of British 
Naval Mastery (Allen Lane London, 1976); Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (Vintage, 2010). 
17 Thus, Waltz notes the minimal systemic effects when the United States “lost” China after the revolution in 1949 or 
American alignment with China in the early 1970s. Waltz, Theory of International Politics. P. 169. Waltz noted in 
another publication: “Two states that enjoys wide margin of power over other states need worry little about changes 
that occur among the latter. . . Because no realignment of national power in Vietnam could in itself affect the balance 
of power between the United States and the Soviet Union—or even noticeably alter the imbalance of power between 
the United States and China—the United States need not have intervened at all.” See "International Structure, National 
Force, and the Balance of Power," in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James Rosenau (New York: Free 
Press, 1969). 
18 Theory of International Politics; "The Stability of a Bipolar World." 
19 Because of its overwhelming advantages in relative military and economic power over other states, a hegemon is 
the only great power in the system, which is therefore, by definition, unipolar. See Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great 
Power Politics. P. 40.   





Thus, a theoretical explanation of why asymmetric alliances might be formed is not 
apparent according to the underlying logic of the neorealist paradigm. The system-focused 
neorealist model is ill-equipped to explain the patterns of alliances and alignment in small weaker 
states. As shown in the previous analysis, one would be hard-pressed to place the role of small 
states in the neorealist theories of alliances. While neorealist theories generate parsimonious 
predictions, the theories are irrelevant in the context of Third World politics. As Mohammed Ayub 
summarizes costs of parsimony: “parsimony is perceived to be a positive aspect of theorizing 
because it simplifies complex realities and makes their comprehension an intellectually 
manageable exercise. But in doing so, theorists are often tempted to oversimplify and may well 
end up constructing a reality that is not in accord with all the important dimensions of the ‘real’ 
reality out there.”21   
Although the alliance theories have downplayed the role of foreign aid in alliance 
formation and maintenance, there is a well-established literature on the use of foreign aid as a 
foreign policy tool.22 Alliance theories in the neorealist tradition ignore the role of foreign in 
alliance formation. For example, Stephen Walt claims that because a common threat is the 
predominant source of alliance formation, foreign aid has little or no impact on alliance 
formation.23 A domestic politics oriented approach to alliances, which emphasizes alliance 
formation as a tool for ruling elites/leaders political survival,24 also fails to provide an adequate 
                                                          
21 Stephanie Neuman, International Relations Theory and the Third World (Palgrave MacMillan, 1998). P. 31 
22 David Allen Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); George Liska, The 
New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy (Chicago U. of Chicago P, 1960); Jeffrey Taffet, Foreign 
Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America (Routledge, 2011). 
23 Walt, The Origins of Alliance. p. 42  
24 See Larson Deborah, "Bandwagoning Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?," in Dominoes and 
Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, ed. Robert Jervis and Jack 
Snyder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Steven R David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics 
43, no. 2 (1991); "Why the Third World Still Matters," International Security 17, no. 3 (1992); Choosing Sides: 





explanation of why and under what circumstances foreign aid might be offered as side payments 
to cement an alliance. Steven David posit that the most powerful determinant of Third World 
alignment behavior is the rational calculation of the leaders as to which outside power is most 
likely to “do what is necessary” to keep them in power. David, however, does not specify what 
outside powers do to keep the Third World leaders in power. Like Walt, David also downplays the 
role of foreign aid in leaders’ alignment decisions.25 In general, major theories of alliances take 
the use of side payments for granted or considered unimportant in alliance formation. Although 
the exchange of side payments between allies is no secret, there have been few theoretical or 
empirical analyses made to explain the role of side payments in the formation and maintenance of 
alliances. This study fills these gaps in the alliance literature by offering a trade-off theory of 
asymmetric alliances which emphasizes that of asymmetric alliances are a result of strategic trade-
off between allies and highlights the role of side payments in the formation and maintenance of 
alliances.   
B. Definitions 
Alignments, Alliances, and Asymmetric Alliances: Alliances and alignments are 
sometimes used interchangeably. Alignment identifies a broader patterns of behavior. It can be 
defined as “expectations of states about whether they will be supported or opposed by other states 
in future interactions.”26 Alliances are a subset of alignments. Some scholars make a clear 
distinction between alliances as formal agreements and alignments as tacit security relationships 
                                                          
Michael M Barnett, "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security," Jerusalem Journal 
of International Relations 14, no. 4 (1992); Michael N Barnett and Jack S Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and 
Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73," International Organization 45, no. 3 (1991). 
25 See David, "Explaining Third World Alignment." 
26 Glenn H Snyder, Alliance Politics (Cornell University Press, 1997).p. 6. George Modelski defined alignment more 
loosely: alignments include “all types of political cooperation.” See George Modelski, "The Study of Alliances: A 





between states.27 Glenn Snyder refers alliances as “formal associations of states for the use (or 
nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own 
membership.” Thus, in this formulation, alliances are formal agreements that specified, explicitly, 
contingencies in which members are expected to cooperate. For others, however, a heavy emphasis 
on formal treaties limits our understanding of alliance behavior. Walt notes that precise distinctions 
between formal and informal alliances would distort more than they would reveal. Walt uses a 
broader definition: “an alliance is a formal or informal agreement for security cooperation between 
two or more sovereign states.”28 In this study, in both case studies and in quantitative analysis, I 
define an alliance as formal security pact between or among states. Furthermore, I use the term 
alignment to imply the expectations of states about the support, which derive from having alliance 
agreements, of their allies.  
Alliances differ in terms of their purposes. Scholars commonly categorized alliances as 
defensive, offensive, neutrality agreement, and nonaggression pact. Instead of focusing on 
purposes, I use variations in power capabilities between allies to differentiate types of alliances. 
Thus, alliances can be divided into two broad types: symmetric and asymmetric alliances. 
Symmetric alliances are those that are formed between or among states with similar level of power 
capabilities. For example, the France-Russian alliance (1894-1914) can be categorized as a 
symmetric alliance.  Asymmetric alliances, on the other hand, are defined as alliances between 
states with dissimilar power capabilities—usually between great powers and weaker states. The 
alliance between Belgium and France (1919-1936) can be cited as an example of asymmetric 
                                                          
27 Snyder. P. 4. Formalization of alliances, according to Snyder, adds specificity, legal obligation, and reciprocity. For 
an analysis on the differences between formal and informal alliance commitments, see Robert A Kann, "Alliances 
Versus Ententes," World politics 28, no. 4 (1976). On the formalization of alliance agreements, see James D Morrow, 
"Alliances: Why Write Them Down?," Annual Review of Political Science 3, no. 1 (2000). 





alliance. More contemporary examples involved the Cold War alliances between the superpowers 
(i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union) and Third World countries. According to James 
Morrow, parties receive different benefits from an asymmetric alliance—the small state makes 
autonomy (the degree to which a nation pursues desired changes in the status quo) concessions to 
the great power in return for the gain in security (a nation’s ability to maintain the current 
resolution of the issues that it wishes to preserve).29 A general feature of these alliances is that 
parties have asymmetric capabilities, which sometimes may generate interest divergence between 
allies. In this study I focus primarily on asymmetric alliances between great powers and weaker 
developing countries in the Third World.  
Small State: There is no consensus on the definition of the term “small states.” It is a 
contested term in the international relations literature. In the nineteenth century European politics 
the term “minor powers” was referred to those political entities that had neither the power nor the 
prestige enjoyed by recognized great powers. A sharp increase in the number of newly independent 
states in the 1950s and 1960s—most of which were weak and underdeveloped former colonies of 
European powers—had stimulated an interests in research, which reached its peak in the 1970s, 
focused on the phenomenon of “small states.”30 In general, small states are defined in terms of 
what they are not (that is, in terms of their shortcomings). In terms of economic potentials, it has 
been argued that small states lack economic vitalities due to their small domestic market, a low 
                                                          
29 James D Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," 
American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (1991). 
30 Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War Ii (University of Chicago Press, 1959); 
David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations (Greenwood Press, 1980); 
Rothstein; Trygve Mathisen, The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Powers (Universitetsforlaget 
Oslo, 1971); Robert O Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in Internatinal Politics," International 
Organization 23, no. 02 (1969); "The Big Influence of Small Allies," Foreign Policy, no. 2 (1971); Maurice A East, 
"Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models," World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International 





diversification of its economy, scarcity of natural resources, higher costs of production and lower 
economies of scale, etc. Small economies are assumed to be more dependent on external trade than 
bigger states, to tend to have trade deficits, to depend often on a single commodity of export. In 
the similar vein, in security realms, it has been argued that the relative weakness of small states 
constrained their ability to influence outcomes in international politics.31  
Scholars use different criteria to define small states. For example, David Vital uses 
population size as a defining criterion. Vital defines small states as those having (a) a population 
of less than 10 to 15 million in the case of economically advanced countries, and (b) less than 20 
to 30 million in the case of underdeveloped countries. His incorporation of the degree of economic 
development, however, casts doubt about the importance of population size as a standard 
criterion.32 Edward Azar defines a small state as a state whose total GNP (Gross National Product) 
accounts for less than one per cent of the world's GNP.33 Robert Rothstein and Robert Keohane 
conceptualize small states in terms of their lack of ability to influence the international system. 
According Rothstein, a small state “recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of 
its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, 
processes, or developments to do so.”34 For Keohane, a small state is “a state whose leaders 
consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the 
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system.”35 Given the relative weakness of small states, external alliances of these states have been 
analyzed as a means to compensate for their weakness and to guarantee their security.36 
In this study I use Miriam Elman’s definition of small states. Elman defines “small” in 
terms of capability rather than size.37  According to this standard, “smallness” can be understood 
in terms of capabilities as well as how those capabilities are applied against whom, when, and for 
what sets of goals. Resource capabilities necessarily constrain the scope and domain of foreign 
policy. Thus a small state can be defined by the state’s limited economic and military capacity to: 
(1) influence the security interests of, or directly threaten, a great power; and (2) defend itself 
against an attack by a great power.38 I use “small states” and “weaker states” interchangeably.39 
By using the above mentioned criteria, most developing countries in the Third World can be 
categorized as small states (even though some of them have larger population and territories than 
many developed states).   
Side Payments: Side payments are positive incentives offered by one side to the other in 
exchange for the recipient’s concessions on issues/policies deemed important to the donor. Foreign 
economic aid, military aid, and loans are clear examples of such side payments.40 Aside from these 
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obvious examples, side payments can take various shapes or forms. For instance, during a 
negotiation process one party can use territorial concessions as side payments to cement an 
agreement. The use of positive incentives in interstate bargaining is no secret. States use foreign 
economic policies to influence other states’ behavior and to achieve foreign policy objectives. This 
is a common practice of “statecraft.”41  
There is a well-developed area of research on the use of side payments (of which issue 
linkage is a part) in the bargaining literature. According to bargaining theories, policymakers use 
side payments as either direct monetary payments (such as bribes) or material concessions on other 
issues (such as issue linages) to encourage concessions on a given issue.42 Side payments and issue 
linkages, if used to provide a positive inducement, help sates to diminish conflict and to reach an 
otherwise unattainable level of cooperation during negotiations.43 Issue linkages, as a part of side 
payment mechanism, help states to solve distribution problems, arise when actors have different 
preferences over alternative possible agreements, in bargaining situations. As Morrow observed: 
“a linkage deal requires two issues that the sides believe are of different importance. Each side 
receives concessions on the issue it believes is of greater relative importance. . . [if] done properly, 
both sides prefer the linkage deal to going to war over the initial issue.” 44  
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A state may offer various types of incentives to encourage otherwise unwilling 
governments to cooperate with it. Side payments may come in the form of direct payments such 
as cash payments (or grants), loans, or military aid, etc. Positive incentives can also be in the form 
of indirect payments, such as unilateral trade concessions, investments, etc. In an alliance 
negotiation the nature and volume of side payments, however, will depend on the strategic value 
of the alliance to the more powerful side.45  I contend that side payments serve as a compensation 
mechanism that closes the deficit in net gains sometimes felt by a member (usually, the weaker 
side) of the alliance. Side payments sometimes increase the scope of the alliance to include 
economic and/or military dimensions. For a great power considering an alliance with a small state, 
the strategic value of the alliance may justify the cost of side payments; for the small state gains 
involve both economic and strategic dimensions at the expense of concessions on issues deemed 
important to the great power.46  This study probes the conditions under which side payments are 
used as a bargaining tool in asymmetric alliances.  
Autonomy and Security:  The term security can be defined as the ability to defend and 
preserve core values and interests against external or internal threats. Having the ability to preserve 
territorial integrity and political independence are two such core interests of every state. Another 
way to define the term, as James Morrow does, is to state that “a nation's security is its ability to 
maintain the current resolution of the issues that it wishes to preserve. A nation's security varies 
with the issues it defines as security concerns, its capabilities to defend those concerns, the support 
it expects to garner from other nations to defend its security interests, and the magnitude of threat 
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that other nations pose to those interests.”47 The former definition subsumes Morrow’s notion of 
security since a state’s core values and interests that it wishes to preserve may come under attacks 
from external sources during an interstate war as well as from internal sources during a civil war.   
A state’s national security policies often lay out the means by which the state would defend and 
preserve these values. 
Autonomy generally refers to the freedom of action. A state’s autonomy, in both external 
and internal realms, implies its ability to pursue policies without being challenged by external and 
internal forces. There is an important linkage concerning the practice of autonomy between a 
state’s internal and external realms. A state will be less likely to practice autonomy in external 
affairs if it lacks the freedom of action in internal affairs (due to interferences from external and 
internal forces). For example, we do not expect Iraq and Syria, which have been experiencing 
violent instability and civil war in recent times, to pursue effective autonomy in external affairs 
when the governments in both states are having difficulties in exerting authority in domestic 
affairs. Also, how well a state is able to maintain its autonomy varies according to its capabilities. 
A great power may have more autonomy than a weaker developing country. It is relatively easier 
for a great power to challenge the status que to pursue desired changes in external realms.    
Divergent Interests:  States device their foreign policies to achieve certain policy 
objectives. They often need to interact with other countries to coordinate strategies and sometimes 
need support from others to achieve these objectives. When parties share similar interests or 
objectives in an undertaking, we can say that they have converging interests. However, when they 
                                                          





have different interests, the parties have diverging interests. Thus, divergent interests can be 
defined as differences or divergence in interests between/among parties in a policy area.  
The figure below depicts a bargaining scenario that illustrates divergent interests between 
two parties. Suppose that a great power and a small state are negotiating over two issues X and Y; 
each party assigns varying degree of importance to these issues ranging from 0 (least) to 10 
(highest). As the figure shows, the great power assigns a higher importance to issue X but cares 
very little about issue Y. The small state has the opposite preference: it assigns more importance 
to Y than to X. These different preferences of the parties on the two issues produce a very small 
area of converging interests (shaded area), but a very large area of diverging interests. It is this 
area of divergence that opens the opportunity for bargaining. In these circumstances issue linkages 
and side payments can provide parties incentives to engage in bargaining and to make an 
agreement despite having a high degree of divergent interests. Side payments compensate parties 
for the compromise on their preferred issue and make the agreement mutually beneficial. A general 
inference can be made that having a higher the degree of divergent interests between the parties, 
open the potential for (and intensity of) a negotiated agreement. It is important to note that each 
state assigns different value to issues and thus the relative importance of interest divergence will 
vary from case to case. 













The trade-off theory is built on some basic assumptions.  First, I assume that leaders are rational 
actors. Rational behavior implies choosing the best means to achieve a predetermined set of ends. 
Rational behavior does not require means or ends to be righteous or moral. For our purpose, it is 
“an evaluation of the consistency of choices and not of the thought process, of implementation of 
fixed goals and not of the morality of those goals.”48 The assumption leads us to expect the 
following: “given a social situation in which exist two alternative courses of action leading to 
                                                          





different outcomes and assuming that participants can order these outcomes on a subjective scale 
of preference, each participant will choose the alternative leading to the more preferred 
outcome.”49 Thus, to put it simply, rational leaders are goal oriented actors; they have preferences 
over the set of outcomes and they try to attain the more desired outcome.  
Second, a core assumption of the theory is that leaders are driven to enhance their political 
survival.  Leaders promote policies, adopt strategies, wage war, make peace, and sometimes use 
the state and its resources to enhance their survival potentials. What policies or strategies leaders 
adopt and how well they can maintain their power depends on domestic political institutions. For 
example, democratic leaders are expected to play by democratic institutions and to win elections; 
non-democratic leaders employ all possible means to keep political opponents at bay and to stay 
in power as long as possible. Thus, rational leaders employ all possible means, conditioned by 
domestic political institutions, to ensure their political survival.   
Third, alliances are a policy tool. Alliance policies are not necessarily an especial craft of 
“high politics”, but rather a commonly used instrument of foreign policy. Just as leaders use fiscal 
policies to collect revenue and to configure and reconfigure the allocation of economic resources 
among various interest groups, they use alliances as a foreign policy tool to achieve their political 
ends. Alliances and alignments are diplomatic tools at leaders’ disposal that can be used to attain 
desired domestic and foreign policy objectives. What objectives leaders want to achieve and how 
they do so are empirical questions that this study seeks to answer.   
Fourth, states are not unitary actors. Some prominent international relations theories, such 
as the neorealist paradigm, make a unitary state assumption, which suggests that the state is a 
                                                          





coherent political entity (an enigmatic black box) and leaders adopt and implement foreign policies 
on behalf of the state to achieve a set of national interests. This is an unrealistic assumption. 
Contrary to the unitary actor assumption, this study assumes that the state consists of a 
constellation of forces divided along various ethnic, religious, cultural or class lines with distinct 
interests. At any given time, domestic and foreign policies of the state reflect the interests of groups 
or forces in power. Thus, by assuming that the state is not a unitary actor, I accept its implication 
that a state’s national interests are not static; instead, national interests have dynamic and ever-
changing characteristics reflecting the values and interests of the forces or groups at the helm of 
the state.     
 
D. The Arguments 
The Trade-Off theory of asymmetric alliances articulates a model about the formation and 
maintenance of alliances between great powers and small states. It contends that leaders in small 
states are motivated to form alliances with great powers to enhance their potentials for political 
survival in a challenging domestic political environment. Side payments play a major role in both 
the formation and maintenance phases of asymmetric alliances. The major components of the 
theory are summarized below. 
 Threats to leaders’ political power and their calculation for political survival increases the 
likelihood that they form asymmetric alliances. Domestic political factors play a crucial role in 
leaders’ alignment choices. When faced with threats to their political survival, sometimes 
proliferated  by domestic political instability,  leaders must decide whether to deal with the threat 
by internal means which involves extraction of scarce societal resources or by external means by 





Since domestic extraction (i.e. levying taxes) is often costly for leaders, forming alliances is an 
attractive option. External alliances may provide small state leaders access to external resources 
that will help them to rely less on expensive extraction from the society and to alleviate risky guns-
and-butter trade-off in domestic distribution of resources. As prospective allies sometimes have 
divergent interests in forming an alliance, weaker parties may experience a deficit in utility from 
the alliance. Side payments then serve as a compensation mechanism that fills the deficit and 
makes the alliance mutually beneficial. Side payments, a source of external resources, help small 
state leaders to ameliorate a critical potential dilemma in domestic resource allocation and maintain 
the loyalty of leaders’ core domestic political coalitions. 
Having divergent interests between prospective allies increases the likelihood that great 
powers use side payments to form the alliance. The likelihood of using side payments by a great 
power to cement an alliance is a function of having divergent interests between the parties. Great 
powers and small states can have incentives to form alliances for different reasons, not necessarily 
driven by a mutual interest in deterring a common enemy. Divergent motivations for forming an 
alliance between great powers and small states are sometimes caused by the disparity in their 
power capabilities. Whereas a great power may use the alliance as a tool for power projection, a 
small state leader may seek an alliance with a great power to obtain external help to counter 
domestic and regional threats to his political survival. An alliance agreement may stipulate that 
the small state offers concessions (such as changes in its internal policies or granting military 
bases) to the great power ally. In return,  the great power can offer a potential ally an increase in 
security through an increased amount of side payments, such as economic aid, military equipment, 
arms or other logistical support. The great power’s ability to influence its ally’s internal and 





changes in the status quo in regional or international politics. Given that the great power is likely 
to be considerably wealthier than the small power, the marginal cost of sacrificing some resources 
(side payments) to the small power is relatively a small cost for the great power and a large gain 
for the small (and often poorer) state who values the marginal gain in external resources more 
highly. Hence, it should not be hard to find an appropriate compensation scheme since the utility 
gain from the side payments is large for the small power relative to the big power and so at a small 
utility cost to the great power a large utility deficit can be bought off for the small power when it 
grants a difficult policy concession. 
The amount of side payments a small state leader needs as a compensation for his policy 
concessions depend on political institutions and constraints the leader faces to his political 
survival. Political institutions affect the bargaining options for the leader. The theory predicts that 
the amount of side payments needed to compensate for policy concessions is likely to be smaller 
for small coalition leaders (that is, leaders who depend on a small group of key supporters, typically 
seen in autocratic polities) than it is for large coalition leaders (typically seen in liberal democracies 
where leaders rely on the support of a large number of electorate). This is not because small 
coalition leaders demand smaller amounts, but because the type of political constraints they face 
and the type of goods they have to produce to stay in power. Since a small coalition leader relies 
on a small number of core supporters, it is easier for him to satisfy these supporters for their utility 
loss due to policy concessions to the great power than it is for their large coalition counterparts. 
Making autonomy concessions in exchange for side payments provides small coalition leaders 
with access to external resources that enables them to remain in office through rent seeking and 
rewarding their supporters with private goods. Large coalition leaders require a large amount of 





result of policy concessions to the great power. They need to compensate their coalition members 
with public goods (such as increasing investment in infrastructure, providing additional resources 
for social welfare programs, education, healthcare, etc.) that are often more expensive than 
rewarding few supporters with private goods.  
Once an asymmetric alliance is formed, the allies have to be concerned with the 
maintenance and management of the alliance. During the maintenance phase of the alliance, the 
parties engage in a process of bargaining to continue the flow of benefits from the alignment as 
well as to minimize one’s costs and risks associated with the alliance commitments. As in the 
formation phase, side payments play an important role during the maintenance phase of the 
alliance. From a small state’s perspective, the attractiveness of an asymmetric alliance depends on 
the continuous flow of side payments. 
The trade-off theory contends that during the maintaining phase of the alliance as the 
degree of interest divergence varies, so does the magnitude of side payments a small state receives 
for its policy concessions. The small state is likely to receive a small amount of side payments 
when the allies have a low level of divergent interests. Large amounts of side payments are not 
needed since parties already share a high level of mutual interests. The great power can buy policy 
concessions from the small state for a cheaper price. Having a high degree of divergent interests 
may lead to two possible outcomes. First, negotiations between the allies for ongoing cooperation 
may fail and very little or no side payments are expected. As a result of a high level of divergent 
interests, the great power may find the small state’s demands too expensive to obtain desired policy 
concessions. Second, if the great power considers the small state’s cooperation crucial (in the 
absence of other plausible alternatives) to its foreign policy objectives, it may be willing to pay a 





negotiations make it possible for the small power to gain large amounts of side payments. In 
between the two extremes, the theory claims that the weaker party is likely to receive large amounts 
of side payments when the degree of interest divergence is in the medium range.  
The value of an existing alliance to a small state leader may depend on the continued receipt 
of side payments as well as the availability of substitute great powers. Any drastic change 
(expected or realized) in the flow of side payments, combined with available great power 
alternatives (to replace the existing one) encourages the leader to consider alternative alliances. 
An asymmetric alliance is likely to be more durable when there are no drastic changes in the flow 
of side payments and the small state does not have plausible great power alternatives to replace 
the existing ally. If there are substitute great powers who are willing to offer more (or the same 
volume) side payments than the small state is getting (or expected to get) from the existing alliance 
and the expected costs for the small state are equal to (or less than) the existing level, then the net 
value of realignment with another great power will increase. The small state leader, then, has an 
incentive to realign with another great power. Thus, the trade-off theory predicts that a small state 
leader chooses to realign with another great power when the leader expects a higher payoffs of net 
value from the new alliance.  
Important domestic political changes in the small state, such as changes in the existing 
political regime or leadership may affect the state’s alliance policies.  The theory predicts that, all 
else equal, a regime change in the small state will cause one of the following outcomes: a) the new 
regime may terminate the existing alliance or b) the alliance remains intact in exchange for an 
increased amounts of side payments. In the wake of a regime change, the new regime may 
terminate the existing alliance if the new ruling coalition prefers non-alignment or realignment 





demands a higher price (i.e. a higher amounts of side payments) for the state’s concessions on 
autonomy. In the latter case, the continuation of an asymmetric alliance will depend on the extent 
to which the great power values the alliance. If the alliance remains important to the great power, 
it will survive albeit for a higher price; otherwise, the alliance will be terminated. 
Leadership changes, both in democratic and non-democratic small states, are likely to 
have minimal impacts on the continuation of asymmetric alliances in the short run. Because most 
democratic leaders cannot govern effectively without cooperating with other officials and groups 
(for instance, legislatures, governing coalition partners, leaders of subnational political units) 
representing different sections of society, any drastic changes in policy tend to be difficult. Thus, 
an asymmetric alliance is likely to survive, at least in the short run, after a leadership change in a 
democratic small state. For a small coalition leader, surviving the initial period in office is 
particularly difficult because of the uncertainties about the loyalty of the coalition members and 
the leader’s ability to reward them with private goods. Side payments are an attractive source of 
revenue. In the absence of any alternative great powers, a small coalition leader has incentives to 
continue the existing alliance, at least in the short run, which can provide him access to much 
needed external resources, such as military and economic aid. These resources enhance the new 
leader’s ability to produce private goods and to keep his coalition members loyal. 
       
E. Research Design 
I employ both quantitative and qualitative methods to test the theory. This hybrid approach allows 
me to analyze complex social and political dynamics, often rooted in historical developments, in 
developing countries that shape leaders’ strategies and preferences for external alliances as well 





in international relations. I use regression analysis to test the hypotheses about the formation of 
asymmetric alliances. Some hypotheses, mostly about the maintenance phase of the alliances, 
however, are difficult, if not impossible, to test using quantitative method. This difficulty is due 
largely to a lack of available data. In some cases, the key variables are simply difficult to quantify. 
Fortunately, qualitative approach—case study methods—provides a useful alterative.  
I use case study approach to test most of the proposed hypotheses. All maintenance 
(cooperation and discord in asymmetric alliances) related hypotheses will be tested primarily by 
using case study method. While large-n quantitative approach is useful in explaining broader 
patterns of alliances, case study approach offers some important advantages. Because I 
hypothesize that divergent interests between allies necessitates side payments and leader’s calculus 
for political survival makes alignments more likely, it is necessary to thoroughly examine the 
domestic and international political environment, the degree of shared interests between allies, 
resource constraints leaders face, and the necessity to maintain the loyalty of key supporters for 
political survival. Moreover, an important explanatory variable in this study is the degree of 
divergent interests between allies that determines the magnitude of side payments small states 
receive from great powers. It is difficult to compare, in large-n analyses, the relative importance 
parties assign to issues and interest divergence.  Case study approach is a better way to make 
detailed analyses of factors that shape the degree of interest divergence between prospective or 
existing allies. I use Alexander George’s structured and focused comparison method in which 
researchers ask general questions of each case under study to guide the standardized data collection 
in order to make systematic comparisons and accumulation of the findings of the cases possible.50 
                                                          






I selected three cases to test the theory. These cases are the following: 1) the US-Pakistani 
alliance; 2) the U.S.-Philippines alliance and 3) alliances and realignment in the Horn of Africa 
that include Ethiopia and Somalia’s alliances with the United States and the Soviet Union. These 
cases provide useful insight as to under what conditions leaders in small states are willing to form 
and maintain alliances with great powers and the role of side payments in their alignment decisions. 
The alliances under study here were formed in the 1950s when Pakistan, Philippines, Ethiopia, and 
Somalia were poor and underdeveloped countries emerged on the international stage that was 
already engulfed by the Cold War tension between the superpowers. Aside from their similarity as 
being underdeveloped small states, these cases are different in many respects including different 
histories, regional and domestic political settings, economic conditions, etc. Importantly, the cases 
vary in terms of two key independent variables: a) the degree of threats to leaders’ political survival 
and b) the degree of divergent interests individual countries had with great powers in forming and 
maintaining the alliances. Since the formation of the alliances in the 1950s, the selected countries 
have experienced important internal and external political change over the years that have shaped 
leaders’ perception of threat and the degree of interest divergence with great power allies. These 
variations offer an opportunity to make longitudinal analyses within cases and test the hypotheses 
concerning the maintenance of asymmetric alliances—that is, within case variations will allow us 
to explain how domestic political changes affect a state’s external alliances.  
For the purpose of data collection the following standardized questions will be asked of 
each case: what was the nature of external and internal threats facing the small state leader? What 
was the relative importance of external and internal threats to the leader’s political survival?  Did 
international political environment constrain the leader’s alignment decisions? What was the 





of concessions (territorial, policy, etc.) asked of the small state leader? Did the leader face political 
instability? What was the nature of political regimes in the small state? What was the state of the 
economy preceding the alignment decisions? Once an alliance was formed, what was the nature 
of changes in interest divergence between the allies overtime? How did these changes, if any, in 
interest divergence affect bargaining between the parties? Lastly, how did domestic political 
changes (regime change and leadership change) in small states affect the alliance relations? I use 
the data accumulated from these standardized questions to test hypotheses in individual case study 
and to make a comparative analysis across the cases in the concluding chapter. For within case 
analysis I use longitudinal congruence procedure (within case comparisons) which will allow me 
to observe and compare values on the independent and dependent variables across a range of 
circumstances within a case. This procedure will then help us to assess whether the values of 
independent and dependent variables covary in accordance with the predictions of the proposed 
hypotheses. To substantiate the causal mechanisms at work, I use process tracing to explore the 
chain of events by which initial case conditions lead to case outcomes; the cause-effect link is 
unwrapped and divided into smaller steps.51 Table 1.1 below summarizes the hypotheses and the 






                                                          










1) Having divergent interests between a great power and a small 
state increases the likelihood that the great power uses side 
payments to cement an alliance.  
Quantitative 
Case study: 
-The U.S.-Pakistan Alliance 
-The U.S.-Philippines Alliance  
2) All else equal, the amount of side payments needed to 
compensate for policy concessions is likely to be smaller for 
small coalition leaders than it is for large coalition leaders. 
  Quantitative  
 
3) All else equal, politically unstable small states are more likely to 
form asymmetric alliances than are politically stable small 
states.  
 Quantitative  
4) Threats to leaders’ political survival in small states increase the 
likelihood that they form asymmetric alliances.  
 
Quantitative  
Case study:  
-The U.S.-Pakistan Alliance 
-The U.S.-Philippines Alliance 
5) All else equal, the amount of side payments used to maintain the 
alliance depends on the level of divergent between the allies:  
a) When the level of divergent interests is very low, small 
amounts of side payments are necessary to maintain the 
alliance;  
b) When the level of divergent interests is very high, very large 
amounts of side payments (for a successful negotiation) or no 
side payments (for an unsuccessful negotiation) are expected; 
and 
 c) When the level of divergent interests is in the medium 
range, parties can bargain policy concessions in exchange for 
large amounts of side payments.   
 
  
  Case study:  
-The U.S.-Pakistan Alliance 
-The U.S.-Philippines Alliance 
6) A small state will be likely to realign if the expected net gain 
from realignment outweighs the expected gain from the 
existing alliance. 
 
 Case study:  
-The Horn of Africa 
7) All else equal, regime changes in small states increase the 
likelihood that a) the alliance will be terminated, or b) the 
amount of side payments received will increase. 
  
 Case study:  
-The U.S.-Pakistan Alliance 
-The U.S.-Philippines Alliance 
- The Horn of Africa  
8) In the short run, leadership changes in small states will be less 
likely to effect the continuation of asymmetric alliances.   
 
 Case study:  
-The U.S.-Pakistan Alliance 








F. Chapter Outline 
The next chapter offers a theory of asymmetric alliances, what I term a Trade-Off theory 
of asymmetric alliances. It critiques major theoretical approaches to alliance formation and 
maintenance and explains several hypotheses that form the building block of the theory. The next 
three chapters then provide empirical findings. Chapter three reports findings from large-n 
quantitative analyses. Chapter four and five provide case studies on the U.S.-Pakistan alliance and 
the U.S.-Philippines alliance respectively. These cases offer a good ground for testing most of the 
proposed hypotheses about the formation and maintenance of asymmetric alliances. The 
penultimate chapter test the hypotheses concerning the termination of alliances and the cases of 
realignment by using the patterns of alignment and realignment in the Horn of Africa. The chapter 
specifically focuses on Ethiopia and Somalia. In the concluding chapter I summarize empirical 
findings specific to each hypothesis and offer a comparative analysis across cases. In addition, the 
concluding chapter discusses potential strengths and weaknesses of the theory and the theoretical 















In The Prince, Niccolo Machiavelli advised that “a prince must beware never to associate with 
someone more powerful than himself” and should “avoid as much they can being at the discretion 
of others.”1 For small state leaders, the risks of alignment with great powers in Machiavelli’s 
advice is consistent with what neorealist scholars call the risks of alignment for weak states2.  
Given these risks, why do small states nevertheless form alliances with great powers? Once 
formed, how are these alliances maintained? Why do small states sometimes realign at the expense 
of great power allies? As asymmetric alliances have been a common feature of international 
relations, an explanation is needed to answer these questions. The purpose of this chapter is to 
provide an explanation, based on a leader’s domestic survival perspectives, of why and how 
asymmetric alliances are formed and how they work. 
  I contend that threats to leaders’ political power and calculation of their own political 
survival increase the likelihood that they form asymmetric alliances. Side payments serve as a 
positive incentive that a great power use to compensate a weaker power for its policy concessions. 
As a source of external resources, side payments help leaders to ameliorate a critical potential 
                                                          
1 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1998). P. 90 
2 See Walt, The Origins of Alliance. 




dilemma in domestic resource allocation and maintain the loyalty of leaders’ core domestic 
political coalitions. Once an asymmetric alliance is formed, side payments continue to play an 
important role in the maintenance of the alliance. Intra-alliance cooperation is more likely when 
both parties receive and are expected to receive their share of the benefits from the alliance. For a 
small state, a primary benefit from an alliance with a great power is gaining a steady stream of side 
payments from its powerful ally. I further argue that small state leaders may realign with a 
competing great power when the expected net gain from realignment outweighs the gain from the 
existing alliance. This chapter begins with a brief literature review on the formation and 
maintenance of alliances with special attention to the alignment strategies of small states. It then 
offers a theory of asymmetric alliances and explains how such alliances are formed, how intra-
alliance cooperation is achieved, and why small states choose to realign. The chapter ends with a 
conclusion that sheds light on the implications of the theory for the alliance literature.       
  
The Alliance Literature: the Formation, Maintenance, and the 
Role of Side Payments  
 
Research on alliance formation has generally neglected the role of side payments. Much of 
the literature on alliances has focused on alliance formation at the systemic level.3 Prominent 
theories of alliance formation follow the logic of capability aggregation, rooted in the balance of 
power theory, as a primary determinant of states’ alignment strategies. Stephen Walt (1987) claims 
                                                          
3 Richard PY Li and William R Thompson, "The Stochastic Process of Alliance Formation Behavior," The American 
Political Science Review 72 (1978); Patrick J McGowan and Robert M Rood, "Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power 
Systems: Applying a Poisson Model to Nineteenth-Century Europe," ibid.69, no. 3 (1975); Manus I Midlarsky, 
"Equilibria in the Nineteenth-Century Balance-of-Power System," American Journal of Political Science  (1981); 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and J David Singer, "Alliances, Capabilities, and War: A Review and Synthesis," Political 
science annual: An international review 4 (1973).  




that the balance of threat theory offers a better explanation of the origins of alliances and the 
alignment strategies of both great powers and small states.  Walt argues that states make balancing 
alliances against those states that they perceive as threatening.4 Simply put, states form alliances 
against external threats. Without stipulating how domestic politics and  how unit level variables 
affect leaders’ perception of threat (which Walt’s theory does not provide), perceived external 
threats is an imprecise predictor of states’ alignment choices since the concept is malleable and 
can be manipulated to fit any foreign policy choices.5 Leaders’ perception of threat can be shaped 
by domestic politics and foreign threats can be perceived as threats to the survival of the 
government and its leaders rather than to the state.6  Various domestic political factors, thus, have 
important effects on leaders’ alignment decisions.7 The balance of threat theory’s heavy reliance 
                                                          
4The degree to which a state threatens others is the product of its aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive 
capability, and aggressive intentions. Walt, The Origins of Alliance; "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World 
Power," International Security 9, no. 4 (1985); "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest 
Asia," International Organization  (1988); "Alliances, Threats, and Us Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufmann and 
Labs," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (1992); "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing Us Grand Strategy," 
International Security 14, no. 1 (1989); "Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold 
War Competition," in Dominoes and Bandwagons, ed. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (Oxford University Press, 1991). 
5 As Walt (1988) noted: “Alliance choices are based on subjective assessments: it is the actors' perceptions of threat 
that count, not the analyst’s ‘objective’ evaluation . . . different states will view potential allies and adversaries in 
different ways.” Leaders often manipulate threat perception to serve their own interests. See Fareed Zakaria, From 
Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton University Press, 1999). An interesting 
issue is that when the balance of threat theory is applied to small states’ alignment choices, the theory cannot be 
falsified. In explaining the alliance patterns of small states, Walt suggests that weak states are more likely to 
bandwagon with an aggressive and powerful great power than balance against it. Thus, if a small state bandwagons, 
balance of threat theory will explain the state’s alignment choice. If a small state balances, the theory explains this 
strategy too since it should be the state’s first choice. Or if a small state’s alliance cannot be categorized as either 
balancing or bandwagoning, Walt can categorized such alliances as “regional balancing.” According to Walt, “what 
might at first glance appear to be bandwagoning, may actually be a specific form of balancing, where the threat to be 
countered is a neighboring power or some other local problem.” See Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World."; Taming 
American Power: The Global Response to American Primacy (New York: Norton, 2005). Thus, it appears that the 
theory explains all alliance strategies and contingencies of small states. See Elman. 
6 For example, Afghanistan under the Taliban rule perceived Pakistan as an ally but India and Iran as threatening since 
these two states supported anti-Taliban forces. These perceptions, however, reversed once anti-Taliban forces came 
to power in 2001. 
7States often react differently to similar systemic pressures and their responses may be more motivated by domestic 
politics than systemic factors. See Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World 
politics 51 (1998); Randall L Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism," in Progress in International 
Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003); 
"Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (1994).  




on a sharp dichotomy between “balancing” (challenging the threat) and “bandwagoning” 
(capitulating to the threat) and its focus on external threats as the primary cause of external 
alignment tend to marginalize states’ myriad motives for alliance formation. The paradigm of 
balancing and bandwagoning misses more important dynamics in small states: domestic political 
instability, the urgency of state building8, and how the leaders’ external alignment choices may be 
driven by the desire to augment their political survival in perilous domestic political environments.   
 A domestic politics oriented approach to alliance formation has produced a number of 
strands in the literature. Some recent studies emphasize the effects of domestic political coalitions9, 
foreign economic ties,10 and regime type11 on alignment policies. One variant of domestic politics 
explanation of alliance formation has emphasized external alliances as a tool for ruling 
elites/leaders political survival.12 Steven David’s (1991) theory of “omnibalancing” explains 
alignments in Third World states as a result of the leaders’ need to counter various internal and 
                                                          
8 Mohammed Ayoob, "The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains?," 
International Studies Quarterly  (1989); The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and 
the International System (L. Rienner Publishers, 1995); "The Security Problematic of the Third World," World Politics 
43, no. 2 (1991); "Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn?," International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944-) 60, no. 1 (1983). 
9 Kevin Narizny, "The Political Economy of Alignment: Great Britain's Commitments to Europe, 1905-39," 
International Security 27, no. 4 (2003); The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Cornell University Press, 2007); 
"Both Guns and Butter, or Neither: Class Interests in the Political Economy of Rearmament," American Political 
Science Review 97, no. 02 (2003). 
10 Paul A Papayoanou, "Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power: Britain, Germany, and World War 
I," International Security 20, no. 4 (1996); Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, Balancing, and War (University 
of Michigan Press, 1999); "Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power," International Studies Quarterly 
41, no. 1 (1997). 
11 Some suggest that democracies are biased toward allying with each other. See Randolph M Siverson and Juliann 
Emmons, "Birds of a Feather Democratic Political Systems and Alliance Choices in the Twentieth Century," Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 2 (1991); William R Thompson and Richard Tucker, "A Tale of Two Democratic Peace 
Critiques," ibid.41, no. 3 (1997); Henry S Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Common Interests or Common Polities? 
Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace," Journal of Politics 59 (1997). Alliance scholars, however, are divided on the 
idea that democracies are more likely to make alliances with other democracies. For opposing views, see Brian Lai 
and Dan Reiter, "Democracy, Political Similarity, and International Alliances, 1816-1992," Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 44, no. 2 (2000). Michael W Simon and Erik Gartzke, "Political System Similarity and the Choice of Allies 
Do Democracies Flock Together, or Do Opposites Attract?," ibid.40, no. 4 (1996). 
12 See Deborah; David, "Explaining Third World Alignment."; "Why the Third World Still Matters."; Choosing Sides: 
Alignment and Realignment in the Third World; Levy and Barnett; Barnett and Levy. 




external threats to their political survival. David argues that the most powerful determinant of 
Third World alignment behavior is the rational calculation of the leaders as to which outside power 
is most likely to do what is necessary to keep them in power. David, however, did not specify what 
outside powers do to keep Third World leaders in power (“do what is necessary” is vague and fails 
to specify  the role of great powers in protecting small state leaders from various threats). As for 
side payments, David downplays its role in the alignment decisions of Third World leaders.13 
There is a well-established literature on the use of foreign aid as a foreign policy tool. The 
use of foreign economic policies to achieve foreign policy objectives is a common practice of 
“statecraft.”14 Foreign aid is often seen as a tool or means of increasing the security of the donor 
country.15 A number of studies support the view that bilateral aid donors are driven by their own 
interests rather than altruism.16 Most bilateral donors place little importance on recipient merit, 
such as a certain level of poverty.17 Some studies provide evidence that foreign aid is used as an 
inducement to alter a country’s votes in the United Nations.18  Thus, there are numerous studies to 
                                                          
13 See David, "Explaining Third World Alignment." 
14 Baldwin; Liska, The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy; Taffet. 
15 Hans Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," The American Political Science Review 56, no. 2 (1962); 
Liska, The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy; de Mesquita and Smith, "A Political Economy 
of Aid."; "Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions." 
16 Robert D McKinlay, "The Aid Relationship a Foreign Policy Model and Interpretation of the Distributions of 
Official Bilateral Economic Aid of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, 1960–1970," 
Comparative Political Studies 11, no. 4 (1979); James H Lebovic, "National Interests and Us Foreign Aid: The Carter 
and Reagan Years," Journal of Peace Research 25, no. 2 (1988); Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, "Who Gives 
Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," Journal of economic growth 5, no. 1 (2000); Alfred Maizels and Machiko K 
Nissanke, "Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries," World Development 12, no. 9 (1984); Peter J Schraeder, 
Steven W Hook, and Bruce Taylor, "Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle," World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998); Kul B Rai, 
"Foreign Aid and Voting in the Un General Assembly, 1967—1976," Journal of Peace Research 17, no. 3 (1980); 
Patricia L Sullivan, Brock F Tessman, and Xiaojun Li, "Us Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation," Foreign 
Policy Analysis 7, no. 3 (2011); Robert S Walters, American and Soviet Aid: A Comparative Analysis (University of 
Pittsburgh Pre, 1970). 
17 Alesina and Dollar; Anke Hoeffler and Verity Outram, "Need, Merit, or Self Interest—What Determines the 
Allocation of Aid?," Review of Development Economics 15, no. 2 (2011). 
18 Ilyana Kuziemko and Eric Werker, "How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery 
at the United Nations," Journal of Political Economy 114, no. 5 (2006); Te-Yu Wang, "Us Foreign Aid and Un Voting: 
An Analysis of Important Issues," International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (1999); Rai. 




support the view that states use foreign aid as a tool of inducement to change the recipients’ 
behavior.   
In the alliance literature, however, the role of foreign aid as side payments is considered 
unimportant and hence largely unexplored.19 For example, Walt (1987) claims that because 
common threat is the predominant source of alliance formation, foreign aid has no or little impact 
on alliance formation. He notes that “when evaluating the importance of economic and military 
assistance on alliances, we should consider the degree to which such assistance has powerful 
independent effects on the recipient’s conduct and the considerations that will increase the 
influence that aid brings . . .”20  Walt concludes that aid is a form of alliance cooperation rather 
than a source of it.21 But there are at least three reasons to question this conclusion. First, great 
powers and small states may not share the same enemies or the same threats; they are less likely 
to perceive a threat with the same magnitude and severity. Second, if resource strapped small states 
can extract economic and military resources from great powers, they have incentives to exploit 
great power rivalries by playing one great power against the other. Walt’s conclusion disregards 
the possibility of bargaining between asymmetric powers that may result in the transaction of aid 
in exchange for policy concessions in alliance relations. Third, empirical evidence, particularly the 
asymmetric alliances formed during the Cold War, provides plenty of examples where aid was a 
                                                          
19 Christina Davis looks at the role of side payments in the alliance between Great Britain and Japan in the early 
twentieth century. However, her argument is less pertinent to asymmetric alliances. Davis argues that high strategic 
value for an alliance and leadership autonomy create incentives for great powers to offer side payments. However, 
growing economic competition between allies and legislative involvement in the decision making process generate 
demands from domestic actors to use the alliance for bargaining leverage on economic policy. Unless small states are 
able to monopolize the supply of certain goods, they may not have enough market power to compete with developed 
great powers and thus, Davis’s point about intra-alliance economic competition is less of an issue in asymmetric 
alliances. Small states are rarely in a position to compete against great power in the international market. Moreover, 
Davis’s formulation does not articulate the role and importance of side payments in alliances between great powers 
and small states. See Davis. 
20 Walt, The Origins of Alliance.pp. 40-41 
21 Ibid., p. 42  




crucial motivation behind small states’ alignment decisions with one great power or the other. 
These observations, then, raise two empirical questions: in the absence of common interests, what 
motivates small states to seek alliances with great powers? In the absence of side payments, would 
small states in the Third World have formed alliances with the superpowers during the Cold War?    
The few studies that focus on small state alignments22 have paid little attention to the 
conditions under which side payments may be offered and their role in the formation of alliances. 
One exception to this is Barnett and Levy’s (1991) study of Egypt’s external alignment which 
argues that Third World leaders may form alliances with powerful states to secure external 
resources.23 They posit that leaders in Third World countries face the trade-off between external 
alliance formation and internal resource mobilization. While internal resource mobilization may 
be difficult within a threatened state, alliance formation can bring a rapid infusion of funds and 
other resources, including military expertise and equipment. Given resource constraints, political 
leaders often try to secure material resources through external alliance formation rather than 
through costly internal extraction. Although this study is in agreement with Barnett and Levy’s 
argument that leaders’ domestic political needs motivate them to seek external alignments as a 
means to get access to external resources, it adds that a great power’s willingness to provide side 
payments to a small state is an outcome of a strategic trade-off where each party is expected to 
receive different benefits from an alliance. 
                                                          
22 Rothstein; George Liska, Alliances and the Third World (Johns Hopkins Press Baltimore, 1968); David, Choosing 
Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World; Walt, The Origins of Alliance; "Testing Theories of Alliance 
Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia." 
23 Michael N Barnett and Jack S Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-
73," ibid.45, no. 3 (1991). 




One branch of the literature focuses on the trade-offs inherent in alliances.24 In this 
literature, Morrow’s (1991) seminal work on asymmetric alliances provides a useful theoretical 
framework for the current research. According to Morrow, the attraction of an alliance depends on 
the autonomy and security that each party can provide and the value each party attaches to those 
goals. In an asymmetric alliance, the weaker side offers concessions, such as military bases or 
changes in foreign policies that can increase a stronger ally’s freedom of action (autonomy) in 
exchange for its gains in security from the great power. In this autonomy-security trade-off 
approach, since parties derive their benefits from different interests, they strike a more stable 
bargain of interests than those in symmetric alliances. Although shifts in either ally’s utility 
function, shaped by changes in ally’s relative capabilities, can alter the duration of the alliance, 25 
changes in the small state’s capabilities will not greatly affect the nature of the trade-off in an 
asymmetric alliance. Because the small state provides autonomy to the great power in exchange 
for security, its contribution to the alliance is unaffected by changes in its capabilities. Thus, 
Morrow concludes that asymmetric alliances are less likely to break because of changes in minor 
powers’ capabilities and tend to last longer than symmetric alliances.26 Asymmetric alliances are 
                                                          
24 Michael F Altfeld, "The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test," The Western Political Quarterly  (1984); John AC 
Conybeare, "Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas and the International Political Economy," International Studies 
Quarterly 28, no. 1 (1984); "A Portfolio Diversification Model of Alliances the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 
1879-1914," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 1 (1992); "Arms Versus Alliances the Capital Structure of Military 
Enterprise," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (1994); "The Portfolio Benefits of Free Riding in Military 
Alliances," International Studies Quarterly  (1994); Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the 
Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances."; "When Do “Relative Gains” Impede Trade?," Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 41, no. 1 (1997); Gerald L Sorokin, "Arms, Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries," 
International Studies Quarterly  (1994). 
25As one ally grows in power, its ability to provide for its own security increases. As a result, the state will demand 
additional autonomy from its ally. These changes in relative power capabilities make breaking the alliance more 
attractive. Decline in a nation’s capabilities will lead to a demand for renegotiation of the alliance terms as well: the 
partner with constant capability will demand additional autonomy in return for an increased in security for the 
declining ally. See  Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of 
Alliances." 
26 Midlarsky’s findings suggest that alliances with great differences in capabilities last longer than those with small 
differences. See Manus I Midlarsky, The Onset of World War (Unwin Hyman Boston, 1988). Pp. 158-68 




more likely than symmetric alliances to continue to provide net benefits to their members. This 
view is contrary to the capability aggregation model which suggests that alliances would  be 
terminated when external security threats decline or when allies no longer provide the necessary 
capabilities to one another.27  
In addition to the capability aggregation model and the autonomy-security trade-off 
approach, some research look at domestic changes as a predictor of alliance duration and 
maintenance. Some scholars argue that regime change alters a state’s utilities for alliances and 
consequently lead to changes in alliance policies.28 Regime types and domestic political 
institutions have been pointed out as an important factor that affect whether leadership changes 
lead to changes in alliance policies and other international commitments made by previous leaders. 
Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004) have argued that due to frequent turnover in "winning coalitions," 
democracies tend to be unreliable allies.29 On the other hand, some scholars have noted that 
leadership changes in democracies are less likely to lead to changes in the state’s international 
commitments and alliance policies than in other types of regimes.30 Because democratic leaders 
face institutional constraints, policy consistency amid domestic political changes is expected in 
democratic polities.31 Due to the costs associated with changing course, abrupt policy change is 
                                                          
27 Morton A Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (ecpr Press, 2005); Morgenthau, Politics among 
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace; Walt, The Origins of Alliance; Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
28 Randolph M Siverson and Harvey Starr, "Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances," American Journal 
of Political Science  (1994). 
29 Erik Gartzke and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies," ibid.48, 
no. 4 (2004). 
30 Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," International Organization 
50 (1996); Brett Ashley Leeds, "Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International 
Cooperation," American Journal of Political Science  (1999); Charles Lipson, Reliable Partners: How Democracies 
Have Made a Separate Peace (Princeton University Press, 2003); Lisa L Martin, Democratic Commitments: 
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less likely and democracies are perceived as credible actors by other states.32 Thus, alliances 
involving democratic states tend to have a long duration. 
Morrow’s theoretical formulation and Barnett-Levy’s empirical findings provide a 
foundation for the current research. However, Morrow does not delve into the details of the 
mechanisms needed to strike a deal that trades autonomy for security or security for autonomy. 
His formulation does not stipulate beyond an abstract theoretical formulation as to how the 
autonomy-security trade would come to fruition. Barnett and Levy’s argument has not been 
applied beyond one case and thus we do not know how generalizable it is across cases. Although 
the current research agrees with David’s argument that domestic political survival motivates small 
state leaders to form alliances with great powers, his “Omnibalancing” theory does not stipulate 
the means by which great powers help leaders in small states to stay in power.  The current research 
intends to fill these gaps. The next section lays out and explains the components of the trade-off 
theory.   
A Trade-off Theory of Asymmetric Alliances 
I. Formation 
I offer an explanation of asymmetric alliances based on a leader’s domestic political 
survival perspective. I will frame the argument using Selectorate theory,33 which posit that leaders’ 
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survival in office depends on two domestic political institutions:  the selectorate (the set of people 
with a potential say in who is to be leader; it is the pool of individuals from which a leader draws 
supporters to form a winning coalition) and the winning coalition. The size of both the winning 
coalition and the selectorate can vary widely across political systems.34  In order to stay in power, 
incumbent leaders must maintain the support of their winning coalition by allocating the state’s 
available resources between private goods and public goods.35 Political institutions—the 
selectorate and the winning coalition — determine the types of goods leaders need to provide: 
when coalition size is small, leaders can most efficiently maintain the loyalty of their supporters 
by providing them with private goods. However, as coalition size increases, rewarding supporters 
with private goods become too expensive and so leaders allocate resources increasingly toward 
public goods.36 I use these insights from the selectorate theory and argue that in the face of various 
forms of threats to their political survival, small state leaders form asymmetric alliances with great 
powers. Side payments serve as a powerful incentive for small state leaders to form such alliances. 
 
A) DIVERGENT INTERESTS AND ALLIANCE STRATEGIES 
States may form an alliance despite having different interests in the alignment. A great power and 
a small state may seek to achieve different objectives from an asymmetric alliance. As we will see 
in the following pages, divergent interests in the alignment between unequal powers are often a 
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result of the disparity in their power capabilities.  Having divergent interests between prospective 
allies have major implications for alliance negotiations since the degree of interest divergence 
determines the amount of side payments needed to cement the alliance.  
i) Small States: Domestic Political Imperatives 
INTERNAL INSECURITY AND LEADER SURVIVAL: Prominent theories of alliance 
formation posit that security against external threats is a primary determinant of small states’ 
alignment choices. This argument presupposes a standard notion of security that may not be useful 
in the context of Third World states. The concept of security has been used in external or outward-
directed terms and assumes that a) threats to a state's security primarily arise from outside its 
borders; and b) that these threats are primarily military in nature and usually need a military 
response if the security of the target state is to be preserved. The concept, in short, has been defined 
to mean immunity (to varying degrees) of a state to threats emanating from outside its boundaries.37 
However, the meaning of security in small states in the Third World is different from the concept’s 
traditional meaning in the advanced industrialized Great Powers.38  
Third World states, like any other states, face both internal and external threats. However, 
a consequence of the historical development of the state structures in the Third World is such that 
even when a threat is external in origin, it often becomes enmeshed with internal security problems. 
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This intertwined nature of internal and external security threats is often a function of arbitrarily 
drawn state boundaries by colonial powers that have divided ethno-linguistic or ethno-religious 
groups across several states. It is not surprising, then, that many interstate conflicts in the Third 
World become enmeshed with secessionist challenges to individual states. Thus, in Third world 
countries, as Ayoob argues, the relationship between internal and external factors is “symbiotic in 
character in the sense that one set of factors cannot thrive without the presence of the other and 
vice versa.”39 The intertwined nature of internal and external sources of threat in Third World 
states, particularly threats to the regime and ruling elites, is often heavily weighted in favor of 
internal sources. External threats often augment the preexisting problems of insecurity within state 
boundaries.40 In some cases, survival-driven leaders in small states may manipulate perceived 
threats to their power as threats to national security that require drastic action. By turning a political 
(and often a social and economic) problem into a military one, leaders may confront domestic 
dissidents with military means in the name of national security.  
 In Third World countries, and indeed elsewhere as well, the perception of insecurity may 
emanate largely from within their boundaries rather than from outside—it is often from domestic 
forces that might try to change the distribution of power in the state.41 The neorealist emphasis on 
external security may be important for the territorial integrity of the state, but this does not 
necessarily mean that states, even weaker states, face external threats to their very existence as 
often as they face such threats internally. Rather, the stability and survival of governments, 
                                                          
39 Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System. Ch. 
3 
40 "Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn?." 
41 Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Wheatsheaf 
Books Brighton, 1983); Edward E Azar and Chung-in Moon, National Security in the Third World: The Management 
of Internal and External Threats (Univ of Maryland Center for Intl, 1988). 




especially (though not exclusively) in Third World states has become increasingly problematic.42 
For many Third World states the sharp boundary between domestic “order” and international 
“anarchy”, as emphasized by the neorealist tradition, may exist in reverse order. It is the 
hierarchical structure of the world that shapes the external behavior of Third World states, and a 
condition of unsettled rules that afflicts them in domestic settings.43 In a world of internal security 
threats the question of who controls state power is crucial.44 The notion of security, in other words, 
is always relative to particular interests and groups that control the decision-making apparatuses 
of the state.45 Contrary to a standard definition of security (the protection and preservation of core 
values), in  many Third World states the term implies the preservation of the regime and its core 
values, which may be at variance with the core values cherished by large segments of the 
population.46 It is often regime security and leaders’ political survival rather than the security of 
the state that is at the core of what constitutes security in many Third World countries. It is in this 
context that one cannot rely exclusively on the external environment as a primary source of threats 
in Third World states.  
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Moreover, economic crises and severe resource constraints can also be a threat to a leader’s 
political survival.47 The degree to which poor economic conditions threaten leaders may depend 
on political institutions. In small coalition systems, dire economic conditions mean the leaders are 
unable to provide private goods to their supporters; whereas in large coalition systems, such 
conditions tend to create wide public discontent with their economic welfare and provide 
incentives to change the incumbent leaders in the next election. One scholar argues that budgetary 
constraints are a powerful determinant of small states’ alignment strategies which may bring some 
much needed external resources to a leader’s coffers.48 In sum, leaders’ political survival in 
perilous domestic political environments is an important part of how regimes in Third World states 
perceive security and how they calculate their survival strategies. Alexander Wendt and Michael 
Barnett note that for the ruling elites--lacking domestic legitimacy to gain support against internal 
security threats--in the Third World, the external environment, rather than being a source of threat, 
may become a source of opportunities for them.49 Forming alliances with great powers is one such 
opportunity that may help small states leaders to deflect threats to their political power.   
 ALLIANCES AS A FOREIGN POLICY TOOL: Leaders need military and defense 
capabilities, including an internal security apparatus, that are strong enough to face a multitude of 
security challenges. Having a strong military and security apparatus depends on a leader’s ability 
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to mobilize and extract resources from the society. Leaders can mobilize resources by controlling 
economic activities and by reallocating resources through centralized planning, the nationalization 
of key industries, and other means. To finance security and defense related expenditures leaders 
need to extract resources from society by taxing and expropriating social resources.50 Extraction, 
however, entails costs. It may create discontent from affected social groups; it diminishes the 
present and future wealth of the society. Extraction in the form of taxes is dangerous when taxes 
are visible, costly, and may be perceived to be illegitimate.51 Because resources are limited, leaders 
face a trade-off: spending resources on national security (military expenditures by extracting 
resources from the society) and domestic consumptions. Given a budget constraint, as surely 
always exists, the more a leader spends on national security, the less he has to devote to domestic 
consumption. The leader, then, needs to find an efficient and effective balance between “guns and 
butter.”52  
  How a leader maintains the balance in resource distribution and amend the distributional 
dilemma depends on the domestic political institutions. In this regard, the selectorate theory 
explanation is relevant. According to the theory, when the winning coalition is large, the leader 
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needs to provide public goods efficiently in order to satisfy his winning coalition and be reelected. 
Since public goods, which benefit everyone in the population, require more efficient public policy, 
large coalition leaders need to react to domestic demands.53 Such leaders have to provide effective 
amounts of both security and domestic consumption to the large winning coalition.54 In contrast, 
the smaller the winning coalition and the larger the selectorate, the easier it is for leaders to survive 
by providing private goods to their key supporters.55 In such polities (typical of most autocracies) 
leaders maintain their hold on power by keeping the members of small winning coalition loyal. 
Private goods benefit only a few key supporters as opposed to public goods which benefit the 
society in general.  The model shows that large coalition leaders distribute resources primarily in 
the form of public goods, while small coalition leaders pursue policies that enable them to provide 
private benefits to the key supporters.56 For a resource strapped small state leader, resource 
extraction from the society for security and defense related spending at the expense of domestic 
consumption might be a difficult trade-off to make since such spending on security could otherwise 
be spent on public or private goods. In addition, various methods of resource extraction (such as 
taxation) may be especially risky for a small coalition leader because they will hurt the economic 
interests of the dominant and wealthy classes, who are often an important part of the leader’s 
winning coalition. An alternative source of resources, such as an alliance with a great power might 
be an enticing choice for a small state leader since it could help the leader to ameliorate the 
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dilemma in resource distribution and could allow the leader to ease the tax burden on his (often 
wealthy) supporters.57      
Thus, for small state leaders, domestic political factors and their calculus for political 
survival can play a crucial role in alignment choices. When faced with a threat to their political 
survival, leaders must decide whether to deal with the threat by internal means which involves 
extraction of scarce societal resources or by external means by forging an alliance with a state 
capable enough to supply resources that satisfy their needs. Given that domestic extraction is costly 
for leaders, as discussed above, forming alliances is an attractive option that will help leaders to 
rely less on expensive extraction from the society and to alleviate risky guns-and-butter trade-off 
in domestic distribution of resources.   
ii) Great Powers: Sphere of Influence and Freedom of Action in the Third World 
In general, a great power’s grand strategy, defined as the means by which a state plans to 
use force or the threat of force to achieve political ends58, conveys the importance of security and 
how it will fare militarily against other great powers.59 Scholars disagree about the extent of great 
powers’ strategic interests in the peripheral regions. Some argue that great powers have strategic 
interests throughout most of the Third World; a great power should actively promote sympathetic 
regimes in the Third World and oppose those that align with its adversaries.60 Neorealist scholars, 
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however, contend that Third World countries have little strategic importance for great powers 
because these countries do not materially affect the balance of power. According to this view, the 
key determinants of national power reside within the industrialized regions of the developed 
world.61 Neorealists argue that extensive Third World involvement leads great powers such as the 
United States to divert scarce military resources from more important areas.62 Therefore, Neo-
realist scholars advise great powers against entanglement in the Third World. 
This neorealist view disregards the complexities and intertwined nature of various elements 
of a great power’s security interests. The proponents make a simplistic distinction among various 
regions of the world. For example, two prominent neorealist scholars suggest that the United States 
has a strategic interest in certain areas, such as the homeland, Western Europe, Northeast Asia, 
and the Persian Gulf.63 Their determinations of U.S. strategic interests, according to Michael 
Desch, are made exclusively in terms of intrinsic value, so they conclude that the rest of the world, 
and especially the Third World, has very little strategic importance to the United States. Desch 
argues that great powers must allocate their military resources to protect those areas with direct 
extrinsic or intrinsic value.64  
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Desch’s formulation raises an important question: where does one demarcate between 
interests with intrinsic and extrinsic value? In other word, where should one draw the line? If a 
great power has interest with intrinsic value in state A and extrinsic value in state B, one can argue 
that states close to B, such as C, D, E (and so on) are also important for the protection of B. 
According to this line of reasoning, then, a great power may have strategic interests in a large 
number of states. The Great Game in the nineteenth century between Great Britain and Russia over 
the control of central Asia demonstrates the difficulty of making a clear distinction between 
intrinsic and extrinsic interests in the periphery. This difficulty was also apparent in the early stage 
of the Cold War. As the Soviet Union rolled out its “economic offensive” in the Third World in 
the early 1950s, the United States responded accordingly. Historian Robert McMahon notes that: 
“Soviet diplomatic victories anywhere . . . . even in territories lacking significant intrinsic value, 
could spark dangerous bandwagon and domino effects that could bring down the whole delicately 
stacked deck of cards. The United States, consequently, had no choice but to compete with the 
Soviet Union everywhere that the Soviets chose to invest their time and resources.”65 Thus, for a 
great power seeking to protect and secure its strategic interests abroad by protecting its intrinsic 
and extrinsic interests, it may be shortsighted to focus only on some states or regions and forgo 
others.     
 Great powers form asymmetric alliances with small states to pursue their strategic 
interests. Great powers, by virtue of their economic and military capabilities, have interests with 
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global scope and have more extensive foreign policy objectives than do weak and small states. 
Competing great powers establish their spheres of influence in the periphery to preserve their 
geopolitical interests. To this end, having access to military and naval bases or other defense 
infrastructures in the periphery can become a strategic asset for great powers. The geographic 
locations of some small states may make them attractive partners to great powers and make the 
formation of asymmetric alliances more likely. In some cases a great power may become 
dependent on a small state because of its geo-strategic position which makes it indispensable for 
carrying out military operations or protecting strategic interests in the surrounding region. A small 
state that is adjacent to a conflict in which the great power has a stake in the outcome, for instance, 
can become an attractive ally, at least in the short run, for the great power.  The current alliance 
between Pakistan and the United States can be cited here as an example. Despite many ups and 
downs in the relationship, Pakistan’s geographic proximity to Afghanistan makes Pakistan an 
important ally for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Since great powers possess more 
capabilities and interests, they may need a high degree of autonomy or freedom of action to protect 
these interests abroad. Forming alliances in the periphery allows them to acquire such freedom of 
action. 
 A Summary:  Prospective allies do not necessarily share identical interests. But it is 
generally understood that alliances are more likely to form when the members have substantive 
interests in common. The more fully interests are shared, the greater the net value of an alliance 
(surplus of benefits over costs). When interests are divergent, the costs are higher than in alliances 
with shared interests since neither ally promises to do much more than it would do anyway.66 As 
the previous analysis shows, great powers and small states can have incentives to form alliances 
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for different reasons, not necessarily driven by a mutual interest in deterring a common enemy. 
Divergent motivations for forming an alliance between great powers and small states are often 
caused by the disparity in their power capabilities. Whereas a great power may use the alliance as 
a tool for power projection, a small state leader may seek an alliance with a great power that will 
allow him to gain access to external resources and will enhance his chances of political survival. 
 
B) BARGAINING AND SIDE PAYMENTS 
Although forming alliances with great powers can offer attractive benefits to small state 
leaders, such alliances entail domestic political costs. In general, alliances involve potential costs 
in terms of security and autonomy. The risks include abandonment by an ally that fails to fulfill its 
commitment, entrapment in a war involving the ally's interests rather than one's own, and a general 
loss of autonomy.67 A loss of autonomy has an important domestic politics dimension. Extensive 
alignment concessions can involve substantial domestic political costs to a leader, particularly if 
these concessions involve the presence of foreign troops, granting military bases, territorial access 
to the powerful ally or other concessions that are perceived as infringements on the sovereign 
independence of the state. The costs of such concessions may be higher for Third World states 
with a history of colonialism and external dependence that invokes popular sensitivity toward any 
symbol of external domination, and for leaders with tenuous claims to domestic authority.68 Thus, 
for a small state leader, the costs of losing some degree of autonomy compounded by the leader’s 
vulnerability in domestic politics must be offset by the gains from an alliance with a great power.   
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During the bargaining phase, according to Morrow’s formulation, parties exchange 
security and autonomy to form an asymmetric alliance: the small state gains in security and the 
great power gains in autonomy. I argue here that this trade-off alone leaves a deficit in benefits for 
the small state. The deficit may arise when parties do not share a common threat or common 
interests in forming the alliance. Because the parties may have divergent interests, the trade-off 
alone is likely to leave a deficit in security benefits for the small state. The small state’s gain in 
security may not offset its loss in autonomy. If the prospective allies have divergent interests and 
do not share a common threat, then the small state’s security gain from the trade-off may be vague 
at best. The great power’s autonomy gain, however, may be immediate: by joining the alliance, 
the small state sends a signal internationally about its alliance preference (and by implication, the 
alignment denies the competing great powers’ access to the small state), or the small state may 
grant the great power access to its strategic bases. In the absence of tangible gains, the alliance 
might be risky for the small state leader: domestically, the leader may endanger his political 
survival (the key supporters or the winning coalition may turn against him for striking such a deal); 
internationally, the state limits its options to pursue other alternatives (i.e. nonalignment, alignment 
with other great powers, etc.) and thus, the alliance may entail large opportunity costs for the small 
state. Side payments fill the deficit in benefits for the small state and improve the net gain from 
the alliance. Side payments, thus, provide a compensation mechanism and a positive inducement 
that increases the net value of the alignment for the small state leader. Since having divergent 
interests open the room for bargaining, a logical inference can be made, then, that all else equal, 




the higher the interest divergence between prospective allies, the higher the likelihood of using 
side payments in asymmetric alliances.69    
   Properly calibrated side payments make the security-autonomy trades and the formation 
of asymmetric alliances mutually beneficial. A great power’s gain in autonomy helps it to secure 
and protect its strategic interests; side payments compensate a small state leader for the deficit in 
benefits from alignment and enhance the leader’s ability to stay in power. Side payments as a 
policy tool is not new. Throughout history, states have used side payments to influence other states’ 
policies and to attract allies. Historians have noted Louis XVI purchase of English neutrality during 
his campaign for hegemony in Europe by providing subsidies to England70; during World War I, 
Britain and France provided gold subsidies and made pledges of territorial gains to various Arab 
leaders in order to obtain their support71; France’s loans to Russia were a contributing factor in the 
formation of the Franco-Russian alliance of 1882.72 Robert Harkavy points out the importance of 
various forms of military and economic aid in great powers’ acquisition of bases in the periphery 
after World War II. The aid-for-base bargain between great powers and Third World countries was 
part of the alliance agreements.73       
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small state leader who has a large winning coalition may demand a high price for autonomy concession that the great 
power may find too costly. The great power then may want to find less costly alternatives. On the other hand, for a 
small state leader who has a small winning coalition, the size and volume of side payments will depend on the state’s 
resource constraints. For a leader facing sever resource shortage, the marginal utility of additional resources, in this 
case side payments, will be higher than it is for a leader who is less constrained by resource shortage. 
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Side payments serve many important purposes for a small state leader. By forming 
alliances with great powers the leader can gain much needed resources which can be used for 
buying the loyalty of the leader’s core supporters as well as for internal and external security 
purposes.74  For a resource-strapped state, supporting a military and defense establishment 
adequately to deal with various forms of threats can put a heavy burden on the society and 
exacerbate the distributional dilemma (guns and butter trade-off). Even if a country does have the 
necessary resources, extracting them for military expenditures can lessen the ability of the leader 
to maintain political support by diverting resources that might otherwise be used to distribute 
financial rewards and privileges to his winning coalition members.75 For the leader, then, having 
access to external resources is an enticing option. The leader has incentives to enlist great powers’ 
help in the form of economic or military aid to quell domestic oppositions, to keep key supporters 
loyal, and to repel threatening forces from neighboring states. Political instability that poses threats 
to leaders’ political survival makes the infusion of external resources even more urgent. This is 
particularly relevant to small state leaders who rely on a small winning coalition. In politically 
unstable small coalition polities, leaders urgently need military equipment and other resources to 
strengthen their domestic security apparatus to quell domestic opposition and buy political loyalty 
in order to stay in power.  
The amount of side payments a small state leader needs as a compensation for his policy 
concessions depend on political institutions and constraints the leader faces to his political 
survival. Political institutions affect the bargains leaders are willing to make. I hypothesize that 
the amount of side payments needed to compensate for policy concessions is likely to be smaller 
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for small coalition leaders than it is for large coalition leaders. This is not because small coalition 
leaders demand smaller amounts, but because the type of political constraints they face and the 
type of goods they have to produce to stay in power.  
Since a small coalition leader relies on a small winning coalition, it is easier for him to 
satisfy the coalition members than it is for their large coalition counterparts. The usage of side 
payments as external resources is dictated by the recipient leaders’ survival strategies. As resources 
are often fungible, side payments in the form of loans, grants, military aid, etc.76 can be used to 
enhance leaders’ ability to produce private goods. Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith’s (2007, 
2009) aid-for-policy model, in which donors give aid to recipient leaders in return for policy 
concessions,77 suggests that aid is more likely to help donors to achieve their objectives when 
leaders in the recipient states have discretion to divert aid to pay for the loyalty of their winning 
coalition members. In this view, aid is expected to flow to countries whose leaders are willing to 
back donors’ policies in exchange for aid sufficient to improve their political and economic welfare 
and enhance their prospect for political survival. Making autonomy concessions in exchange for 
side payments provides small coalition leaders with access to external resources that enables them 
to remain in office through rent seeking rather than by producing effective public policy. Side 
payments, however, improve the survival prospects of recipient leaders at the expense of their 
citizens who may dislike the concessions their leaders make.78 Those outside the winning coalition 
in the recipient state often are made worse off by the transaction of these side payments. In small 
coalition polities external resources disproportionately end up in the hands of the leader and her 
cronies in the form of private goods. The improvement in government-provided benefits aimed at 
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the winning coalition is unlikely to offset the welfare losses resulting from the concession to the 
donor for those outside the coalition. 79 Thus, all else equal, small coalition leaders may be able to 
afford to strike a deal with great powers as long as the deal provides a sufficient amount of side 
payments that they can utilize to improve their chances of political survival.  
A large coalition leader may require a large amount of side payments for policy 
concessions. The leader requires large amounts of resources to compensate the members of his 
large winning coalition for their losses in utility due to policy concessions. In general, large 
coalition leaders must allocate available resources to produce public goods that benefit general 
voters (the selectorate). Side payments are likely to be used for more inclusive purposes that tend 
to benefit a large section of the society. A large volume of side payments in large coalition polities 
may enhance the leaders’ ability to produce necessary public goods without imposing additional 
taxes (or other means of resource extraction) on their citizens. These side payments can increase 
investment in infrastructure, provide additional resources for social welfare programs, and ease 
the budgetary burdens of military expenditures. U.S. aid to Western Europe under the Marshall 
Plan is an example of such a success story. In sum, small coalition leaders may be able to afford 
to make policy concessions for a smaller amount of side payments than large coalition leaders can. 
This variation in the amount of side payments is a function of institutional constraints small state 
leaders face and the types of goods they have to produce to stay in power. 
 Thus, as side payments become part of the deal, the autonomy-security trade-off is 
mutually beneficial for the parties. The small state offers concessions (such as changes in its 
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internal policies or granting military bases that allow the projection of military forces) to the great 
power ally. In return, a great power can offer a potential ally an increase in security through an 
increased amount of side payments, such as military equipment, arms or other logistical support. 
The great power’s ability to influence its small state ally’s internal and external policies80 can 
produce autonomy benefits by realizing desired changes in the status quo and by freeing resources 
to pursue other goals. In sum, for the great power, the strategic value of the alliance justifies the 
cost of side payments; for the small state, gains involve both economic and strategic dimensions 
at the expense of some autonomy.81 Given that the great power is likely to be considerably 
wealthier than the small power, then the marginal cost of sacrificing some resources (side 
payments) to the small power is relatively a small cost for the great power and a large gain for the 
small, poorer power who values the marginal gain in external resources more highly. Hence, it is 
possible to find an appropriate compensation scheme since the utility gain from the side payment 
is large for the small power relative to the big power and so at a small utility cost to the great power 
a large utility deficit can be bought off for the small power when it grants a difficult policy 
concession. 
  Hypotheses  
Thus, taking domestic politics and leaders’ political survival perspectives into account I 
propose the following hypotheses about the formation of asymmetric alliances: 
1. Having divergent interests between a great power and a small state increases the 
likelihood that side payments will be used to cement the alliance.  
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2. All else equal, the amount of side payments needed to compensate for policy 
concessions is likely to be smaller for small coalition leaders than it is for large 
coalition leaders. 
3. All else equal, politically unstable small states are more likely to form asymmetric 
alliances than are politically stable small states.  
4. Threats to leaders’ political survival in small states increase the likelihood that 
they form asymmetric alliances.  
 
 
II. Cooperation and Discord  
 
Once an alliance is formed, the allies have to be concerned with the maintenance and 
management of the alliance. Some scholars have suggested that alliances may fail to achieve their 
stated objectives when they lack political cohesiveness or are riven by internal quarrels and 
disagreements. These strains in alliances are more likely to arise when states form alliances for 
different purposes and have divergent interests. When the objectives are incongruent or the parties 
do not a share a common enemy, serious problems of cooperation and coordination may arise that 
make the alliance more formal than real.82 When parties sometimes have divergent interests in 
asymmetric alliances, one should expect numerous ambiguities in alliance commitments, which in 
turn may cause frequent policy disagreements and open discord between the allies. Thus, 
asymmetric alliances need to be managed if the parties want to continue to receive the benefits 
from their alignments. During the maintenance phase of the alliance, the parties engage in a process 
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of bargaining to continue the flow of benefits from the alignment as well as to minimize one’s 
costs and risks associated with the alliance commitments.  
 From a small state’s perspective, the attractiveness of an asymmetric alliance depends on 
the continuous flow of side payments. Any drastic change in the flow of side payments, combined 
with available great power alternatives (to replace the existing one) encourages the small state to 
consider alternative alliances. If the alternative arrangement promises to offer more than the 
existing one, the small state will have an incentive to terminate the current alliance. Hence, ongoing 
side payments play an important role in maintaining intra-alliance cooperation. An asymmetric 
alliance is likely to be more durable when there are no drastic changes in the flow of side payments 
and small states do not have great power alternatives to replace the existing ally. We must consider 
the effects of domestic changes (regime and leadership change) in small states on the maintenance 
of asymmetric alliances. Drastic changes in domestic politics (e.g. changes that occur after a 
violent revolution) may alter the preferences of the ruling coalition such that the previous trade-
off and benefits from the alliance are no longer deemed attractive. A regime change that drastically 
alters the institutions of government and its personnel may lead to changes in the terms of alliance 
agreements and affects the continuity of the alliance.     
A) The Volume of Side payments 
 As in the formation phase, side payments play an important role in the maintenance phase 
of asymmetric alliances. The trade-off theory of asymmetric alliances suggests that as the degree 
of divergent interests varies, so does the magnitude of side payments a small state receives for its 
autonomy concessions. The small state is likely to receive a small amount of side payments when 
the allies have a low level of divergent interests.  Since parties already have a high degree of shared 




interests, large amounts of side payments are not needed. The great power can buy policy 
concessions from the small state for a cheaper price.  
 The formative period of the U.S.-Ethiopian alliance illustrates this point. In the early 1950s, 
the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie Mariam sought to capitalize on growing U.S. fear of Soviet 
expansion and requested American aid. The emperor sought an alliance with a great power, 
preferably with the United States, that would provide him with military and economic aid in order 
to deter various internal and external threats. Although the emperor had the Soviet Union as an 
alternative, he preferred the United States for some practical and political considerations. He feared 
that the semi-feudal nature of his empire would become a fertile ground for revolutionary 
propaganda often supported by the Soviet government. In addition, the Emperor’s desire to build 
a sophisticated Ethiopian army, he thought, would be possible quickly and efficiently with 
American help.  Despite the Emperor’s declared loyalty to the West,83  the United States viewed 
Ethiopia as a lower priority than other countries in the Middle East. In order to attract American 
interests, the Ethiopians offered the United States the use of Kagnew communications facility. An 
alliance agreement was signed in 1953. The amount of side payments was a contentious issue at 
the outset of the U.S.-Ethiopian alliance. Under the 1953 agreements Ethiopia received only about 
$5 million in military aid per year, which reflected Ethiopia’s lack of importance to the United 
States and a source of dissatisfaction for the emperor, whose bargaining power in Washington was 
limited during the early years of the alliance. The emperor’s domestic critics questioned Ethiopia’s 
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alliance with the United States. They pointed out that during 1956 the Soviet Union provided Egypt 
with $450 million in military aid; Syria and Yemen received Soviet arms worth $60 million and 
7.5 million respectively from Moscow. These states received large amounts of aid without granting 
bases to the Soviet Union. Ethiopia, on the other hand, despite its consistent support of U.S. foreign 
policy received a very small amount of aid from the United States.84 Thus, as the degree of 
divergent interests between the allies was very low, the Ethiopian leader’s ability to bargain for 
more side payments for his concessions on autonomy was limited.   
When the level of divergent interests is very high, two outcomes are possible. First, 
negotiations may fail and very little or no side payments are expected. As a result of a high degree 
of divergent interests, the great power may find the small state’s demands too expensive to obtain 
desired policy concessions. Second, if the great power considers the small state’s cooperation 
important to its foreign policy objectives, it may be willing to pay a higher price for the small 
state’s concessions. In this case, a successful negotiation is possible. For example, the United 
States was willing to pay large amounts of side payments for Pakistan’s cooperation in the War on 
Terror even though the countries had a high level of divergent interests in the war. When the level 
of divergent interests is in the medium range (neither very low nor very high), parties can bargain 
policy concessions in exchange for large amounts of side payments. In this case since prospective 
allies have at least some shared interests, they have incentives to strike a successful deal. 
Thus, I propose the following hypotheses concerning the volume of side payments small 
states are likely to receive for their concessions on autonomy: a) when the level of divergent 
interests is very low (that is, parties share a high level of mutual interests), small amounts of side 
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payments are necessary to maintain the alliance; b) when the level of divergent interests is very 
high, very large amounts of side payments (for a successful negotiation) or no side payments (for 
an unsuccessful negotiation) are expected; and c) when the level of divergent interests is medium 
(neither very low nor very high), parties can bargain policy concessions in exchange for large 
amounts of side payments. The figures bellow shows the hypothesized relations between the level 
of divergent internets and the expected amounts of side payments. 
 
 






B) Cooperation and Realignment     
Side payments offer a mechanism to compensate small states for granting autonomy 
concessions to great powers. In order for this arrangement to continue, a steady flow of side 
payments is necessary. Intra-alliance discord is expected when the parties have divergent interests. 
It has been argued that the task of alliance maintenance is easier and the risks associated with being 
in an alliance are less acute when members share a set of common objectives.85 Divergent interests 
among allies tend to make the alliance precarious and prone to disintegration. When parties have 
divergent interests and they want to achieve different objectives from an alliance, the alliance may 
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face a more pronounced alliance security dilemma.86 In addition, alliance cohesion and tightness 
is less likely in the absence of a common threat or a shared enemy.87 According to James Morrow 
(1994), alliance “tightness”—the degree of peacetime military coordination among the members 
of an alliance—involves greater peacetime costs, but it also increases the ability of the allies to 
fight together if a military conflict occurs. Morrow argues that a high degree of coordination 
requires tighter alliances, which in turn depends on how “deterrable” the threat is.88 Divergent 
interests and the absence of shared enemies between allies, however, should not be detrimental to 
the maintenance of asymmetric alliances. A steady flow of side payments to small states may 
overcome the strains between allies caused by divergent interests. 
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The level of benefits parties receive or expected to receive tends to vary from year to year. 
Intra-alliance bargaining will determine who will get what and how much. The outcome of this 
bargaining may depend on changing circumstances and the relative importance of goods parties 
willing to trade with each other. For example, the volume and size of side payments a small state 
receives will depend on the degree to which the great power ally values the importance of 
autonomy concessions from the small state. On the one hand, changing geopolitical circumstances 
may alter the importance of the small state to the great power. If the small state becomes less 
attractive, its bargaining power vis-à-vis the great power will deteriorate and consequently the 
volume of side payments it receives will be more likely to decrease. On the other hand, the small 
state leader can extract more side payments if the state remains strategically important to its great 
power ally. A small state leader may use divergent interests with his great power ally as a 
bargaining leverage. The U.S.-Pakistan alliance illustrate this point.  
After the end of the Cold War American strategic interests in South Asia and in Pakistan 
waned. In 2001, Pakistan received $5.3 million from the U.S. However, Pakistan became an 
attractive partner again in America’s prosecution of the war in Afghanistan. Pakistan received 
$800 million in 2002. As the war unfolded, Pakistan turned into a safe haven for the Taliban and 
Al Qaeda, the groups that the United States wanted to defeat. The United States pressed Pakistan 
to take strong actions against these groups, but the Pakistani leaders feared that doing so would 
start a domestic insurgency. Moreover, the Pakistani military actively supported some factions 
within these groups to maintain Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan. This difference in objectives 
between the parties offered an opportunity for Pakistan to demand more side payments. The United 
Stated offered a higher amount, but the Pakistani government deemed the offer inadequate. The 
Pakistani government ignored American pressure and started looking for ways to work with the 




Taliban.89 As Bueno de Mesquita observes, “Aid is basically a pay or don’t play program. The 
United States wouldn’t pay and Pakistan wouldn’t play.”90 The stalemate was resolved in 
Pakistan’s favor: the United States increased side payments to $1.5 billion by the end of September 
2009.91     
If the conditions that initially helped to form the alliance hold, leaders are likely to maintain 
current alliance policy.92 However, when such conditions change, leaders may find the 
maintenance of the alliance not as valuable as it once was or it becomes more costly than beneficial. 
For instance, the strategic importance of the small state to the great power may decline which may 
prompt the great power to reduce the volume of side payments it previously offered. The small 
state leader then may want to renegotiate the alliance terms or realign, if they can, with a competing 
great power. In general, alliances are more likely to be terminated when one or more members 
experiences changes that affect the value of the alliance. The small state leaders will have 
incentives to realign when the expected net gain from realignment outweighs the expected gain 
from the existing alliance. The magnitude of side payments and the availability of substitute great 
power allies will affect small state leaders’ calculation whether to continue or terminate the 
existing alliance. 
 When small state leaders become heavily dependent on side payments, the continuation of 
these external resources is crucial for their political survival. A significant change in the volume 
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and composition of side payments is likely to have adverse effects on intra-alliance cooperation. 
Changes in side payments alone, however, are less likely to lead to the termination of the alliance 
by small states. Although a small state leader will oppose any reduction in side payments, the 
termination of the alliance, in the absence of an alternative source, will deprive him of valuable 
(albeit a reduced amount) external resources. For the small state, realignment under these 
circumstances becomes an attractive alternative if it promises to offer more net gains than possible 
under the existing arrangement.93 As Bruce Berkowitz argues (in the context of International 
Treaty Organizations or ITO) that a state is more likely to confirm its membership in an ITO when 
the net advantages of membership increases, and when the advantages decrease, a state is more 
likely to defect.94 In order to evaluate comparative gains from alignment strategies, small state 
leaders must have one or more substitute great powers or prospective allies to replace the existing 
great power ally.  
The availability of a prospective great power ally improves small state leaders’ bargaining 
leverage vis-à-vis the existing ally. A state’s bargaining power during the maintenance phase will 
be greater if it is less dependent on the ally, has loose commitments, and the ally has greater 
interests at stake in the alliance. A state’s dependence on the alliance in turn is a function of the 
net benefits it receives from it, compared to the benefits available (or expected) from alternative 
sources.95 The state is less dependent on the ally if it has alternative sources of benefits—a 
substitute great power and the opportunity for realignment. In other words, a state is more 
dependent on the alliance if it has a high opportunity costs of terminating the alliance.96 For a small 
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state leader, the opportunity costs of terminating an existing alliance is lower when an alternative 
great power is available who is willing to meet the leader’s needs.  The following example of 
Ethiopia’s decision to realign with the Soviet Union at the expense of its existing ally, the United 
States, demonstrates this point. 
In the 1960s, Ethiopia was the location of the largest American economic and military 
assistance program and the largest embassy in Sub Saharan Africa.97 Ethiopia was a loyal 
American ally in Africa. The alignment came to an end when Emperor Haile Selassie was toppled 
in 1974 by a group of military officers known as the Derg (committee) who found the Soviet Union 
a better provider than the United States. The Derg commenced on violent purges and targeted 
killings of its opponents to consolidate its power.98 The group was then taken over by Major 
Mengistu Haile Mariam in late 1974. Following the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie, the new 
regime secured record levels of military and economic aid from the United States.99 Steven David 
notes that despite this record level of aid, the new leader Mengistu Haile Mariam chose to realign 
with the Soviet Union at the expense of the United States.100 If side payments were an important 
factor for Mengistu’s decision to end the alignment with the U.S., David’s narrative appears to be 
a puzzle. However, when one looks into Mengistu’s dealings with both superpowers, it is clear 
that he was looking for the highest bidder.  
While Mengistu opened negotiations with the USSR for an alliance, he worked out new 
plans for military support from the United States, the existing ally. Between mid-1974 and the fall 
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of 1976 the United States supplied Ethiopia with $180 million worth of military aid.101 Meanwhile, 
the Ethiopian leader rejected at least two Soviet offers because they were too small and limited.102 
Finally, by early 1977 Moscow agreed to offer a more extensive aid package that satisfied the 
Ethiopian leader. Ethiopia obtained from the Soviets a commitment for between $350 million and 
$450 million in arms. Mengistu’s calculations paid off handsomely: starting in September 1977 
and for the following eight months, the Soviets sent more than $1 billion worth of military 
equipment to Ethiopia; the Soviet support proved to be a crucial factor in Ethiopia’s success against 
Somalia during the Ogaden war.103   
Thus, for small state leaders, the value of an existing alliance may depend on the continued 
receipt of side payments as well as the availability of substitute great powers.  If there are substitute 
great powers who are willing to offer more (or the same volume) side payments than the small 
state is getting (or expected to get) from the existing alliance and the expected costs for small states 
are equal to (or less than) the existing level, then the net value of realignment with another great 
power will increase. The small state leader, then, has an incentive to realign with another great 
power. The small state leader’s expectations about a higher payoffs of net value from the new 
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the USSR offered a much broader proposal for Soviet military assistance. To surprise of the USSR, Ethiopia rejected 
the offer as well. See ibid. p. 267-69  
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C) Domestic Changes in Small States 
Important domestic political changes in small states, such as changes in the existing political 
regime or leadership may affect the state’s alliance policies.  A regime change is different from a 
leadership change. A regime change must accompany complete changes in the “rules of the game” 
whereas a leadership change often involve changes in the personnel without altering the major 
institutions of the state. For example, in a coup d’état one part of the military replaces another 
without any discernable changes in the rules of the game or the institutions of government. Thus, 
in a regime change both the rulers and the rules have to change.104 
i) Regime Change:  The characteristics of the governing coalition tend to change after a 
regime change and that, in turn, affects the preferences and policies of the new regime. Different 
groups or coalitions serve different constituencies with different ideologies or world views. They 
bring different values and priorities to office when they gain control of the institutions of 
government. As Morrow points out, a change in the government or regime may alter a state’s 
utility function and hence its alliance portfolio.105  I contend that, all else equal, a regime change 
in small states will cause one of the following outcomes: a) the new regime may terminate the 
existing alliance or b) the alliance remains intact in exchange for an increased amount of side 
payments.   
When a violent revolution replaces an existing regime (a complete change in the leadership 
and institutions of the previous regime), changes in the state’s internal and external policies might 
be far reaching.106 In the aftermath of a revolution, the new leader will have a winning coalition 
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106 There is another obvious source of changes in alliance policy. If a country losses a war and in the aftermath a new 
regime is installed in the country by the victorious foreign power, then it is highly likely that the new regime will 




whose members may have different set of preferences about internal and external policy issues. 
Leeds et al (2009) argue that a change in foreign policy is most likely when the new leader 
receives his or her primary societal support from a different core group than his or her predecessor. 
The sources of the state’s alliance policies may derive from the desire of new elites to “redistribute 
international values”107; the new regime and its leaders may want to enhance its internal 
legitimacy by aligning with other states that share the state’s internal and external policies108. 
Thus, the probability of some changes in the state’s alliance policy is higher when small states 
experience a violent regime change. The new regime may terminate the existing alliance if the 
new winning coalition prefers non-alignment or realignment with another great power. The U.S. 
alliance with Iran encountered this fate after the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 when the new 
regime terminated Iran’s long-held alliance with the United States. It is also possible that the new 
regime maintains the existing alliance but demands a higher price (i.e. a higher amount of side 
payments) for the state’s concessions on autonomy. In this case, the continuation of an 
asymmetric alliance will depend on the extent to which the great power values the alliance. If the 
alliance remains important to the great power, it will survive albeit for a higher price; otherwise, 
the alliance will be terminated.   
   
                                                          
change the foreign policy in general and alliance policy in particular of the old regime. For example, after the end of 
the World War II, new regimes in Japan and Germany adopted foreign policies preferred by the United States. Another 
point should be noted here that in less sever forms of regime change, such as gradual democratization, where key 
stakeholders from the previous regime retain control of important decision-making apparatuses, the state’s foreign 
policy, in this case alliance policy, may not change.  
107 Richard N Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective (Greenwood 
Press, 1977). 
108 Randolph M Siverson and Charles McCarty, "Alliances in the Interwar Era, 1919-1939: A Reexamination," The 
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ii) Leadership Change: I hypothesize that changes in leadership are less likely to lead 
to the termination of an existing alliance in the short run. A leadership change, both in democratic 
and non-democratic small states, should have minimal impacts on the continuation of asymmetric 
alliances. The extent to which changes in foreign policy preferences translate into observed policy 
changes is influenced by political institutions,109 which are less likely to go through extensive 
changes after a leadership change. Domestic political institutions mediate the translation of 
interests and preferences into policy, and some institutions tend to moderate the effect of changes 
in policy by making policy change more difficult. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) demonstrate 
that the size of the winning coalition and the selectorate have systematic influence on the policies 
adopted by leaders; different institutional rules encourage different behavioral patterns on the part 
of leaders.  
Separation of powers, accountability, transparency, and well-established legal systems 
make policy change more difficult in large coalition polities, which in turn encourage policy 
continuity.110 Since all democratic leaders must maintain the support of a significant portion of the 
selectorate and they have to provide public goods to make their large winning coalition happy, it 
can be inferred that large coalition leaders will want to pursue policies with broad appeal. Drastic 
changes in alliance policies without garnering support from the winning coalition may be a 
difficult thing to do for a large coalition leader. Moreover, because most democratic leaders cannot 
govern effectively without cooperating with other officials who may draw support from different 
sections of society (for instance, legislatures, governing coalition partners, leaders of subnational 
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political units), any drastic change in policy becomes difficult. Thus, an asymmetric alliance is 
likely to survive, at least in the short run, after a leadership change in a democratic small state. 
Variance in policy choice is expected to be more dramatic in small winning coalition 
systems. However, I argue that leadership changes in small coalition states will less likely to lead 
to the termination of an existing alliance. Leaders in such systems can exercise variations in private 
goods policies more easily than in policies that maximize the public good.111 For small coalition 
leaders, surviving the initial period in office is particularly difficult because “they have not yet 
worked out where the money is, making them unreliable sources of wealth for their coalition, and 
they have yet to work out whose support they really need and who they can dump from their 
transitional coalition.”112 Side payments are a more attractive source of revenue than taxation or 
other internal means of resource extraction. In the absence of any alternative great powers, survival 
driven small coalition leaders have incentives to continue the existing alliances, at least in the short 
run, which can provide them access to much needed external resources, such as military and 
economic aid. These resources enhance the new leader’s ability to produce private goods and to 
keep his coalition members loyal. Thus, based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis 
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1) All else equal, the amount of side payments used to maintain the alliance depends 
on the level of divergent between the allies:  
a) When the level of divergent interests is very low, small amounts of side 
payments are necessary to maintain the alliance;  
b) When the level of divergent interests is very high, very large amounts of side 
payments (for a successful negotiation) or no side payments (for an 
unsuccessful negotiation) are expected; and 
 c) When the level of divergent interests is in the medium range, parties can 
bargain policy concessions in exchange for large amounts of side payments.   
2) A small state will be likely to realign if the expected net gain from realignment 
outweighs the expected gain from the existing alliance. 
3) All else equal, regime changes in small states increase the likelihood that  
a) The alliance will be terminated, or  
b) The amount of side payments received will increase.  
4) In the short run, leadership changes in small states will be less likely to effect the 













Alliances are an important part of states’ foreign policy. Prominent theories in international 
relations posit that states form alliances to aggregate their capabilities; states use alliances to deter 
a common threat. However, states also form alliances even when they do not share a common 
threat or a common enemy. Great powers and small states sometimes form asymmetric alliances 
to achieve different objectives from the alliances. The current research focuses on alignment 
strategies of small states and asks why and under what conditions asymmetric alliances are formed. 
The capability aggregation models of alliance formation, mostly in the neorealist tradition, are ill-
equipped to provide an adequate explanation of why states with divergent interests form alliances. 
This chapter offers a trade-off theory of asymmetric alliances. It argues that in the face of multiple 
threats to their political survival, small state leaders trade some parts of their state autonomy in 
exchange for gain in security from great powers. Because the parties have divergent interests, the 
trade-off tends to leave a deficit in benefit for small states. Side payments are used as a 
compensation mechanism that make the alliance mutually beneficial to both parties. The chapter 
also explains the role of side payments in intra-alliance cooperation and lays out the conditions 
under which small states may realign or terminate an existing alliance.  
The trade-off theory lays out conditions that are likely to affect the continuity and change 
in asymmetric alliances. It pays special attention to the role of side payments in the formation and 
maintenance of alliances.  Side payments offer a powerful incentive for small state leaders to form 
alliances with great powers.  Consider SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, two (multilateral) 




asymmetric alliances formed in the height of the Cold War.113 Although these American-led 
asymmetric alliances were formed to fight communist expansion in Asia and the Middle East 
respectively, small states in the Third World were interested in these alliances more about gaining 
economic and military support from the United States than about fighting Communism. One 
observer noted that these small state allies “consider their membership to the alliance to constitute 
a special claim upon the American treasury, American weapons, and American political support 
for their special national aspirations. In other words, this support is the price the United States pays 
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Having set out the theoretical argument, I turn now to the evidence to evaluate the validity of the 
trade-off theory. While the three chapters after this one probe the theory in light of detailed case 
analyses designed to assess the subtle and detailed nuances of security arrangements and side 
payments, this chapter examines the potential of the theory to be generalized across a large sample 
of cases, providing an overall analysis of the extent to which the theory’s hypotheses characterize 
general patterns in asymmetric alliances and alignments. Thus, this chapter reports and explains 
the result of quantitative analysis. Using quantitative methods, I seek to explain when great powers 
and small states are likely to form alignments or formal alliances and under what circumstances 
side payments are likely to be used in asymmetric relations. In addition to testing the hypotheses 
on asymmetric dyads, I extended the test to the entire domain of observations in the dataset to 
assess the validity of the hypotheses to all dyads.     
I test four hypotheses related to alliance formation and maintenance. The results from the 
regression analyses are consistent with the predictions of the hypotheses. I have found that first, 
having divergent interests between allies increases the likelihood that small states receive a higher 
amount of aid (which I used as a proxy for side payments). Second, nondemocratic or autocratic 
states (small coalition polities) are more likely to receive a smaller amount of aid for policy 
concessions than do large coalition (democratic) states. Third, politically unstable (states that 




experience more political violence) small states are more likely to form asymmetric alliances than 
are politically stable small states (that experience less political violence). Fourth, threats to leaders’ 
political survival in small states increase the likelihood that they form alliances with great powers. 
Moreover, I also found that the abovementioned findings are not necessarily limited to small states 
in the Third World (asymmetric dyads), these findings are equally valid in other interstate dyads 
as well.    
The organization of the chapter is as follows. The first section summarizes the predictions 
from each hypothesis. The next section describe the data, and explains the research design used to 
test the hypotheses. The following section then reports and explains the results of the regression 
analyses. The last section explain the implications of the findings. Specifically, I address the 
strength and weakness of the findings and the extent to which the results are generalizable.     
 
I. Hypotheses 
The chapter analyzes the regression results of the following hypotheses concerned with bargaining 
between parties with disparate capabilities and with the formation and maintenance of asymmetric 
alliances as developed in the previous chapter 
5. Having divergent interests between a great power and a small state increases 
the likelihood that the great power uses side payments to cement an alliance.  
6. All else equal, the amount of side payments needed to compensate for policy 
concessions is likely to be smaller for small coalition leaders than it is for large 
coalition leaders. 
7. All else equal, politically unstable small states are more likely to form 
asymmetric alliances than are politically stable small states.  




8. Threats to leaders’ political survival in small states increase the likelihood that 
they form asymmetric alliances.  
 
These hypotheses make distinct predictions about the conditions under which asymmetric 
alliances might be formed and side payments are likely to be used. The first hypothesis predicts 
that having divergent interests between the parties increases the likelihood  of using side payments 
by great powers to obtain cooperation from otherwise unwilling governments. The prediction is 
built on the idea that side payments work as a compensation mechanism that fills the gap in benefit 
from security arrangements for one party (usually the weaker side). Thus, I contend that when 
having divergent interests between allies generates gaps in benefit for weaker parties, great powers 
offer side payments to compensate small states for the gaps in order to cement security 
arrangements, such as alliances. The second hypothesis suggests that small coalition (autocratic) 
small states will be more likely to receive smaller amounts of side payments than their large 
coalition counterparts. Since small coalition leaders rely on a small group of key supporters 
(known as the winning coalition) to stay in power, it is relatively easier for them (than their large 
coalition counterparts) to make security arrangements with great powers for a smaller amount of 
side payments, which can be used to garner support, through the provision of private goods, from 
the coalition members who may be dissatisfied by the security arrangements with great powers.    
The third and fourth hypotheses predict that politically unstable small states and politically 
threatened leaders are likely to form asymmetric alliances. While the hypotheses predict the same 
outcome, they have different predictors—political instability and threats to leaders’ political 
survival. The third hypothesis suggests that small states that face political instability (as a result of 
frequent and a high magnitude of political violence) are likely to form external alliances as a way 




to gain assistance, such as military aid, from great powers. The fourth hypothesis stipulates that 
threats to small state leaders’ political survival make it more likely they form asymmetric alliances 
to protect their political powers at home. The following chart lists key explanatory variables and 
the predicted outcomes suggested by the proposed hypotheses.   
 
 
Table 3.1: Key Variables and Predicted Outcomes 
 
Hypothesis Explanatory Variables 
 
Predicted Outcomes 
1 Divergent interests 
 
The use of side payments  
2 Small coalition regime in small 
states  
Smaller amounts of side payments 
(than for large coalition polities) 
 
3 Politically instability (in small 
states) 
 
More likely to form asymmetric 
alliances  
 
4 Increased threats to small state 
leaders  
 




II. Data, Variables, and Research Design 
The panel data used in this study are organized in directed dyad-year format in which side A (which 
the database coded as ccode1) is the United States and side B (ccode2) involves all available states. 
Below I explain the variables used in testing the hypotheses, the source of data, and the research 
design.  
Dependent Variables 
Side Payments: I use U.S. foreign aid as a proxy for side payments. Although side 
payments may come in other forms, foreign aid is a widely used mechanism between the United 




States and small states as a bargaining tool. As for data availability, foreign aid data are more 
readily available and easily accessible than other forms of side payments. Examples of other types 
of side payments may involve trade concessions, offers of investment, territorial concessions, etc. 
U.S. foreign aid data are available for an extensive period of time covering most interstate dyads. 
The foreign aid data are derived from the annual “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants” (also known 
as the “Greenbook”) that contains U.S. economic and military foreign assistance from 1946 to 
2011.1  
 Changes in the level of foreign aid as a dependent variable can be measured in two ways: 
measuring nominal or percentage changes over the years and thus making it a continuous variable; 
or measuring changes in two simple categories—whether there is an increase in aid level or no 
increase, thus making it a dichotomous or binary variable. I did not choose the former option for 
at least two reasons. First, using aid as a continuous dependent variable to test the first hypothesis 
would lead to misleading results. The theory stipulates that the likelihood of using side payments 
is a function of having interest divergence between the parties. Since each state assigns different 
values to issues, it would be misleading to use a standardized measure of interest divergence to 
infer changes in the (actual) amounts of aid.  Second, as shown below in figure 1, the prediction 
that the amount of side payments is a function of interest divergence is conditioned upon a key 
variable—successful or failed negotiation between the parties.2 However, the lack of these 
                                                          
1 I use constant data ($U.S. 2011) for both economic and military aid. See U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants 
(Greenbook), http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/. 
2 Note that a separate hypothesis predicts that all else equal, the amount of side payments used to maintain the alliance 
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high, very large amounts of side payments (for a successful negotiation) or no side payments (for an unsuccessful 
negotiation) are expected; and c) When the level of divergent interests is in the medium range, parties can bargain 
policy concessions in exchange for large amounts of side payments. This hypothesis will be tested in the case studies 
chapters.  




bargaining related data to measure these variables constrains a proper test of the hypothesis and in 
the absence of these data regression results will be likely to lead to misleading conclusion.     
Consider a simple hypothetical example. Suppose that the United States, after the 
completion of bargaining process, increased aid amount from $1 million to $ 2 million for X and 
$ 50 million to $100 million for Y. Also suppose that both the U.S.-X and U.S.-Y dyads have 
divergent interests scores of -0.5. (I use affinity score, explained below, which is based on the 
similarity of a country’s voting patterns with the United States—in support of U.S. interests—in 
the UN General Assembly. In a scale between +1 and -1, a negative score implies dissimilar or 
divergent interests). Given these setup, regression results will lead to misleading conclusion: a 
huge difference in nominal aid amounts despite having the same level of interest divergence. 
Measuring percentage changes in aid would not solve the problem either: both X and Y have a 
100% increase in aid with the same level of interest divergence. (Here we would not know the 
importance and intensity of interest divergence in the dyads that lead one party getting $2 million 
whereas $100 million for the other) The affinity scores do not capture many case-specific 
variations and the importance of interest divergence unique to individual cases. (The case study 
method, which allows a more detailed and nuanced analysis of the magnitudes and depth of interest 
divergence in a dyad, is more suitable for testing the hypothesis that predicts outcomes conditioned 










The above mentioned problems should not limit our ability to test the hypothesis if a binary 
dependent variable is used. In this case logit regression models will test the odds of an increased 
level of aid when a dyad has divergent interests. Thus, a dependent variable aidup is generated to 
test the first hypothesis. The variable measures changes in total aid—the sum of economic and 
military aid. It is a binary variable coded as 1 for a given year if the total aid increases in the next 
three years, 0 otherwise. For example, a value of 1 will be assigned for 1960 if total aid increases 
between 1960 and 1963. The variable helps us to test the odds of an increased level of aid when 
interests diverge between allies. According to the summery statistics shown in Table 2, there are 
3,112 observations involving an increase in aid level and 10,319 in which aid level did not increase. 
A second dependent variable logaid (the log of total aid) is used to measure the magnitude of 
change in aid level. This dependent variable is used to test the second hypothesis. Multiple 
regression models are used to test the hypothesis. 




Alliance Formation: Formal alliances data are collected from the Correlates of War 
(COW) project. The data are in directed-dyad year format.3 For our purpose I use alliance data 
from 1946 to 2012 that include all alliance dyads involving the United States. In order to test the 
third and fourth hypotheses I generated a dependent variable aformed. It is a binary variable, coded 
as 1 if a new alliance was formed between the United States and a small state in given year, 0 
otherwise. As shown table 2, there are 88 observations involving the formation of new alliances in 
the dataset. Logit regression models will be used to test the hypotheses.  
 
 
Independent and Control Variables 
Divergent Interests: I use Erik Gartzke’s affinity dataset, which measures state 
preferences or the interest similarity and divergence among pairs of states (dyads). The dataset 
uses voting in the UN General Assembly to measure interest similarity. For the purpose of this 
                                                          
3 The Directed-dyad format contains the alliance dataset with one observation for each directed-dyad alliance 
initiation. See Formal Alliances (v. 4.1), the Correlates of War Project, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-
sets/formal-alliances 
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study, I included only U.S.-directed dyads (i.e. the pairs include the United States on the one side 
and all other countries on the other). The Affinity index constitutes values on a scale between -1 
(least similar interests) to 1 (most similar interests) for all countries that are members of the United 
Nations for the period 1946 to 2008. The dataset contains three categories of United Nations 
Voting data (1 = “yes” or approval for an issue; 2 = abstain, 3 = “no” or disapproval for an issue.) 
to create an index ranging from -1 to 1.4  One problem with using affinity data as an explanatory 
variable to predict changes in aid level in a given year is that the relationship between the variables 
may have an endogeneity problem. It is hard to determine whether the affinity level shapes aid 
amounts or vice versa. In other words, we do not know whether the amount of aid a state receives 
in a given year is a consequence or a cause of the state’s affinity (voting in the UN General 
Assembly) with the donor in that year.5   To address this problem I calculated the moving average 
of the previous years’ affinity scores from a given year.  Thus, a dyad’s degree of interest 
divergence for a given year is the previous five years’ moving average of the dyad’s affinity scores 
from the year. (For example, a state’s affinity score for 1960 would be the moving average of the 
state’s affinity score from 1955 to 1959). Using the moving average of previous years’ affinity 
score helps us to address the potential endogeneity problem because the moving average looks at 
the pattern of past affinity as a possible explanation of the current year’s aid.  
A binary variable divinterest is used as a key independent variable in testing the first 
hypothesis. The variable is coded 1 if the affinity score is negative in a given year, meaning that 
the moving average affinity – voting similarity in the General Assembly – between the country in 
question and the United States is less than 0; otherwise the variable is coded as 0. A negative 
                                                          
4 For more details about the affinity dataset, see http://pages.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/htmlpages/data.html 
5 In addition to the problem of endogeneity, affinity scores are only limited to UN voting patterns. However, as 
conceptualized in this study that the variable divergent interests incorporate all political and security related issues 
affecting the interest of parties.  




affinity score between a dyad members implies dissimilarities of interests, which I term in this 
study as divergent interests. 
I did not use divinterest as a continuous variable because first, the hypothesis (that having 
divergent interest increases the likelihood of using side payments) does not require the key 
independent variable divinterest to be measured in continuous values. Secondly, as mentioned 
previously, states assign different values to issues and rate interest divergence with allies 
differently reflecting an individual state’s unique historical and geopolitical circumstances. For 
example, both India and Pakistan want to have their presence in Afghanistan to help to maintain a 
status quo and a political outcome favorable to their respective state interests. But Pakistan tends 
to assign far more importance to this goal (as specified in a doctrine called “strategic depth”) than 
India does. An individual country can bargain with the great power over its perceived interest 
divergence and can iron out a compensation scheme. It is thus, implausible to compare divergent 
interests across cases in large-n analyses.    
 
Political Instability: The yearly level of political violence in a country is used as a proxy 
for political instability. A plausible argument can be made that the more violence a state 
experiences, the more politically unstable the state tends to be. I use the magnitude of societal and 
interstate violence to measure the level of political violence. The data are derived from the Major 
Episodes of Political Violence and Conflict Regions dataset (hosted by POLITY IV) covering 
1946-2014. Major episodes of political violence are defined by the systematic and sustained use 
of lethal violence by organized groups that result in at least 500 directly-related deaths over the 
course of the episode.6 The dataset include observations about both societal and interstate violence. 
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The categories of interstate violence include major episodes of international violence and a state’s 
involvement in an interstate war in a given year. The types of societal violence include episodes 
of civil violence, civil war, ethnic violence, and ethnic war. For both interstate and societal 
violence, the data are scaled from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each episode and 0 denotes no 
episodes. I labelled the variable polviolence, which contains the total summed magnitudes of 
societal and interstate violence. Thus, since polviolence = interstate violence + societal violence, 
the data range from 0 to 20. It is a key independent variable to test the third hypothesis. According 
to the summery statistics shown in table 3, the variable contains 9197 observations with a mean 
score of .729. 
       
Threats to Leaders’ Survival: I created a variable, highthreat, to measure leaders’ 
perception of threat to their political survival. The variable generated a threat index for each year 
by taking into consideration two factors: the causes of leadership change and changes in GDP per 
capita income.7 Three major causes of leadership change were included into the analysis: regular 
means, irregular means, and deposed by foreign powers. A regular means of leadership change 
occurs in accordance with explicit rules or established conventions of a particular country. 
Examples of Regular removal include voluntary retirement, term limits and defeat in elections. 
Removal from office through irregular means occurs when the leader was removed in 
contravention of explicit rules and established conventions. Most Irregular removals from office 
are done by domestic forces, such as leadership removal through coups, popular revolts, 
assassinations, etc. A leadership change by foreign powers involves cases where a foreign state 
                                                          
7 I ran a logit analysis using dummy variable, leadershipconcern (that included the causes of leadership change, i.e. 
regular, irregular, and deposed by foreign powers) as independent variable and the change in GDP per capita. The 
results derived from the logit analysis were used to generate prediction index, highthreat. See Appendix A for results 
of the logit analysis.  




directly removes a foreign leader, for example through invasion. Leadership change data are 
derived from the Archigos Leadership Dataset.8  
The change in national income is measured by calculating the change in GDP per capita 
over the preceding three years. (For example, the change in national income in 1960 is measured 
by calculating the difference in income level from 1956 to 1959).9 GDP per capita income data 
come from the Maddison project database.10 For an incumbent leader, the mode of how his 
predecessors were removed and the health of the state’s economy may shape his understanding of 
threats to his political survival. Thus, a prosperous economy and a regular means of leadership 
change would be considered less threatening than a suffering economy with decreasing national 
income and irregular means of leadership change. 
   
Winning Coalition:  A small winning coalition polity is typically represents an autocratic 
regime, a monarchy, or a military junta whereas large coalition polities generally represent liberal 
democratic regimes.11 For coalition type in small states, I use POLITY IV’s autocracy index. The 
variable has an 11-point additive scores (0-10): the higher the score, the more autocratic the state 
                                                          
8 For more on Archigos dataset, see http://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/hgoemans/data.htm. See also Henk E 
Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza, "Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders," 
Journal of Peace research 46, no. 2 (2009).   
9 Looking back at three years is arbitrary. The idea is that a general trend in economic conditions, such as changes in 
GDP per capita income can be better understood by previous experiences rather than the conditions present in the 
current year. A dummy variable changeincome is created to measure whether GDP per capita income decrease. A 
decrease in income is calculated in the following way: Changeincome (year0) = lag (year1). Percapitagdp < lag 
(year4). Percapitagdp. The variable is coded as 1 if GDP per capita income decrease, 0 otherwise.   
10 For Maddison database, see The Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Maddison project/home.htm, 
2013 version. For data methodology, see Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten Zanden, "The Maddison Project: Collaborative 
Research on Historical National Accounts," The Economic History Review 67, no. 3 (2014). 
 11 I use winning coalition types to classify political regimes following the Selectorate theory developed by Bruce 
Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues. See Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, The Logic of Political Survival.   




is. Thus, a score of 10 implies that a state is most autocratic.12 According to the descriptive statistics 




Control Variables: I used several control variables in testing the hypotheses. A coldwar 
variable is used to control for the effects that Cold War politics exerted in alliance politics. It is a 
binary variable, coded as 1 for the years 1955 to 1990, 0 otherwise. During the height of the Cold 
War in the early 1950s the United States and the Soviet Union competed for allies in the Third 
World. The superpowers formed several asymmetric alliances to spread their sphere of influence. 
                                                          
12 POLITY IV defines Institutionalized Autocracy in terms of “the presence of a distinctive set of political 
characteristics. In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief 
executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise 
power with few institutional constraints.” For more on the data, methodology, see Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert 
Gurr, and Keith Jaggers, “POLITY IV Project: Political regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013” Center 
for Systemic Peace www. systemicpeace.org   
 
















   9197 .729 1.80 
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   7045 3.933 3.605 
 
highthreat  
   13431 .082 .019 
sumten 
 
   7476 2792.12 2797 
distance 
 
   12210 5582.692 2105.672 




Controlling for these competitive alignments will allow me to assess the effects of primary 
independent variables on alliance formation.   Leadership tenure, measured in the number of days 
a leader stays in power, is used to take into account each leader’s longevity in office. It is plausible 
to infer that a leader who has been in power for a long time may have more sway in policymaking 
process and is more competent in policy implementation than a new incumbent. I used the log of 
leadership tenure (logsumten) in the regression. The data for leadership tenure come from the 
Archigos dataset. Neighboring countries may be friendlier or more hostile toward each other. A 
great power may consider its neighboring states as its sphere of influence and thus may be more 
inclined to make alliances or provide more material assistance than it does to distant states. In 
order to control the effects of these factors, a variable distance is generated that measures distance 
in miles between the two capital cities of a dyad.13 The log of miles (logdistance) is used in 
regression analysis.  Another variable year is used to control for the time effects or the temporal 
trends during a given period. The level of military expenditure is used as a control variable to test 
the third and fourth hypothesis. The expectation is that countries that can spend more on the 
military may have a less need for external alliances. The source of data is the Correlates of War 
(COW) National Material Capability dataset, which measures military expenditure in thousands 
of U.S. dollars. I use the log of military expenditure, logmilex, in the regression models.  
 In addition, I used several interaction variables. An interaction term divinterest*allaince1 
is used to assess the effects of divergent interests between allies. Furthermore, I generated some 
interaction variables involving the Cold War. An interaction variable coldwar*alliance1 is used to 
the separate the Cold War alliances from non-Cold War alliances. A second interaction variable 
cold*auto is used to control for any different treatment (in terms of aid receipt) autocratic regimes 
                                                          
13 I use Google Map service to calculate the distance between two capital cities.  




received during the Cold War. Lastly, cold*threat is intended to control for the interaction effects 
between the level of threats to leaders and the Cold War.  
 
III. Results  
 
In testing each of the hypotheses enumerated earlier, I divided the test results into two types of 
models: a) the first set of models exclude excluding European states and Canada from the analyses 
(henceforth panel A); and b) the second set of models include all dyads in the dataset (henceforth 
panel B). The first type is intended to limit the tests to non-European and non-Western countries, 
most of whom are developing countries. The purpose of the later is to assess the application of the 
hypothesis to all available dyads (where ccode1 is the United States) in the dataset. Thus, the 
results for each hypothesis are presented in two separate tables, representing regression models for 
asymmetric and all dyads. I compare both models (for each hypothesis) side by side.   
I use logit regression to test all but the second hypothesis. Multiple regression is used to 
test the second hypothesis. In both cases I use cluster-robust method.  In panel data individual 
observations, rather than being independent of each other, are grouped together in clusters (such 
as clustered on country-level). The cluster method assumes that model errors uncorrelated across 
clusters but correlated within cluster. The method generates robust standard errors for individual 
independent variable. (Failure to control for within-cluster error correlation can lead to small 
standard errors, and consequently narrow confidence intervals, and low p-values.) 
In logit analysis I add odds ratio (e^b) and e^bStdX to make data interpretation easier. 
Since it is difficult to interpret logit regression coefficients, odds ratio serves a useful purpose. The 




ratio tells us the odds of a change in the dependent variable in response to changes in independent 
variables. It is, however, difficult to compare the odds ratio for one variable with the odds ratio for 
another variable when they are measured on different scales. This is usually the case for continuous 
and categorical variables. For binary variables we can interpret the odds ratio and percentage 
directly (a change in X (0/1) increased/decreased the odds of changes in Y). But for continuous or 
categorical variables, a more useful way to interpret data is to evaluate the effect of a 1-standard 
deviation change in an independent variable on the dependent variable. Thus, e^bStdX generates 
the odds ratio for a 1-standard deviation change in a predictor variable.  
In analyzing multiple regression (used to test the second hypothesis) results, I use a 
measure known as semipartial R2 (in addition to Coef. std. error. and P values) to compare the 
importance of each independent variable to R2. In other words, semipartial R2 measures how much 
each variable increases R2 if the variable is entered into the model last.14 This approach helps us 
to understand how much of the variance is uniquely explained by an independent variable, 
controlling for all other independent variables. The purpose of using semipartial R2   is not to assess 
the overall size of the R2   but to evaluate the relative importance of each independent variable to 
the model.        
A) Divergent interests—Side payments: 
The first hypothesis predicts that having divergent interests increases the likelihood that 
side payments will be used. The expectation is that an increase in divinterest positively affects the 
likelihood of aidup.  The results from the logit analyses shown in both set of models—panel A 
                                                          
14 For example, suppose that we are interested in how much a variable M increases to R2 (which measures how much 
a regression model explain the variance in the data). In semipartial R2 approach, a regression model will be run without 
M and an R2 will be generated. Then the model will be run for the second time with inclusion of M. The second model 
now has a larger R2. The difference between the two R2-values will tell us how much the variable M increases R2.  




(table 4a) and panel B (table 4b)—support the hypothesis. In model 1 (table 4a) the interaction 
between existing alliances and divergent interests (divinterest*alliance1) is positively related to 
aidup; the relationship is statistically significant (p<0.04).  Divergent interests and alliances alone 
(without interaction) are not significant. The odds ratio (shown in the third column for each model) 
suggests that having divergent interests in existing alliances increases the odds that aid will 
increase by 54.2% [(1.542-1)*100]. The interaction term in model 4 (table 4b) is also positively 
related to aidup and the result is significant at P<0.00. Here the interaction term increases the odds 
that the United States provides more aid to allies by 109.4%.  
Model 2 (table 4a) and model 5 (table 4b) add a new interaction term (Cold War alliances—
coldwar*alliance1), year and its binomial term yr2 into the analysis. As in the previous models, the 
first interaction term—divergent interests in alliances—is positively related to the dependent 
variable aidup and the relationship is statistically significant in both models. In both cases, the 
interaction term increases the odds that allies get more aid from the United States (the odds ratio 
is 2.11 in model 2 and 2.78 in model 5—which can be read as 111% and 178% respectively). The 
new interaction term, coldwar*allaince1, is positively related to aidup and the result is statistically 
significant (P<0.03) in model 2; the odds that the United States gave more aid to small state allies 
during the Cold War increased by 55.8%. Model 5 shows a similar pattern: the interaction term is 
statistically significant. In this model, the odds of more U.S. aid to all allies during the Cold War 
increased by 83%.  The coefficients for year and yr2 (year squared) suggest that the level of aid 
gradually declined since 1946 and then started to increase. The turning year (when total aid level 
began to increase again) was 1979 in model 2 and 1980 in model 5.15   
                                                          
15 The following formula is used to determine the turning year: Coefyear/(Coefyr2)*2 




Model 3 (table 4a) and model 6 (table 4b) drop year and yr2 from the analysis. The two 
interaction terms—divergent interests among allies and the Cold War alliances—are still 
significant. For both interaction terms in both models there are increasing odds that U.S. aid will 
increase. Figure 3.2 and 3.3 below show the pattern of the interaction between divergent interests 
and alliances (divinterest*alliance1) in the probability matric for model 3 (panel A) and model 6 
(panel B) respectively. The figures show the effect of having divergent interests in the absence and 
presence of alliances.  
 
Figure 3.2: 






























Predictive Margins of divinterest#alliance1 with 95% CIs













To sum up, the logit analyses, presented in table 3.4a and table 3.4b, are consistent with 
the prediction—having divergent interests increases the likelihood that more aid will be used as 
side payments. The key interaction term, divinterest*alliance1, is positively related to the 
dependent variable aidup and the result is statistically significant. The results suggest that the 
likelihood of the United States giving more aid to its allies increases when there are divergent 
interests between the parties. As figure 3.2 and 3.3 show, this relationship is consistent in both sets 
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Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
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B) Coalition type—Side payments  
The second hypothesis proposes a relationship between coalition type in small states and the level 
of side payments. It predicts that small coalition small states are likely to receive smaller side 
payments than large coalition small states. The regression results presented in table 3.5a (panel A) 
and 3.5b (panel B) are consistent with the prediction. The results for model 1 in panel A shows 
that autoc2 (autocratic small states) is negatively related to logaid. Thus, keeping all other 
variables constant, as regimes in small states becomes more autocratic, aid level is likely to 
decrease. The relationship is statistically significant at a level of p>0.01. The interaction term—
cold*auto—is not significant. The variable auto2 has an increment to R2 of 0.012 (p < 0.000)—it 
adds more to the model’s R2 than other predictors. Model 4 in panel B (table 3.5b) shows a similar 
pattern: controlling for other variables, as regimes (in all dyads) becomes more autocratic, they 
were likely to receive less aid from the United States. The relationship is statistically significant 
(P < 0.01). As in model 1, the semipartial R2 for autoc2 is more important to the model than other 
variables.  
 Model 2 in panel A (table 3.5a) and model 5 in panel B (table 3.5b) add leadership tenure 
(logsumten) and year in the regression. The results for model 2 suggest that controlling for other 
variables, autoc2 is positively related to logaid and the relationship is statistically significant 
(P<0.001). Leadership tenure is not significant. This implies that leaders who stayed in power 
longer have no advantage in gaining more aid than leaders who had shorter tenure in office. The 
results show that year has a negative coefficient, suggesting that U.S. aid decreased over the years, 
and it is significant at P<0.003. As in model 1, autoc2 has the highest increment to R2—0.016 
(P<0.000).  We see a similar pattern in model 5 in panel B: autoc2 is significant; as in model 2, 




leadership tenure is not significant and year is negatively related to logaid. Here, unlike in model 
2, the interaction term, cold*autoc, is significant. The coefficient for the main effect (autoc2) is -
.143 and for the interaction term it is .103. This results suggest that while autocratic regimes 
received more aid from the U.S. during the Cold War, autoc2 has a net negative effect on logaid 
(since auto2 has a larger coefficient than the interaction term).      
The next two models, model 3 (table 3.5a) and 6 (table 3.5b), add a control variable, GDP 
per capita of ccode2 (logincome) to the regression. As we see in table 5a and table 5b, both models 
have results very similar to the previous models. The key independent variable, autoc2, is 
negatively related to logaid, as expected by the hypothesis, and the relationship is statistically 
significant.  In model 3, logincome is negatively related to logaid with a coefficient of -.428 
(P<0.05); the variable has an increment to R2 of 0.022 (P<0.000). The semipartial R2 values for 
autoc2 and logincome suggest that both variables are equally important, adding (0.022) more to 
the overall variance explained by the model than other predictors.  Model 6 has similar results: 
autoc2 is significant with a negative coefficient; logincome has a coefficient of -.538 (P<0.004), 
which suggests that controlling for other variables, as GDP per capita in ccode2 increases, the 
amount of aid they receive from the United States decreases. Figure 3.4 and 3.5 below show the 
pattern of the relationship between autoc2 and logaid, controlling for other variables, for model 3 
and model 6 respectively.  
Thus, the test results are in line with the expectation. We have seen that autocratic regimes, 
across all models, tend to receive less aid. This finding is consistent both in panel A (involving 
asymmetric dyads) and in panel B (involving all dyads). An identical test using democracy, rather 
than autocracy, as the key independent variable shows that democratic regimes are receive higher 
amounts of aid (see Appendix B).  





Autocratic Regimes and aid: asymmetric dyads 
 
Figure 3.5 
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C) Political instability—Alliance formation  
The third hypothesis predicts that politically unstable small states are more likely to form 
asymmetric alliances. Political instability is represented by polviolence—the total magnitudes of 
interstate and societal violence. Since it might be unlikely that political instability would 
immediately prompt leaders to form alliances, I used lagged three years of polviolence to reflect a 
country’s experiences with political instability in the three previous years. It is more realistic to 
infer that having had experience with political violence in previous years, a leader is better able to 
form expectations about the country’s needs for external help that could be obtained through 
alliance formation.  
The logit analysis shows a statistically significant relationship between political instability 
and alliance formation supporting the hypothesis. Model 1 in panel A (table 3.6a) shows that 
holding other variables constant, polviolence is positively related to alliance formation (aformed) 
with a coefficient of .283 and the result is statistically significant (P< 0.001). The control variable 
year is significant, which suggests that the likelihood of U.S alliances with small states declines 
over the years; leadership tenure (logsumten) is not significant.  Since polviolence is a categorical 
variable, it is more appropriate to measure odds ratio by using 1-standard deviation change in the 
independent variable (reported by e^bStdX). According to the results for model 1, 1-standard 
deviation change in polviolence increases the odds that small states form alliances with the United 
States by 56.7%. Model 4 in panel B (table 3.6b) shows a similar pattern: polviolence has positive 
coefficient of .238 (P<0.003); for model 4, 1-standard deviation change in polviolence increases 
the odds that states form alliances with the United States by 40%. Figure 3.6 and 3.7 below show 
the pattern of the relationship between polviolence and alliance formation (using a probability 
metric), controlling for other variables, for selective model 1 and inclusive model 3 respectively. 
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Political instability and alliance formation: asymmetric dyads 
 
Figure 3.7 
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 The key independent variable polviolence remains significant in model 2 in panel A (table 
3.6a) and model 5 in panel B (table 3.6b). The two models drop leadership tenure (logsumten) and 
add distance (in miles) between the dyads (logdistance) to the analysis. In model 2 polviolence has 
a positive coefficient of .219 (P<0.01); 1-standard deviation change in polviolence increases the 
odds that the United States form alliances with small states by 39.8%. The independent variable is 
also significant in model 5, where 1-standard deviation change in polviolence increases the odds 
of alliance formation by 28.3%. Geographic distance between the dyads is positively related to the 
dependent variable, aformed in both model 2 and model 5 and the relationship is significant at 
P<0.000 and P<0.015 respectively. The results suggest that the United States was more likely to 
form alliances with distant countries than with proximate countries.  
Model 3 (table 3.6a) and model 6 (table 3.6b) extend the analysis by adding the log of 
military expenditure (logmilex) to the regression. The variable of interest, polviolence, is still 
significant with positive coefficients in both models. While military expenditure is not significant 
in selective model 3, it is significant (P<0.025) with a positive coefficient in model 6. In the later 
model the results suggest that 1-standard deviation change in logmilex increases the odds of 
alliance formation with the United States by 68.5%. This finding is counterintuitive since we 
expect that countries that are able to spend more on their military capabilities have a lesser need 
for external alliances.   
Thus, to sum up, the results in both panel A (table 6a) and panel B (table 3.6b) are 
supportive of the hypothesis that political instability (represented by interstate and societal 
violence) increases the likelihood that states form alliances with external powers. We have seen 
that the key independent variable polviolence increases the odds of alliance formation with the 
United States; this relationship is statistically significant across all models. 
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D) Political threats to leaders—Alliance formation  
The last hypothesis tests the effects of threats to leaders’ political survival on alliance 
formation. It predicts that threats to leaders’ political survival increase the likelihood of alliance 
formation. As explained before, a predictor variable highthreat is generated by incorporating the 
patterns of leadership change and changes in GDP per capita income. The results from logit 
analyses reported in table 3.7a and table 3.7b are consistent with the prediction.  
The key independent variable highthreat in model 1 in panel A (table 3.7a) is positively 
related to the dependent variable, alliance formation (aformed) and the result is significant at 
P<0.000; 1-standard deviation change in highthreat increases the odds that small state leaders, 
who face threats to their political survival, form alliances with the United States by 58.7%. The 
other variables in the model are the geographic distance between the dyads (logdistance) and 
military expenditure (logmilex). The results suggest that as geographic distance between the 
asymmetric dyads increases, the odds of alliance formation increases as well. Small states that 
have a higher level of military expenditure are less likely to form alliances with the United States 
(the odds decreases by 57% [the e^bStdX is 0.431 and thus the odds ratio is 1- 0.431= 0.569]). The 
results for Model 4 in panel B (table 3.7b) has a similar pattern. The variable highthreat has a 
positive coefficient and the result is statistically significant (P<0.000). In this model 1-standard 
deviation change in highthreat increases the odds that states form alliances with the United States 
by 54.8%.  
A new variable coldwar is added to the analysis in model 2 (table 3.7a) and model 5 (table 
3.7b) to control for the effects of Cold War competition on the pattern of alliance formation. The 
results for model 2 and model 5 have the similar pattern and direction as found in the previous two 




models. In both models, highthreat has positive coefficients and the results are statistically 
significant at P<0.000. In both models coldwar, holding other variable constant, is negatively 
related to alliance formation, which suggests that there was a decreasing odds of alliance formation 
during the Cold War. 
The last two models, model 3 (table 3.7a) and model 6 (table 3.7b), replace the control 
variable coldwar with year, which is significant in both models. The addition of year to the 
regression has some noticeable effects: in model 3 the significant level for highthreat has changed 
from P<0.000 to P<0.048; in model 6 we see that logdistance and logmilex are no longer 
significant. We should note that the key variable of interest, highthreat, is still significant in both 
models. As for the odds ratio, 1-standard deviation change in highthreat increases the odds of 
alliance formation by 26% (by asymmetric dyads) in model 3 and 38% (by all dyads) in model 6.             
 Thus, as discussed above, the logit analyses support the prediction of the fourth hypothesis. 
The key independent variable, highthreat, is positively related to the dependent variable, aformed 
across all models. We have seen that an increase in highthreat increases the odds of alliance 
formation. The relationship is statistically significant. From these results we can infer that 
controlling for other variables, an increase in threats to leaders political survival increases the odds 
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IV. General Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The findings reported above have potential consequences for our understanding of interstate 
bargaining and the causes of alliance formation. The results support the first hypothesis that having 
divergent interests increases the likelihood that aid will be used by one party (usually the more 
powerful one) to compensate the other party (usually the weaker side). The idea that aid is a 
strategic tool used by donors to achieve certain foreign policy objectives is not new. However, the 
role of aid as a bargaining tool in alliance relations has been discounted by prominent alliance 
theorists. For example, Stephen Walt argues that, “military or economic assistance is offered and 
accepted only when both parties believe it is in their interest to do so. In particular, offering or 
accepting aid is one way that states with different capabilities can respond to a common threat.”181 
The results found in support of the first hypothesis contradict Walt’s point that states offer and 
accept aid only to pursue a common interests—defeating or deterring a common enemy.  The 
regression results suggests that the odds that the United States provide more aid to the allies 
increase when the parties have divergent interests (that is, when parties have more dissimilar 
interests). 
 It is perhaps intuitive to think that states that share common interests help each other more 
by giving foreign aid than states with divergent interests. But when we consider bargaining 
scenarios in interstate relations, as such bargaining involves the strategic use of aid, then give-and-
take is a normal outcome. The idea that having divergent interests requires one party to use aid as 
                                                          
181 Walt, The Origins of Alliance. P. 42 




side payments to compensate the other party for its concessions on issues falls in the realm of a 
give-and-take understanding of interstate relations. Indeed, this is a key argument of this study.  
 
Domestic politics looms large in the findings of this chapter. Both for the transaction of 
foreign aid and the causes of alliance formation, domestic political factors have importance effects. 
As explained before, the regression results support the hypothesis that all else equal, autocratic 
(small coalition) states are likely to receive smaller amounts of aid than democratic (large 
coalition) states. This result support other studies in the literature. For example, Alberto Alesina 
and David Dollar found that democratic states receive more foreign aid than non-democratic 
states.182 I elaborated in the theory chapter that the logic of the hypothesis is rooted in Bruce Bueno 
de Mesquita and others’ work on the Selectorate theory.183  In bargaining with foreign powers it is 
easier for small coalition leaders to make concessions for at a lower price than it is for large 
coalition leaders. As a small coalition leader relies on a smaller number of key supporters to stay 
in power than does a large coalition leader, it is easier for such a leader to reward the coalition 
members for their utility losses as a result of the leader’s policy concessions. (For example, 
granting bases to a foreign power may anger some members of the winning coalition. The leader 
then has to compensate these disaffected members.) Thus, small coalition leaders can make 
concessions in exchange for smaller amounts of aid than can large coalition leaders. Empirical 
evidence consistent with the second hypothesis support this Selectorate theory framework. 
                                                          
182 Alesina and Dollar. 
183Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and other have done extensive work on the Selectorate theory, which focuses on domestic 
politics and leadership survival. For their seminal work, see Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, The Logic of Political 
Survival. On the application of the model to foreign aid transaction, see "A Political Economy of Aid," International 
Organization 63, no. 02 (2009); "Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions," Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 2 
(2007).   




In addition to the transaction of aid, domestic politics have crucial effects on leaders’ 
motivation for forming alliances. The results suggest, consistent with the third and fourth 
hypotheses, that politically unstable small states are more likely to form alliances with great 
powers than are politically stable small states; threats to leaders’ political survival in small states 
motivate leaders to form alliances with great powers. These findings highlight the importance that 
domestic political factors, such as political violence and the consequent instability as well as 
threats to leaders’ political survival, play in in shaping leaders’ motivation for external alliances. 
The fourth hypothesis (threats to leaders’ survival as cause of alliance formation) is consistent with 
other studies in the literature. For example, Michael Barnett and Jack Levy as well as Steven David 
have made a similar argument albeit based on a small sample of case studies rather than the large-
n, more general analysis, done here.184 More importantly, these findings have implications for the 
theoretical debate in the alliance literature. They suggest that a heavy emphasis on the balance of 
power, the balancing-bandwagoning paradigm, and external exigencies of alliance formation (as 
in the neorealist tradition) are perhaps misguided and an incomplete explanation of why small 
states in Third World form alliances. While I do not claim that external threats have no role, this 
study put emphasis on domestic political imperatives in the Third World (that Mohammed Ayoob 
calls aptly “the security problematic of the Third World”185) as a cause of alliance formation. 
As discussed previously, each hypothesis is tested on asymmetric dyads involving non-
Western and developing countries as well as on all dyads (all observations in the dataset). The 
results are consistent with the hypotheses in both cases. This suggests that the theory has wider 
application. Although the theory lays out its explanation in the context of small states in the Third 
World, the test results reported in this chapter show that when European states are included in the 
                                                          
184 Barnett and Levy; David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World. 
185 Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World." 




analysis, the trade-off theory can explain alliance politics and bargaining processes in all interstate 
relations. The theory offers an explanation where parties bargain for security arrangements and 
use side payments as a bargaining tool to achieve desired objectives.  
The data used in this quantitative analysis contained only U.S.-led directed dyads and U.S. 
foreign aid data. As the time period under study here contains the Cold War conflict, the Soviet-
led dyads are also relevant to the study as we will see in some of the case analyses in the following 
chapters. However, the lack of reliable Soviet aid data makes it difficult to expand the dataset. The 
question then becomes, how generalizable are these findings relying only on U.S. aid data. 
Building on the idea that foreign aid is a bargaining instrument that powerful states use to achieve 
their foreign policy objectives, I content that the results are generalizable. For example, during the 
Cold War both the United States and the Soviet Union used foreign aid as a strategic tool to 
compete over bases, allies, and influence in the Third World. Both superpowers followed a similar 
strategic purpose.  
During the height of the Cold war the dominating factor determining the nature of 
American aid to the less-developed countries was the Communist threat. Section 2 of the Mutual 
Security Act of 1951 provided the framework for the United States aid program: “The Congress 
declares it to be the purpose of this act to maintain the security and to promote the foreign policy 
of the United States by authorizing military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly 
countries to the free world, to develop their resources in the interest of their security and 
independence and the national interest of the United States. . .” As a foreign policy instrument, 
economic assistance was used as a carrot to entice less-developed countries into joining the 
Western camp. Military aid to the developing countries was designed to enable local forces to deter 
the threat of Communism. The military security of the less developed countries and of the United 




States—a factor closely related to anticommunism—also prompted economic assistance.186 
Similarly, the Soviet Union used foreign aid to influence less developed countries in the Third 
World.  An important motivation for Soviet economic assistance was the desire to affect foreign 
policy position of the less developed countries. The use of aid for this purpose was most clearly 
manifested in unreserved Soviet support of newly independent countries’ espousals of neutralism, 
anti-colonialism and anti-Westernism. The Soviet aid program, military and economic, made 
“neutrality” pay as a foreign policy stance for less developed countries. Through economic aid to 
neutral states the Soviet Union provided an alternative source of capital which served to strengthen 
the bargaining power of Third World countries with the West as well as to prevent them from 
joining the western alliance system.187  To sum up, Foreign aid can be seen as a basic instrument 
which the United States used to achieve its foreign policy objectives in the Third World. Like 
American aid policy, Soviet aid was in large part motivated in large part by the desire to exert 
direct political influence of various forms on the less developed countries. The claim that foreign 
can be used as a side payments to obtain cooperation from unwilling governments is not unique to 
the United States. I content that the proposition is generalizable in other cases where parties engage 
in bargaining for security arrangements.   
I used quantitative method to test the hypotheses related to alliance formation. Lack of 
available data for alliance management and maintenance prevented me from testing hypotheses 
about alliance maintenance and cooperation. In addition, among the four hypotheses, the test for 
the first and the second could have been more precise to alliance formation if I had access to data 
related to negotiations among prospective allies. As I mentioned previously, the affinity data, 
which I used for divergent interests, are a partial reflection of interest divergence between states. 
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Since the affinity scores are only based on states’ voting patterns in the UN, the data do not tell us 
other aspects of states’ interest similarity or divergence with the United States. Moreover, not all 
issues being considered for voting in the UN General Assembly are important to U.S. relations 
with other states. Fortunately, case studies allow me to further test these hypotheses. For example, 
I found regression results that show that having divergent interests increases the chances of more 
side payments. The finding can be tested further in case studies to see if it holds for alliance 
bargaining. The next three chapters test most of the proposed hypotheses—both regarding the 
formation and maintenance of alliances—using case studies that allow me to use more nuanced 
























A predictor index highthreat is used as a key independent variable in testing the fourth hypothesis. 
The index is generated by running a logit analysis using leaderconcern (the causes of leadership 
change) and changeincome (a decrease in GDP per capital income). The results of the logit analysis 
is given below. 
Highthreat: Threats to leaders’ political survival  
 
Leaderconcern  Coef. (Std. Err.) P>|Z| 
 
Changeincome  .595 (.071) 
 
0.000 




N = 13431 




















As I discussed earlier, the results for the second hypothesis consistent with the hypothesis, suggest 
that autocratic small states are likely to receive a decreasing amount of foreign aid. An identical 
test using democracy as a key independent variables show the democratic small states are likely to 































































































































0.000  33.103 
(14.270) 








N = 4386 
Prob > F = 0.000 
R-squared = 0.034 
N = 4357 
Prob > F =0.000  
R-squared = 0.040 
N = 4235 
Prob > F =0.000 
R-squared = 0.073 
 





















































































































0.000  61.340 
(14.368) 








N = 5223 
Prob > F = 0.000 
R-squared = 0.015 
N = 5191 
Prob > F =0.000  
R-squared = 0.035 
N = 5000 
Prob > F =0.000 






















THE U.S.-PAKISTAN ALLIANCE 
 
An alliance does not require the allies to have identical interests, but “an alliance requires of 
necessity a community of interests for its foundation.” One well-received proposition in the 
alliance literature suggests that states are more likely to form an alliance when they share a 
common threat.1 These ideas, however, would provide an inadequate explanation of the U.S.-
Pakistan alliance. The United States and Pakistan had divergent and conflicting interests in 
forming the alliance. During the height of the Cold War American policy toward the subcontinent 
was based on an effort to unite the region against Communist powers. The United States initially 
sought alignment with both India and Pakistan in order to create a united force against 
Communism. The Pakistanis, however, sought an alliance with the United States to strengthen 
their defense against India. The Pakistani leaders wanted the United States to arm Pakistan at the 
expense of India and had little or no interest in the containment of Communist powers. The U.S.-
Pakistan alliance, thus, poses an interesting puzzle.  Despite these conflicting objectives, the 
United States and Pakistan formed an alliance in 1954 and subsequently Pakistan joined two U.S.-
led regional security pacts in the 1950s. Indeed, both countries have long been allied. This chapter 
explains why the United States and Pakistan formed an alliance and how they have been able to 
maintain the alliance.   
                                                          
1 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. Pp. 175-87. For an important work on the 
balance of threat, see Walt, The Origins of Alliance. 




 Since its inception in 1954, the alliance has had many ups and downs including accusations 
of Pakistan’s “double plays”2 and America being a “fair weather friend.”3 Given the states’ 
divergent objectives, such ups and downs are not surprising. Consider a recent issue concerning 
Pakistan’s support for the Taliban, which the United States wants to defeat in Afghanistan. During 
a meeting with American officials in May 2008 one Pakistani General made the case that the real 
problem in Afghanistan was not al Qaeda or the Taliban; the real problem was India, Pakistan’s 
arch enemy. The officer described, with alarm, how the Indians were encircling and intent on 
annihilating Pakistan by opening consulates and building roads in Afghanistan. The officer argued 
that in the long run, “when the U.S. pulls out, India will reign. Therefore, the Pakistanis will have 
to sustain contact” with the Taliban to ensure a friendly government in Afghanistan. The officer 
concluded that Pakistan “must support the Taliban.”4 Such an admission by a Pakistani general 
was a confirmation of what had already been known to policy makers in Washington, i.e., that 
Pakistan had been actively supporting the Taliban and various militant groups in the region. 
Billions in American aid to Pakistan were being used to support the Taliban and groups that the 
United States wants to defeat in the region, as if “the American taxpayers were making monthly 
deposits in the Taliban’s bank accounts.”5 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain why the United States and Pakistan, despite having 
divergent interests, formed an alliance and how they have maintained the alliance despite having 
                                                          
2 There has been wide media coverage on the recent tensions between the United States and Pakistan. For example, 
see Daniel S. Markey, “The Gloves Come Off,” Foreign Policy (Sep 23, 2011), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/23/the_gloves_come_off#; Elisabeth Buniller and Jane Perlez, 
“Pakistan’s Spy Agency Is Tied to Attack on U.S. Embassy,” The New York Times, (Sep 22, 2011); Kapil 
Komireddi, “The Generals have no Clothes, Foreign Policy (Nov 29, 2011), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/28/the_generals_have_no_clothes#.   
3 For an example of the accusation that the United States has not been a loyal ally of Pakistan see Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (Oxford University Press, USA, 1969). 
4 David E Sanger, The Inheritance (New York: Harmony Books, 2009). pp. 243-245  
5 Ibid.,  pp. 245-246 




so many strains in the bilateral relations. The chapter tests two distinct hypotheses about the 
formation of asymmetric alliances. First, threats to leaders’ political survival in small states 
increase the likelihood that they form asymmetric alliances. The hypothesis emphasizes that 
leaders’ domestic politics imperatives play a critical role in their alliance strategies. We should see 
that the Pakistani leaders sought to use the alignment with the United States as a tool to counter 
threats to their political survival. Second, having divergent interests between a great power and a 
small state increases the likelihood that side payments will be used to cement the alliance. We 
should observe that having divergent interests between the United States and Pakistan about the 
objective of the alliance increased the likelihood that the United States uses side payments as a 
compensation for Pakistan’s autonomy concessions. 
 The Trade-Off theory suggests that during the maintenance phase of an asymmetric 
alliance ongoing cooperation between the allies is more likely when the small state receives a 
steady flow of side payments from the great power. In general, intra-alliance cooperation will be 
likely as long as the conditions that initially lead to the alliance formation—the autonomy-security 
trade-off and the use of side payments to compensate for small state’s autonomy concessions—
hold. Following the theory’s logic, the United States and Pakistan should be able to cooperate as 
long as Pakistan received a steady flow of side payments. The chapter tests several hypotheses 
related to alliance maintenance.  First, all else equal, the amount of side payments used to maintain 
the alliance depends on the degree of divergent interests between the allies. The theory 
hypothesized three possible scenarios about the relationship between the level of divergent 
interests and amounts of side payments: a) when the level of divergent interests is very low (that 
is, parties share a high level of shared interests), small amounts of side payments are necessary to 
maintain the alliance; b) when the level of divergent interests is very high, a very large amount of 




side payments is expected if negotiations are successful, but no increase in side payments 
otherwise. Lastly, c) when the level of divergent interests is in the medium range (neither very low 
nor very high), parties can bargain policy concessions in exchange for large amounts of side 
payments. The theory also predicts the effects of domestic political changes in small states on the 
continuation of asymmetric alliances. Second, all else equal, regime changes increase the 
likelihood that a) the alliance will be terminated, or b) the alliance will remain intact in exchange 
for an increased amount of side payments. The hypothesis is built on the idea that a regime change 
involves fundamental changes in the state’s political institutions and in the characteristics of the 
winning coalition. The new regime may want to detach itself from the foreign policies, including 
the state’s existing alliances, of the previous government. Thus, we should observe that the new 
leadership after a regime change in Pakistan may want to terminate the alliance with the United 
States or may demand a higher price for its cooperation with the ally. Third, in the short run, 
leadership changes in small states will be less likely to affect the continuation of an asymmetric 
alliance. Thus, we expect leadership changes, which do not alter the existing institutions of the 
government, in Pakistan to have minimal impacts on the continuity of the alliance.6 
 The chapter is organized in the following order.  The first part of the chapter is about the 
formation of the U.S.-Pakistan alliance. Consistent with the predictions, the case study finds that 
threats to the Pakistani leaders’ political survival led them to form an alliance with the United 
States. Even though the prospective allies had divergent interests, the alliance agreement was made 
possible by a strategic trade-off between the two parties facilitated by the transaction of side 
                                                          
6In small coalition polities leaders are less likely to cut an important source of external resources by terminating the 
alliance. In large coalition polities (in democracies), as many scholars have shown, leadership changes are not 
associated with rapid changes in the state’s foreign policies. Democratic leaders are expected to respect the state’s 
existing commitment in foreign relations. Thus, I contend that leadership changes in small states are less likely to 
effect the continuation of the alliance.   




payments. The second part focuses on the maintenance of the alliance. As we will see, the alliance 
went through many phases of ups and downs. Disagreements between the parties, some of which 
are deep rooted, (whether U.S. aid to India, Pakistan’s nuclear programs, or fighting the Taliban) 
have been numerous and the alliance relations have been abound with unmet expectations and 
questions about unfulfilled obligations toward each other.  The chapter illustrates that a very high 
degree of divergent interests adversely affected the amount of side payments Pakistan received 
form the United States. The allies managed to cooperate and Pakistan received large amounts of 
side payments when the level of divergent interests was medium (that is, not very high or very 
low). Lastly, the case study shows that leadership or regime change in Pakistan have had little 
impacts on the continuity of the alliance since all leaders, driven by domestic political survival, 
prioritized the maintenance of the alliance with the United States to secure maximum amounts of 





The U.S.-Pakistan alliance was the result of a bargaining process in which Pakistan made some 
concessions on its autonomy (in terms of supporting American foreign policy and granting the 
United States basing rights in Pakistan) in exchange for side payments. As the following analysis 
shows, even though the prospective allies had divergent interests in pursuing the alignment, 
military and economic side payments played a crucial role in cementing the alliance. The alliance, 
which guaranteed a steady flow of side payments, enhanced the Pakistani leaders’ political survival 
in a perilous domestic political environment.  




   
A) Pakistan’s Incentives for the Alignment 
 
i) External Threats: The partition of the subcontinent and the traumatic birth of Pakistan 
set off long-term acrimonious relations with India. Most important and consequential of all issues 
was the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir. In addition, dividing India’s financial and physical 
assets, settling refugee property claims, distribution of vital irrigation water, demarcating borders, 
etc. became difficult and thorny issues.7 Although Pakistan’s founding leader, Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah, hoped to have friendly relations with India and the two states even attempted to join in a 
no-war declaration,8 the dispute over Kashmir and the inability to come to a resolution sealed the 
fate of India and Pakistan on a trajectory of mutual distrust and hostilities. In October 1947, a tribal 
incursion into Kashmir from Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province sought to capture the capital 
city of Srinagar and the surrounding Vale.9 The dispute has been a source of tension between the 
two countries since that tribal skirmish in 1947. 
Relations with another neighbor, Afghanistan, immediately turned sour after the Kabul 
government opposed Pakistan’s entry into the United Nations. Regarding irredentist Pashtun 
nationalism and the border issues with Afghanistan, the Kabul government upset Pakistan by 
                                                          
7Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies: The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 
2001); Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence (Cambridge 
University Press New York, 1990). Ch. 3 
8 Kux. p. 25; Samuel Martin Burke and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (Oxford 
University Press London, 1973). p.55  
9 Some 2000 armed tribesmen were trucked in from Pakistan Northwest Frontier Province to join the local forces. The 
Indian army successfully cleared the Vale of the tribal intruders and subsequently took control over the two-third of 
Kashmir. For more on this, see Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir (Karachi: Pak Publishers Limited, 1970); Phillips 
Talbot, "Kashmir and Hyderabad," World Politics 1, no. 03 (1949); Alastair Lamb, The Kashmir Problem: A 
Historical Survey (New York: Praeger, 1967); Henry Vincent Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain, India, Pakistan 
(Oxford University Press, USA, 1985). 




stating that “the natural and legal rights of freedom of the Northwest Frontier people and the free 
tribes along the borders may also be established.” Furthermore, Afghanistan supported the call for 
Pushtunistan, an independent state for the Pathans to be curved out of Pakistan’s Northwest 
Frontier Province, and questioned the validity of the frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan—
the Durand Line.10 
An effective response to these external challenges required a significantly stronger military 
capability than Pakistan possessed in its early years. In the aftermath of the partition Pakistan 
gained 30 percent of the Indian army, 40 percent of the navy, and 20 percent of the air force. 
Pakistan had no ordinance factories of its own which left the state in an odd position of being in 
the possession of an army without matching firepower.11 As Pakistan scrambled to develop its 
defense force and lacked military equipment and the industrial plant to produce arms and 
munitions, it needed a powerful external ally who could help build its defense capability. The 
Pakistani leaders turned to the United States in the fall of 1947 for military aid.12 
 
ii) Internal Challenges: Pakistan’s internal challenges were no less formidable and in 
some respects posed serious problems for the ruling party and its leaders. Various domestic forces 
made it difficult for the Pakistani leadership to consolidate the authority structure of the new state, 
to maintain stability and even territorial integrity. Immediately after independence, Pakistan, with 
seventy million people, had to work within many serious constraints, including an unusual 
                                                          
10 The Durand Line was established by Britain in the 1890s as a boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The 
border split the ethnic Pathans between Afghanistan, where they were the largest ethnic group, and Pakistan. For more 
on the Pak-Afghan relations, see Umbreen Javaid and Qamar Fatima, "An Analytical Study of Pakistan’s Policy 
toward Afghanistan before the Taliban’s Rise," Journal of Political Studies 20, no. 2 (2013); Marvin G Weinbaum, 
"War and Peace in Afghanistan: The Pakistani Role," The Middle East Journal  (1991); "Pakistan and Afghanistan: 
The Strategic Relationship," Asian Survey  (1991); Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction 
(Westview Pr, 1994). 
11 Jalal. p.42 
12 Pakistan requested arms and military aid worth $510 million, which the U.S. rejected. See  Kux. p.44 




geography: a thousand miles of Indian territory separated the Eastern wing (East Pakistan) from 
the west, where the Punjab, the Northwest Frontier Province, Sindh, and Baluchistan were located. 
Perhaps the biggest challenge for the leadership was the integration of disparate populations with 
various nationalities into a sense of nationhood and loyalty to the state.13  
 Pakistan, like almost all new states, had to build its central government infrastructure and 
national institutions from scratch. For Pakistan’s leaders after Jinnah, it was difficult to manage 
the increasingly unruly Muslim League, the nation’s only significant political party. Once its 
principal demand, an independent Pakistan was achieved, the party began to unravel in the face of 
mounting infighting and the lack of programmatic goals. As Ayesha Jalal noted, “since Pakistan 
was constitutionally a federation of provinces, the absence of a nationally based political party 
providing a two-way channel of communication between the government and the different levels 
of society was to become a serious impediment to the integration of its diverse constituent units.”14 
The League lost mass support within a few years of independence. The elite that had demanded an 
independent Pakistan was now challenged by groups that sought to build Pakistan as a loose 
federation of Muslim majority provinces, with an emphasis on ethnic and regional cultures.15 In 
the new state, the Mohajirs (the migrants from North and Central India) gained control of the 
government, bureaucracy, and business, while the local elites were marginalized.16 The local 
politicians (the “feudals”) were more interested in preserving their power and cliental support base 
                                                          
13In addition to the Bengalis in East Pakistan, the new state had to integrate five major groups: the Sindhis, the Baloch, 
the Puktoons, the Punjabis, and the incoming Mohajirs or migrants from North and Central India, who migrated in 
huge numbers to the new state. See Owen Bennett-Jones, "Pakistan: Eye of the Storm," (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2009). p.43 
14The Muslim League encompassed a broad spectrum of organizations including quarrelsome rural grandees from the 
Punjab and Sindh, disgruntle refugee leaders from India, ambitious Muslim clerics, and squabbling Bengali politicians. 
Jalal. See P.61 and Ch. 3 for a broad overview.  
15 Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2005). p.10 
16Mohajirs were more educated, urbanized and professionally qualified and experienced in the British Indian 
bureaucracy than the local population. Stephen P Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Brookings Inst Press, 2004). pp.45-46  




than lending their support to the League.17 As the central government’s priorities became 
increasingly diverged from the provincial demands, the League leaders at the center lent their 
support to the feudals. The central leadership understood that the fate of the League was tied to the 
support and survival of the landed feudals.18 The instrument that hastened the disintegration of the 
Muslim League was the Pakistani army, which kept the civilian politicians on a “short leash”, 
while pursuing their self-anointed destiny as defenders of the nation against what they “imagined 
to be an ever present Indian threat.”19 
  The focus on rivalry with India served a useful purpose for the ruling elite. According to 
Pakistan scholar Husain Haqqani, the rivalry was used as an instrument to secure legitimacy and 
authority for the new state and to influence the relationship between the state and its citizens. 
Within weeks of independence, the Muslim League newspaper Dawn carried editorials that “called 
for ‘guns rather than butter’, urging a bigger and better-equipped army to defend ‘the sacred soil’ 
of Pakistan.”20 This meant prioritizing the military and security apparatus above anything else in 
the name of Pakistan’s security. In Pakistan, defense against India justified the call for a strong 
army and a strong state with consolidated central authority. For an insecure central leadership in 
Pakistan, the distinction between internal and external security threats became blurred. In order to 
legitimize their political authority Pakistani leaders must demonstrate strength and decisiveness 
                                                          
17Politics was dominated by local notables in West Pakistan. In Punjab and Sindh, the leadership was drawn from the 
landed elites known as “feudals.” Their politics was based on patron-client relationships that had long dominated the 
region. Eventually the local feudals were co-opted by the Muslim League. See John R Schmidt, The Unraveling: 
Pakistan in the Age of Jihad (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011). pp.22-23 
18 The landed families were in control of the provincial Muslim Leagues in the West Pakistan. They provided the bulk 
of the leadership at the center. According to one estimate, 7% of the landowners in West Pakistan owned 51% of the 
land, while the upper 1% owned 30% of the land. The landed elite class was so powerful that the central leadership 
was afraid to levy tax on their incomes or to initiate agrarian reforms. The League leaders at the center feared that 
antagonizing the elites might encourage mass exodus of prominent local notables from the League, the formation of 
opposition groups, and consequently, a serious loss of support for the central government. See Jalal.pp.66-67    
19 Schmidt.,pp. 22-23 and  33-34 
20 Quoted in Haqqani. p.14 




vis-à-vis India. This explains the preoccupation and even obsession of Pakistan’s leaders with the 
need to have a strong defense establishment since the early years of the state.21 Given Pakistan’s 
weak resource base, the leadership was ill-equipped to develop a strong defense establishment 
without external help.  
  
iii) The State of the Economy: The state of the economy in Pakistan was such that the 
government’s ability to exercise central authority over disparate national groups in the newly 
demarcated provinces was severely constrained. The partition of the subcontinent left Pakistan 
only 17.5 percent of the financial assets of British India, not all of which were available for its 
immediate use. The new state had less than 10 percent of the industrial base in British India and 
according to one estimate, in 1947 Pakistan’s total industrial assets were worth approximately 
$112 million, of which the better part was owned by non-Muslims who had fled to India after the 
partition.22 The government without adequate means found it impossible to arm and supply 
military forces sufficient to handle a multitude of internal and external security problems.23 The 
central government thus faced a dilemma in domestic resource distribution: defense spending 
absorbed nearly seventy percent of the central government’s total expenditures between 1948 and 
1950, which handicapped Pakistan’s domestic economic development efforts.24 Financially 
strapped Pakistan badly needed help and was not bashful about seeking it from the United States. 
                                                          
21 Jalal. pp. 48-49 
22 Pakistan had virtually no industry, and the major markets for its agricultural products were in India. The monetary 
assets of the government were held by the Reserve Bank of India and in the hostile atmosphere the transfer of assets 
was not a smooth process. The non-Muslim entrepreneurial class, which had dominated commerce in the areas now 
became Pakistan, either fled or transferred its capital across the new border. Ibid.p. 64; Haqqani. P. 11 
23 Robert J McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (Columbia University 
Press, 1994).p.66 
24 Ibid. p. 128. Pakistan’s finance minister Ghulam Mohammad commented on the state’s first budget which allocated 
70 percent of the total revenues for defense: “expenditure for defense . . . was higher than would normally be justified 





B) American Interests 
The Indian subcontinent appeared remote and less important to the American leadership 
preoccupied with the emerging Cold War challenges in the late 1940s. One analysis produced by 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947 placed India and Pakistan along with the colonial 
areas of North Africa in fourth place (after Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East) 
among areas important to U.S. security. The same analysis also maintained that the two states were 
not subject to direct Soviet aggression.25 These conclusions, however, changed in a few years in 
light of the tumultuous events in Asia and the Middle East in the early 1950s. With regards to 
Pakistan, America’s attitude toward its creation had been unenthusiastic as American leadership 
expressed support for a united India. Some U.S. media commentaries were hostile toward the idea 
of Pakistan and focused mainly on the Congress Party as the leading force for independence and 
on its principal leaders, Mahatma Gandhi and his designated heir, Jawaharlal Nehru.26 One way 
the Pakistanis could have won America’s sympathy for their cause was to tie Pakistan’s internal 
political instability to communist penetration orchestrated by the Soviet Union or the Communist 
China. Pakistan, however, did not have strong communist organizations capable of threatening the 
state’s political structure.27 
                                                          
for a young state”, which really should be channeled into the “social, industrial, and economic development of the 
country.” See Jalal.pp.70-71  
25 McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan., p. 14 
26 American media was unflattering toward the creation of Pakistan. For example, Time reported that the people of 
Karachi “did not welcome Pakistan with the wild enthusiasm that swept the new dominion of India. After all, Pakistan 
was the creation of one clever man, Jinnah.” See Kux. pp. 5-10  
27 Indeed efforts were made in the early 1950s to characterize labor troubles in various parts of the state as part of a 
grand communist design. In the early 1950, Pakistan intelligence services “had been fabricating increasingly bizarre 
reports about the fledgling local communist party and its purported plans to destabilize the state. These “subversive” 
activities were reported to have been linked to the Soviet embassy in Pakistan. Then in March 1951, Ayub Khan’s 
sudden elevation to the post of Commander-in-Chief was followed by an alleged coup attempt (known as “the 
Rawalpindi Conspiracy”) which was portrayed as linked to communist conspiracy. Subsequent evidence, however, 




 Despite a low priority on America’s Cold War agenda, American defense strategists 
explored the potentials of the subcontinent in the future American sphere of influence against the 
Soviet Union. Thus, it was argued that the conditions of political and economic deterioration and 
the near-chaotic situations in the region had created a power vacuum from which the Soviet Union 
stood to gain.28 One approach to the region highlighted the importance of Pakistan to U.S. national 
security objectives given the state’s geographic location. Another perspective recommended the 
United States maintain good relations with India especially in the aftermath of the Chinese 
Communist revolution. According to the latter approach, India and its leader Nehru held a special 
place in the developing world and gaining India’s support would be a moral and political advantage 
for the United States.29 The Truman administration, however, charted an evenhanded approach to 
the subcontinent. It refrained from taking sides for fear that open support for one would alienate 
the other and would entrap the United States in the region’s conflicts and might give the Soviet 
Union an opening to intervene in the region.30    
Although initially American policymakers had doubts about the feasibility of an alliance 
with Pakistan, increasing involvement of the Soviet Union in the Middle East generated a new 
urgency for a regional defense organization. As Nehru adopted a nonaligned foreign policy and 
made it clear that India would resist all efforts to draw it into the Western camp,31 the Eisenhower 
                                                          
suggest that the plot was a result of internal rivalries within the army than a communist conspiracy. Jalal. Pp. 75, 85-
87, 112, 119-20, 121-23.  
28 See McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan.pp. 13-15 
29 A State Department analysis highlighted India’s importance to the United States: “In all of Asia it is now the only 
nation that is large enough and has the power potential to resist a determined communist military effort with any 
possibility of success. If India should fall to the Communist power, a consolidation of that power throughout Asia 
would be inevitable. If we were to have an effective policy in Asia, therefore, India must be the keystone of that 
policy.” Quoted in ibid., p. 19 
30 The fear of entrapment also prevented the Truman administration from taking any side in the border dispute between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. see Kux. pp. 42-43 
31 Nehru repeatedly pronounced India’s nonaligned foreign policy. On one occasion he warned that “Once foreign 
relations go out of your hand into the charge of somebody else . . . to that extent and in that measure you are not 
independent.” Quoted in  McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan., p. 37 




administration adopted a changed approach to the region, shifting from evenhandedness (or a 
relative indifference between India and Pakistan) to a tilt toward Pakistan. American defense 
planners sought to incorporate Pakistan into a regional defense organization. The new policy was 
consistent with the administration’s approach to foreign policy which emphasized forming new 
alliances in the periphery.32 Pakistan’s strategic location and its possible importance in a 
confrontation with the Soviet Union had caught policy planners’ attention in Washington. One 
report noted the strategic importance of Pakistan and suggested that in a period of emergency, 
Pakistan could form a base both for military and air operations.33 To American defense planners, 
thus, Pakistan’s strategic importance was based on two considerations: a) Pakistan’s contiguous 
border with the Soviet Union which would facilitate the establishment of air bases and effective 
intelligence gathering facilities there, and b) Pakistan’s geographic proximity to the Persian Gulf 
which could enhance the defense of Middle East oil fields. 
 
Incentives for Alignment: A Summary The United States and Pakistan had divergent 
objectives in forming an alliance: Pakistan wanted an alignment with the U.S. to check the Indian 
threat (an external motivation) and to check various centripetal and irredentist forces (an internal 
security motivation). Pakistani leaders sought to strengthen the state’s military and its economy by 
gaining access to external economic and military resources. The United States, in contrast, sought 
to enlist Pakistan in the ensuing Cold War by utilizing Pakistan’s geostrategic location in U.S. 
maneuvers and potential war fighting capabilities against the Soviet Union. A growing number of 
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Soviet aggression. Ibid. pp. 155  
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officials in the U.S. were convinced that the Middle East--a paramount concern given its chronic 
instability, vulnerability to external aggression, and oil wealth--must be defended (and denied 
access to the Soviet Union) if a global war should erupt and they believed that Pakistan could 
become a strategic asset in achieving this goal.34 Thus, both parties sought to form an alliance 
albeit having divergent interests. In the following pages I analyze how the United States and 
Pakistan negotiated an agreement in the face of divergent interests by employing side payments to 
cement the alliance.  
 
C) Bargaining and the Alliance formation 
 
i) The Bargaining: The initial bargaining terms for Pakistan and the United States can 
be summarized as follows: Pakistan would form an alliance with the U.S. and join the U.S.-led 
regional security arrangements in exchange for a) military and economic aid, and b) a security 
guarantee from the U.S. against India; the United States was willing to provide military and 
economic aid in exchange for a) Pakistan’s inclusion in the regional security arrangements, and b) 
the ability to use Pakistan’s strategic location, including military bases, in any future confrontation 
with the Soviet Union. However, the U.S. refused to provide security guarantees against India. 
Thus, Pakistan’s key external security concern was not included in the agreement. Side payments, 
as we will see, were used to compensate for interest divergence and to cement the alliance.   
Pakistan’s political and military leaders made concerted efforts to convince American 
officials about Pakistan’s strategic value. They portrayed Pakistan as an anticommunist warrior 
even though Pakistan faced no communist threat. In the height of the Cold War, the Pakistani 
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leaders stressed their country’s value in a war with the Soviets. Immediately after independence, 
Jinnah explored the possibility of an alliance with the United States. He believed that Pakistan 
could extract a good “price” from the United States for such an alliance in light of Pakistan’s 
strategic location, which he thought was important in the “Great Game” between the great 
powers.35 One observer reported an overemphasis by Pakistan’s leaders of a Russian threat to 
Pakistan. This “manufactured threat” and “the hope of tapping the U.S. treasury was voiced so 
persistently that one wondered whether the purpose was to bolster the world against Bolshevism 
or to bolster Pakistan’s own uncertain position as a new political entity.”36 Soon after independence 
Pakistan lobbied Washington to obtain a $2 billion loan to meet the state’s economic and defense 
needs over the coming five years.37 From 1947 to the finalization of the alliance in 1954 Pakistan 
lobbied fervently in Washington for economic and military aid.38  
Jinnah’s successors maintained the same strategy—emphasizing Pakistan’s geo-strategic 
value in the Cold War-- to attract American aid. Pakistan’s military leader, Ayub Khan, portrayed 
Pakistan’s situation as being in the tradition of the nineteenth-century “Great Game” between 
Russia and Britain: in the new Great Game the threat was the possibility of a massive Soviet 
invasion through the mountain passes of Central Asia aimed at reaching the warm waters of the 
Arabian Sea. Ayub proposed to American officials that a proper response to the “Soviet design” 
should be an expanded Pakistani army properly equipped for the task of blocking the Soviets. He 
boasted about Pakistan’s potential to provide manpower and strategic bases and declared that 
Pakistan was “extremely anxious to cooperate with the United States.” In Ayub’s formulation, to 
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37 Pakistan received a $10 million relief grant or .5 percent of its request. See  Kux.  pp. 21-44 
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million worth of military equipment and again, as before, the request yielded no results. Ibid. p. 35, 52-53.  




win the “great game” the U.S. needed to strengthen Pakistan’s military with arms and equipment.39 
He further assured American officials by saying that “our army can be your army if you want us. 
But let’s make a decision.” In sum, Pakistani officials worked hard to convince American officials 
that Pakistan and its resources would be at America’s disposal in times of security crises in the 
region. They highlighted Pakistan’s support for American foreign policy objectives in the region. 
From the outset, the Pakistani leaders conditioned their support for American foreign 
policy on Pakistan’s receipt of tangible benefits from the United States. For example, Pakistan 
supported the U.S. position on Korea at the United Nations. But, when the U.S. asked that Pakistani 
troops join the UN forces in the Korean War, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, 
declined. He refused to send troops without an American commitment to strengthen Pakistan’s 
military capability. The Prime Minister thought the price of Pakistan’s support “should be a 
positive American assurance to help equip. . . [the] Pakistan army.”40 He further argued that his 
country might send troops to Korea only if the U.S. made a “commitment that will assure his 
people” (against possible Indian threat). Washington rejected such a condition, believing that such 
a commitment would alienate India and Afghanistan and limit U.S. freedom of action (that is, 
autonomy) in Asia.41 The Pakistani officials underscored Pakistan’s needs for aid in the context of 
the Cold War rivalry.42 They warned U.S. officials, in climacteric terms, that the government 
                                                          
39To allay U.S. concerns about the impact of American aid to India, Ayub asserted that if the United States 
strengthened Pakistan by providing economic and military aid, India would “drop its intransigent attitude on 
Kashmir.” Also, Pakistan’s Governor General Ghulam Mohammed reportedly promised that no U.S. military aid 
would ever be used against India; furthermore. Ibid. p. 55 
40 Jalal. p. 113 
41Kux. p.49 
42An interesting example in this regard involved Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan’s use of Moscow visit 
to secure an invitation from the Truman administration. In mid-1949, when Truman invited Indian leader Jawaharlal 
Nehru to the United States but not Liaquat Ali Khan, it hurt Liaquat’s political standing in Pakistan. The Pakistani 
leader countered the American move by eliciting an invitation to visit the Soviet Union. Liaquat’s Moscow visit was 
a signal to Washington that Pakistan should not be taken for granted. To counter any fallout from Liaquat’s visit to 
Moscow, Truman invited the Pakistani leader to the United States. Liaquat’s Moscow visit, however, did not 
materialize. Although the Pakistani leader was eager to travel on short notice, Moscow continued to delay the matters 
and eventually postponed the visit. See ibid.pp.32-33  




needed to show some results of (reward for) the state’s “pro-western policy” and “. . . If Pakistan 
does not get assistance from the West, the Government’s position will be grave. Pakistan may turn 
away from the West.” They wanted American officials to know that the future government in 
Pakistan might be controlled by groups hostile toward the West and aligned with the Soviet 
Union43       
The Pakistani ruling elite’s calculations for political survival played an important role in 
seeking an alliance with the United States. An increase in political instability, intraparty disputes 
within the League, and the lack of a resolution of the Kashmir dispute made the opposition a 
credible threat to the ruling elite’s hold on power. These internal troubles manifested themselves 
in a dire outcome: Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated on Oct 15, 1951. Pakistan 
went through important institutional changes after Liaquat’s assassination that altered his 
successor’s survival strategy. Liaquat’s successor Khwaja Nazimuddin’s brief tenure ended on 17 
April, 1953 when he was forced to resign by the governor-general in collaboration with the military 
leadership.44 Pakistan’s military establishment was now in firm control of the state’s foreign 
policy. Whereas Liaquat and Nazimuddin were worried about anti-western sentiments—especially 
when it came to Pakistan’s support for pro-American policies, the new mode of foreign 
policymaking lacked any concern about public opinion.45   
It is important to note that the new leadership was willing to join the alliance without having 
explicit security guarantee from the U.S. against India. This changed strategy resulted from 
deteriorating political and economic conditions in Pakistan that made external aid vital for the 
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ruling elite. A constitutional crisis concerning the power-sharing formula between the center and 
the provinces made the shaky balance between the two even more volatile. Around the same time 
sectarian rioting in West Pakistan (especially in Punjab) prompted the military to dismiss the 
provincial government in Punjab and impose martial law. In addition, Pakistan experienced a 
severe food shortage starting in 1952 for which the government needed urgent help from external 
sources. In the midst of these political and economic crises, Mohammad Ali Bogra, who was then 
Pakistan’s ambassador in Washington, was appointed as the new Prime Minister after Nazimuddin. 
By 1953 the military had become the dominant force in Pakistan whose leadership portrayed the 
organization as the only force capable of maintaining order.  The new Prime Minister’s priority 
was clear from the outset. If Bogra were to retain his power, he had to satisfy the defense 
establishment’s demand for military equipment. He had to use his connections in the United States 
to prepare the ground for a substantial economic and military aid package.46 Given Pakistan’s 
deteriorating political and economic conditions, Pakistan’s political and military leaders agreed to 
join the U.S-led defense arrangements in exchange for military and economic aid, even if the 
United States remained unwilling to give Pakistan a security commitment against India. That is, 
they were prepared to accept aid (side payments) that could help them to hold on to power even as 
they gave in on their principal concern—security guarantees against India.    
American policymakers in the Eisenhower administration needed to decide whether the 
advantages of having Pakistan’s contribution to Middle East defense as a member of the alliance 
would outweigh the adverse reaction in India. Many in the administration, prominently Vice 
President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, believed Pakistan’s inclusion 
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into the alliance would provide the United States with important strategic advantages.47 As noted 
previously, America’s interest in Pakistan was rooted in the state’s geostrategic location. 
According to one analysis, Pakistan’s air bases would become crucial bases for strategic bombers; 
Pakistan’s numerous airfields were within easy reach of Soviet Central Asia, including Ural and 
Siberian industrial areas that are far distant from U.S. bases in the Mediterranean and Arabia.48 
Implicitly or explicitly, the prospect of gaining access to Pakistan’s air bases “almost certainly 
factored into all U.S. assessments of Pakistan’s overall strategic worth.”49 Given the unequivocal 
enthusiasm Pakistani leaders had for the alliance, such an assessment was not unrealistic. The 
United States decided to provide military aid to Pakistan by forming an alliance with the state. 
Pakistan’s decision to form the alliance without getting a security guarantee against its 
principal rival is not consistent with the perspective that argues that external threat is the primary 
cause of alliance formation. Rather, the decision can be explained by the domestic political needs 
of Pakistan’s leaders and by their calculus for political survival. Side payments served as a positive 
inducement for the Pakistani leaders and facilitated the formation of an asymmetric alliance. James 
Morrow argues that asymmetric alliances are formed as a result of a security-autonomy trade-off 
between great powers and minor powers. In forming asymmetric alliances, according to this 
formulation, small states trade some autonomy in exchange for gains in security.50 The trade-off 
theory of asymmetric alliances contends that a simple security-autonomy may not be enough. In 
the absence of side payments, the autonomy-security trade-off would have left a deficit in benefit 
for Pakistan. Since the parties did not share a common enemy and the United States was not willing 
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48 Hanson Baldwin, "Pakistan Looms Large in South Asian Defense," The New York Times December 20, 1953; "A 
Real Ally in South Asia," U.S. News and World Report November 13, 1953. James W. Spain, “Pakistan: New Ally,” 
America 90 (March 13, 1954): 623-25 
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to offer any security guarantee against India, the security benefit for Pakistan was ambiguous at 
best. Without side payments an alliance with the United States would have endangered the survival 
prospects of Pakistani leaders. Pakistani public opinion, after all, was hostile toward the West. 
Moreover, the alignment signaled Pakistan’s preference for the U.S.-led alliance (which by 
implication, limited Pakistan’s options to pursue nonalignment or to join the Soviet bloc). Thus, 
for Pakistan, side payments filled the deficit in benefits from the alliance and compensated for the 
vagueness of security gains. 
 
ii) The Alliance and its provisions: The Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), 
a British-led military group to be headquartered in Egypt with mainly Arab members and perhaps 
including Pakistan, was the initial formulation for a regional defense pact. Pakistan rejected the 
idea in 1952. Likewise, Pakistan was not enthusiastic about joining the altered informal version 
of MEDO.51 Given Pakistan’s unwillingness, Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade 
concluded that Pakistan would probably change its mind and join an anticommunist alliance if 
the United States were willing to provide enough military equipment.52 After MEDO failed to 
materialize, Secretary of State Dulles advanced the idea of a northern-tier defense arrangement 
in July 1953 to bolster Middle East security. He believed that Pakistan would be a strong supporter 
of such an arrangement against communism.53 
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52 Kux. p. 47- 49 
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The Eisenhower administration decided to form a bilateral alliance with Pakistan. Pakistan 
soon join two U.S.-led regional alliances. The United States encouraged Pakistan to join these 
alliances to incorporate Pakistan into a broader regional defense system against possible Soviet 
aggression. With encouragement from Washington, Pakistan and Turkey negotiated a bilateral 
treaty for military, economic, and cultural cooperation in February 1954. This first step toward the 
broader northern-tier arrangement provided the rationale for Pakistan to seek arms from the United 
States. Pakistan immediately submitted a formal request for U.S. military aid and the United States 
responded positively. President Eisenhower, concerned about India’s reaction, assured the Indian 
leaders that the United States would not allow Pakistan to use American military aid against 
India.54 On May 19, 1954, Pakistan and the United States signed a mutual defense assistance 
agreement. The accord provided the legal basis for military aid. The first regional alliance that 
Pakistan joined was the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). After France’s defeat in 
Indochina, the SEATO was intended to create a collective security mechanism in Southeast Asia 
against communist expansion. Pakistan sought to have the SEATO shield aimed against aggression 
from all quarters, including protection against the Indian threat.55 However, Dulles made it clear 
that the SEATO would deal only with communist aggression lest it became entrapped in the India-
Pakistan disputes.  Pakistan joined the alliance and became a founding member of the SEATO. 
Pakistan joined a second regional security organizations when it became a member of the Baghdad 
Pact, which was designed to counter Soviet influence in the Middle East.56 Joining the Baghdad 
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to resist it wherever it came from.” Quoted in Syed Adil Husain, "Politics of Alliance and Aid: A Case Study of 
Pakistan (1954-1966)," Pakistan Horizon 32, no. 1/2 (1979). 
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Pact and the SEATO gave Karachi a strengthened claim on U.S. resources and in turn, the United 
States acquired an even larger stake in Pakistan’s well-being.  
 
D) The Trade-off  
         Soon after the completion of the bilateral alliance, the United States and Pakistan had to 
renegotiate the amount and scope of aid. The Pakistanis quickly and loudly voiced their 
dissatisfaction. As one observer put it, “A gaping chasm existed between the free-flowing dollars 
that Pakistani military officers and bureaucrats conjured up as their just reward for open alignment 
with the West and the modest dollar figures contemplated by Washington planners.”57 Military 
Chief Ayub complained that if Pakistan was to get no more than what the U.S. was offering ($30 
million) in the form of military assistance, it would be better for Pakistan not to be involved in a 
defense arrangement with the United States. The Pakistani leaders made the case that alignment 
with the United States was such a risky decision that without enough military and economic aid, 
the survival of the pro-U.S. ruling group was in danger.58 Prime Minister Bogra urged Washington 
to grant more aid and argued, in a meeting with Dulles, that without sufficient aid he would be 
“derided” in Pakistan. Secretary of State Dulles, annoyed by numerous requests for more aid, told 
Bogra that he “thought Pakistan had undertaken its anti-communist stand because it was right, not 
just to make itself eligible for certain sums of dollar aid.”59 These complaints from the Pakistani 
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officials provide further support for the idea that gaining material support (economic and military 
aid) was a crucial motivation for the Pakistani leaders’ decision to join the alliance. 
 Pakistan’s anxieties over the size of the American aid package eased as the United States 
had put together a more generous and comprehensive aid package for Pakistan. Washington 
promised $105.9 million as economic aid for the 1954 fiscal year. More importantly, U.S. officials 
also presented Pakistan with a military program boosted to $50 from the initial $30 million and 
established specific program goals: the United States committed to equip 4 army infantry and 1.5 
armored divisions, to provide modern aircraft for 6 air force squadrons, and to supply 12 vessels 
for the navy. The estimated cost of this program was $171 million.60 The Pentagon later 
recalculated the possible cost of the military program promised to Pakistan in 1954 to $301.1 
million. Another interagency review of foreign military aid programs revealed that fulfilling the 
October 1954 arms aid commitment to Pakistan would cost $505 million—almost three times the 
original estimate of $171 million. Thus, the United States became Pakistan’s primary supplier of 
economic and military aid. By 1957, Pakistan was receiving significant amounts of defense 
equipment and training, along with substantial economic aid. These aid programs improved 
Pakistan’s armed forces across the board.61  
 Pakistan’s sense of security was strengthened by gaining access to American military aid. 
The United States, as expected, gained in autonomy or freedom of action in the region by getting 
access to Pakistan’s strategic bases. The United States was granted permission to two important 
bases in Pakistan for intelligence gathering purposes. Pakistan allowed the United States to 
establish a secret U.S. intelligence facility and granted permission for U-2 aircraft to fly from 
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Pakistan. Later it was announced that Pakistan would grant the U.S. Air Force a ten-year lease to 
set up a “communications facility” at Badaber, ten miles from Peshawar (the capital of the 
Northwest Frontier Province). The air force communications station was the cover for a major 
communication intercept operation for collecting electronic intelligence, run by the National 
Security Agency (NSA). Because of its proximity to Soviet Central Asia, Badaber was an excellent 
place from which to monitor signals from Soviet missile test sites and to intercept sensitive 
communications. The Badaber facility became an important link in the chain of electronic listening 
posts that U.S. intelligence agencies established around the borders of the Soviet Union in order 
to gain knowledge and understanding of Russian military capabilities. Pakistan also granted the 
CIA permission to use the Peshawar airport as a takeoff point for flights over the Soviet Union by 
U-2 aircraft, known as the “spy in the sky.” The photo intelligence gathered by the U-2 had vital 
strategic importance in the years before the United States developed space satellites. Pakistan, 
thus, joined countries, such as Norway, West Germany, Japan, and Turkey that offered base 
facilities to the United States for secret aircraft and intelligence gathering efforts.62 Pakistan’s 
willingness to host these key U.S. intelligence operations substantially increased the value of the 
alliance for the United States. In return for side payments, the United States gained strategic bases 
that it judged to be of great importance for U.S. national security.  
 In addition to the base facilities, one has to consider Pakistan’s autonomy loss in terms of 
the opportunity costs of the alliance. Pakistan’s inclusion into the U.S.-led alliances had adverse 
effects on its relations with the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and other non-
aligned countries. The fallout was especially harsh on Pakistan’s relations with key Islamic 
countries. For example, during the Suez crisis in 1956 the Egyptian leader Gamal Nasser, a popular 
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figure in the Islamic World and among non-aligned countries, publicly criticized Pakistan (as a 
“stooge of Western imperialism”) for its alliance with the United States.63 More importantly, the 
alliance hurt the potential for a diplomatic solution to the Kashmir conflict. The Indian leadership 
back away from an earlier pledge to hold plebiscite in Kashmir and accused Pakistan of introducing 
the Cold War into the region.64 The alliance cost Pakistan the Soviet support for the Kashmir 
plebiscite. Instead, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and premier Marshal Nikolai Bulganin, in 
their visit to India in 1955, declared Kashmir as an “integral part of India”.65 The Pakistani leaders 
expected that these autonomy losses and liabilities on the state’s foreign policy would be 
compensated by side payments from the United States.      
At the formative stage of the alliance both sides gained from the alliance as expected. 
Pakistan gained in side payments: between 1954 and 1959, the United States provided $425 million 
in military aid and $855 million in economic aid to Pakistan.66 The U.S. gained in autonomy 
(freedom of action) in the region by gaining influence in Pakistan’s foreign policy during the height 
of the Cold War and importantly, having access to strategic bases in Pakistan. Pakistan, as Ayub 
put in his autobiography, Friends Not Masters, had become America’s “most allied ally in Asia.”67 
Figure1 below shows the volumes of side payments the United States provided to Pakistan from 
1948-2010. The Figure shows that a large amount of side payments followed immediately after 
the formation of the alliance. However, the flow of aid, particularly military aid, fluctuated.  The 
volumes of aid have been correlated with the strategic importance of Pakistan to the United States. 
The fluctuation is fairly consistent with the ups and downs in the intra-alliance relationship. The 
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bilateral relations attained, according to one observer, an “unsteady equilibrium” in the early 
1960s.68 During the maintenance phases the alliance has suffered from numerous difficulties due 
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Pakistan signed a second bilateral security agreement with the United States (in addition to the 
1954 bilateral treaty) in March 1959. The United States subsequently received a written promise 
(from Pakistan) of unrestricted access to the Peshawar base for ten years.69 The security agreement 
did not offer Pakistan anything new: it committed the United States to take actions only in the 
instances of communist aggression.70 It did not commit the United States to defend Pakistan 
against India—something that the Pakistani leaders wanted. It did, however, offer the Pakistani 
leader an added tool for demanding more side payments. For example, the Pakistani leader, Ayub 
Khan, successfully extracted supersonic F-104 fighter aircraft from the United States in 1960 by 
using the Badaber facility as a lever.71  Despite Ayub’s success in gaining the aircraft, the alliance 
relations began to unravel by the mid-1960s. At the heart of discords between the allies was 
divergent interests which led to different understandings of the outcomes the alliance supposed to 
produce. We will see in the following pages that as the level of divergent interests varied, so did 
the amount of side payments Pakistan received from the United States.    
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A) A Troubled Alliance: Diverging Views on Alliance Obligations 
 
This section explains major phases of strains in the US-Pakistan alliance since the 1960s. A 
principal reason for the strains in the alliance was diverging views on alliance obligations. This 
was because both the United States and Pakistan pursued the alliance with diverging and in some 
cases with conflicting objectives. As Shirin Tahir-Kheli noted, “The fundamental dichotomy 
between the U.S. and Pakistani perceptions of the source of threat was irreconcilable.”72  The first 
sign of a serious trouble began when the United States decided to provide long-term aid to India 
in the early 1960s. The Pakistani leadership reacted to the growing U.S.-India relations by 
diversifying their foreign relations, particularly by developing close relations with Communist 
China, which the United States regarded as contrary to Pakistan’s alliance obligations. Contrary to 
the American view, the Pakistani leadership construed the 1959 agreement and its alignment with 
the United States as an open-ended pledge of U.S. help.73 Each side pursued policies that the other 
deemed contrary to its interests. Both parties complained about unmet expectations and accused 
each other of reneging on the alliance obligations. During these troubled phases of the alliance, 
the degree of interest divergence increased to the extent that it diminished Pakistan’s bargaining 
lever and made Pakistan’s demands for side payments too costly for the United States.   
i) U.S. Aid to India:   The Pakistanis often complained that the United States treated India 
better than it treated Pakistan. American economic aid to India and the emphasis on India’s 
economic development was part of a new approach put forwarded by the Eisenhower 
administration in the late 1950s that focused on economic development as a way to contain 
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Communism in the Third World. This developmental approach to combating communism picked 
up speed when John F. Kennedy became president.74 The Pakistanis opposed this policy and were 
increasingly irritated by the steady increase in U.S. economic aid to India.75 Figure 4.2 below 
shows U.S. economic and military aid to India as a percentage of U.S. aid to Pakistan from 1955 
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The Indo-American relations improved markedly under the Kennedy administration. A rapid 
increase in U.S. economic and later military aid to India caused much anger and frustrations in 
Pakistan. Whereas the administration substantially increased economic aid to India to $1 billion, 
it pledged only $150 million in 1961 for the Pakistan aid consortium, organized by the World Bank 
to raise funds for Pakistan’s economic development. Indeed, as figure 2 shows, from 1955 to 1979 
India received more economic aid, on a yearly basis, from the United States than Pakistan did. The 
Pakistani leadership, disappointed by this disparity, pressed the U.S. officials to use economic aid 
as a lever to force India to make concessions on Kashmir. Having failed to persuade the Kennedy 
administration to put pressure on India and concerned about the possibility of U.S. military aid to 
India, a frustrated Ayub warned that Pakistan would reconsider its membership in the SEATO and 
might leave the Western alliances.76 Despite Ayub’s threat of defection, the United States decided 
to provide military aid to India in the wake of the Sino-Indian border war of 1962.77 For some 
American defense strategists, the border war was an opportunity to shore up an anti-communist 
front and to strengthen U.S. relations with India.  
To allay Pakistan’s concern, the Kennedy administration assured Ayub—as the United States 
assured India in 1954 before giving military aid to Pakistan—that the United Sates was committed 
to Pakistan’s security. For the Pakistanis, U.S. aid to India, in the absence of a solution to the 
Kashmir conflict, increased Pakistan’s insecurity and demonstrated that the U.S. government was 
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insensitive to Pakistan’s core security interest. In response, Ayub stipulated the need for Pakistan 
to diversify its foreign policy in order to reduce dependency on the United States.78  
ii) Pakistan’s triangular diplomacy: Hosting U.S. intelligence facilities posed certain 
entrapment risks for Pakistan. These risks came close to fruition in May 1960 when the Soviet 
Union shot down a U-2 spy plane launched from the U.S. facilities in Pakistan. The Soviet leader 
singled out Pakistan and warned: “Do not pay with fire, gentlemen! . . . If any American plane is 
allowed to use Peshawar as a base of operations against the Soviet Union, we will retaliate 
immediately.”79 Although the U-2 incident and the Soviet threat should have activated the security 
guarantee (against any threats of communist aggression) embedded in the alliance, Ayub doubted 
American commitment to Pakistan’s security.80 Ayub stressed that although Pakistan would 
maintain its alliance with the United States, it needed to reduce total dependence on the United 
States. To this end, Ayub devised a strategy that he called “walking on a triangular tightrope”: 
maintaining good relations with the United States while developing friendlier relations with China 
and the Soviet Union.81 
Although Ayub’s triangular diplomacy did not achieve its stated objectives, it brought 
Pakistan closer to China. Pakistan’s relations with Communist China improved markedly in the 
1960s that caused much tension in the U.S.-Pakistan alliance. Pakistan switched its vote on the 
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China representation issue at the UN in 1961 to support the Chinese communists in the place of 
the Chinese nationalists. Pakistan and China subsequently reached a number of bilateral 
agreements—such as a Kashmir border agreement in December 1962 and a civil aviation 
agreement in August 1963—that marked a step toward improving the bilateral relations.82 The 
Chinese leadership responded positively to the Pakistani gestures: China formally announced its 
support for the Pakistani position on the Kashmir issue and provided Pakistan a $60 million 
interest-free loan.83 The Soviet Union was another part of Pakistan’s triangular diplomacy. Ayub 
assured the Soviet leaders in April 1965 that Pakistan would not serve as an instrument 
(particularly referring to the Badaber facilities) of US policy in South Asia if the Soviet Union 
supported Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute.84 From 1967 to 1969, the Soviet Union offered 
Pakistan multiple inducements, such as expanded economic aid, military aid (for the first time), 
and opening up transit trade across Pakistan and Afghanistan to permit increased economic activity 
between the Soviet Union and South Asia in an effort to offset Chinese influence and reduce U.S. 
position in Pakistan.85 Pakistan, however, could not sustain the Soviet leg of its triangular 
diplomacy. Cooperating with the Soviet Union or participating in the Soviet-led regional 
arrangements would have risked involving Pakistan in an anti-Chinese groupings. As the Sino-
Soviet split was then at its height, the Soviet leadership offered Pakistan a choice: if Pakistan 
wanted more arms from the USSR, it had to distance itself from China; Pakistan could not be on 
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friendly terms with both at the same time. Facing a trade-off between the Soviet Union and China, 
Pakistan opted for the later.86  
Ayub’s triangular diplomacy infuriated American officials. President Kennedy made it 
clear that the U.S. core interest was the prevention of control of Europe by the Soviet Union or 
Asia by Communist China. He warned the Pakistanis regarding their growing relations with China: 
Pakistan “must realize that there are certain limits which should not be overstepped if a fruitful 
Pak-US relationship can continue.” Similarly, President Johnson told Ayub that if Pakistan wanted 
to receive American aid, “there could be no serious relationship with China.”87 For Johnson, 
Pakistan’s relations with communist countries would destroy the foundation, the raison d’etre, of 
the U.S.-Pakistan alliance. The Sino-Pakistani relationship, despite American opposition in the 
1960s, flourished and China has remained Pakistan’s close strategic partner in the regional politics.     
iii) A Commitment Problem:  The build-up tensions in the alliance manifested their 
effects on Pakistan’s inability to obtain American assistance, which in turn reinforced the Pakistani 
leaders’ doubt about the sincerity of U.S. commitment to defend Pakistan’s security.88 The doubt 
came to fruition during the Indo-Pakistani wars in 1965 and 1971. The 1965 India-Pakistan war 
broke out in an inopportune phase of the alliance. When the war took a turn for the worse for 
Pakistan,89 Ayub, citing the 1959 the bilateral agreement, asked for immediate American military 
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aid. The Johnson administration, instead, suspended military and economic aid to Pakistan and 
India on September 8, 1965. The U.S. arms embargo hurt the Pakistani defense establishment more 
than it did India since the Pakistani military was heavily dependent on American weapons and 
equipment. The Pakistanis accused the United States of rewarding India’s aggression and warned 
a dire consequence of the embargo on the alliance relations. In the end, the Pakistani leadership, 
feeling bitterly let down by the United States, accepted the UN imposed ceasefire. While the 
United States imposed arms embargo, China stepped up its role as Pakistan’s arms supplier.90 
Although the Pakistanis appreciated a relatively better American response to the 1971 war, 
they were disappointed that the United States did not intervene militarily to prevent Pakistan’s 
territorial dismemberment. When East Pakistan declared independence on March 26th, 1971, the 
civil war (or the Bangladesh’s war of independence) between the two wings began.91 While the 
Pakistani army’s indiscriminate killings led to a humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan, the Nixon 
administration remained silent. A New York Times editorial noted, “Washington’s persistent 
silence on recent events in Pakistan is increasingly incomprehensible in light of eye witness 
evidence that the Pakistani army has engaged in indiscriminate slaughter.”92 The administration’s 
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reluctance to put pressure on Pakistan was due to America’s rapprochement effort with China in 
1971 in which the Pakistani leader Yahya Khan, who succeeded Ayub Khan following the 1965 
war, played the role of a mediator between Washington and Beijing. India officially intervened in 
the war when Pakistan broadened the conflict by initiating preemptive air attacks against India (on 
December 3, 1971). In light of Indian intervention and perhaps the fear that the Indo-Soviet 
alignment, formalized as a friendship treaty in August 1971, might disintegrate Pakistan,93 the 
United States threatened to intervene on Pakistan’s behalf. President Nixon ordered nuclear aircraft 
carrier Enterprise to proceed toward the Bay of Bengal as a way to underscore the credibility of 
the threat.94 Given the importance of Pakistan’s role in the secret diplomacy with China, a 
reasonable inference can be made that President Nixon did not want to put pressure on the Pakistani 
leader on the East Pakistan crisis lest it jeopardized the rapprochement effort with China.95 Despite 
America’s measured action, Pakistan’s defeat in the 1971 War and its eventual dismemberment 
with the birth of an independent Bangladesh was a bitter experience for the Pakistanis. Pakistan’s 
alliance with the United States did not save its territorial unity.  
The commitment problem, as explained here, was at the heart of divergent interests between 
the parties. The United States never gave Pakistan an explicit security guarantee against India, 
which has always been the primary concern for the Pakistanis. The Nixon administration’s “tilt” 
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toward Pakistan ended soon after its rapprochement with China was completed by 1972, at a time 
when Pakistan needed the United States to replenish its lost weapons and equipment after the war 
of 1971.96 The bilateral relations were about to hit another roadblock as Pakistan commenced on 
a nuclear arms race with India. 
iv) Pakistan’s Nuclear Program:  Pakistan’s nuclear ambition has been a source of 
friction in the alliance for decades. The nuclear arms race in the subcontinent begun when India 
detonated an underground nuclear device on May 8, 1974. Reacting to India’s action, Prime 
Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto vowed to follow suit and to develop Pakistan’s own nuclear device.97 
American efforts, which involved promises of economic and military rewards, to dissuade Pakistan 
from the nuclear arms race failed to materialize from the outset. In light of the mounting evidence 
that Pakistan was pressing ahead with its nuclear program, the United States offered both carrots 
and sticks to sway Pakistan from the nuclear path.98 For carrots, the United States lifted the arms 
embargo on Pakistan (and India) on February 1975. Importantly, the Ford administration offered 
110 A-7 attack bombers, which the Pakistani air force wanted to improve its strike capability 
against India. For sticks, the administration warned Pakistani officials about harsher treatment 
should Jimmy Carter, who was favorite to win the 1976 election, elected President. In addition, 
the administration let the Pakistanis know that it may have to cut-off foreign aid as required by the 
Glenn-Symington amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which barred assistance to non-NPT 
(the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) countries that are pursing nuclear capability. Thus, the deal 
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on the table entailed Pakistan to forgo its nuclear ambitions and in exchange the United States 
would provide a substantial conventional arms package.99 Pakistan rejected the offer believing that 
the state’s security against India could only be enhanced by acquiring nuclear weapons. The 
bilateral tension over Pakistan’s nuclear program abated in the 1980s for the sake of mounting a 
covert war against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.     
   Pakistan’s nuclear program became a source of tension again after the end of the Afghan 
War in the early 1990s. As it was no longer in doubt that Pakistan possessed a nuclear device and 
Pakistan’s strategic importance, which prevented punitive actions before, to the United Sates 
declined sharply, President Bush imposed sanctions, as specified in the Pressler provisions, on 
Pakistan in October 1990.100 As a result, the $564 million economic and military aid program 
approved for fiscal year 1991 was frozen. The loss of nearly $300 million of arms and other 
military equipment a year was a heavy blow to Pakistan’s defense establishment.101 The Pakistanis 
criticized the Pressler Amendment as unfair since it penalized only Pakistan but not India. The 
bilateral stand-off got worse when India exploded a series of underground devices on May 11, 
1998. The Clinton administration, like his predecessors, attempted to persuade Pakistan’s Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif not to follow suit by offering tangible benefits, such as the resumption of 
economic and military aid as well as the delivery of the F-16s aircraft. Prime Minister Sharif, 
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however, faced a difficult choice, one that could jeopardize his political survival. On the one hand, 
if Pakistan tested a nuclear device, the United States would certainly impose new sanctions which 
in combination with the existing Pressler sanctions would take a huge toll on Pakistan’s weak 
economy. On the other hand, if he did not test, Sharif would have to pay a huge political cost at 
home as Pakistanis were clamoring for their state to match India’s test. In the end, the Pakistani 
leader gave in to mounting pressure from domestic forces and Pakistan exploded a total of six 
underground nuclear devices by the end of May 1998. As expected, the United States imposed 
sanctions on Pakistan once again.102  
A pertinent question thus becomes: could the United States have persuaded Pakistan from 
the nuclear path? One might suggest that Pakistan’s objective in developing nuclear capability and 
gaining parity vis-à-vis India’s nuclear power was an indivisible issue. The Pakistani leaders could 
not have traded the issue for side payments. Both Bhutto and Sharif faced tremendous domestic 
pressure to develop Pakistan’s nuclear capability. While exploring how to respond to India’s 
nuclear test, Prime Minister Sharif was reportedly told by the editor of the widely read Urdu 
newspaper Nawai-i-Waqt, “There is going to be an explosion soon. It will either be a Pakistani 
nuclear test or your being blown out of office!”103 The Pakistani leaders would have jeopardize 
their political survival had they gave in to American pressure. It can also be argued that the United 
States did not offer the Pakistani leaders a big enough side payments package to induce Pakistan’s 
concessions on the nuclear program. Indeed, Prime Minister Bhutto argued in 1975 that Pakistan’s 
need for improving security after India’s nuclear test might be fulfilled and Pakistan might be 
deterred from seeking nuclear weapons if the United States provided sufficient conventional 
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weapons.104 The U.S. offers of conventional weapons (offered by the Ford and Clinton 
administration) were inadequate for the Pakistani leaders to make concessions on the nuclear 
program. Given the past experience—American indifference, as perceived by the Pakistanis, to 
Pakistan’s security concerns—Pakistani officials were reluctant to give up on the nuclear program. 
A big enough side payments package, such as a security guarantee against India and offering the 
U.S. nuclear umbrella (the kind that the United States offered to Japan) to Pakistan could perhaps 
worked to dissuade Pakistan from its nuclear path.105 The United States was unwilling to offer 
such a guarantee as it was too costly for America’s strategic interests in the region.  
As we have seen, the United States and Pakistan had fundamental disagreements as to what 
their obligations were to each other as allies. These disagreements were an outcome of their 
divergent interests in the alliance. Pakistan’s relations with China, which was considered a threat 
to U.S. interests in Asia, remained a source of discords between the allies until 1971. American 
policymakers detested Pakistan relations with communist China to the extent that President 
Kennedy warned the Pakistanis that “if they don’t play ball, we will give our aid to someone else.” 
Another contentious issue was U.S. military aid to India, which increased Pakistanis’ perception 
of insecurity and reinforced the idea that the United States was insensitive to Pakistan’s security. 
While the importance of Badaber facilities to the United States in the early 1960s mediated 
divergent interests and allowed Pakistan to obtain side payments by using the base as a lever, 
developments in U.S. space satellites capable of intercepting Soviet communications waned the 
                                                          
104 Ibid. P. 216. See also, Lewis W. Simons, "Bhutto, Citing Sikkim, Seeks Arms," The Washington Post September 
11, 1974; Bernard Weinraub, "Pakistan Presses U.S. For Arms," The New York Times October 14, 1974; "Ford Sees 
Bhutto and Hints U.S. May Ease Pakistan Arms Curb," ibid. February 6, 1975. 
105 As some American officials argued that Pakistan might be deterred from its nuclear program only if the United 
States offered to rewrite the 1959 security pledge to Pakistan--which obliged the United States to come Pakistan’s 
defense in case of attack by a communist country—promising to defend Pakistan against India. See Bernard 
Gwertzman, "Washington Plans $500 Million in Aid for Pakistanis," ibid. March 24, 1981.   




base’s importance by the mid-1960s.106 The level of divergent interests in the mid-1960s, thus, 
changed from medium to high. The effects of this change were seen when the United States 
imposed a decade-long arms embargo on Pakistan in 1965. Finally, Pakistan’s nuclear program 
injected more tensions into the alliance and Pakistan suffered more punitive sanctions. The next 
section delves into the revival of the alliance. It shows that the parties found the level of divergent 
interests was within a bargaining range and the alliance cooperation was achievable for a price. 
    
B) The Revival of the Alliance  
The U.S.-Pakistan alliance was revived following two events that broke the phases of Pakistan’s 
relative insignificance to the United States and made the state a crucial U.S. ally. The Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and the ensuing U.S.-financed covert war against communist forces in 
Afghanistan marked the first event. The second was the U.S.-led War on Terror in Afghanistan. In 
both instances the United States and Pakistan were able to bargain a level of cooperation facilitated 
by a large amount of side payments.  
i) The Afghan War: The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979 elevated 
Pakistan’s profile in Washington as a frontline state. Although the Soviet officials informed 
Pakistan that the scope of the invasion was limited, the Pakistani government decided to oppose 
the Soviets in Afghanistan publicly, would provide shelter for Afghan refugees, and would 
covertly offer clandestine military assistance to anti-Communist insurgents.107 The degree of 
interest divergence between the United States and Pakistan can be characterized as medium in the 
ensuing Afghan War. Both parties sought to topple the Kabul government to achieve different 
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objectives. American interest in war derive from the Cold War logic. For the United States, “It was 
revenge time after the series of U.S. defeats in Vietnam, Angola, the Horn of Africa, etc. It was 
payback time.”108  For President Zia, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan did not necessarily raise 
alarm concerning Pakistan’s security. Even though he accused the Soviet Union of having 
expansionist agenda in the region, the Pakistani leader did not move any troops from Pakistan’s 
border with India to its border with Afghanistan. This suggests that Zia was not worried about 
hostile Soviet action against Pakistan. If he did, as Haqqani points out, “there would have to be at 
least some Pakistani resistance before American and other Western troops come to Pakistan’s 
defense.”109 Instead, the Pakistani leader saw the war as an opportunity to secure Pakistan’s 
strategic interests in Afghanistan by replacing hostile Afghan leaders with friendly ones.110 Thus, 
it was possible to find a cooperative arrangement for a price.  
American intention to punish the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (as stipulated in the “Carter 
Doctrine”) made Pakistan’s role critical and the Pakistani leader, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, was 
intent on using his state’s newfound importance and an improved bargaining position to extract 
maximum side payments possible. In an effort to maximize the Soviet costs of the invasion, the 
United States decided to collaborate with Pakistan and in exchange for Pakistan’s cooperation, the 
Carter administration offered Pakistan $400 million of military and economic aid over two years. 
Zia, however, rejected the offer as “peanuts,” too small a compensation.111 Although aid 
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negotiations failed, the Carter administration expanded the CIA’s covert cooperation with 
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (the ISI) to provide weapons and ammunition to 
anti-communist insurgent groups in Afghanistan, known as mujahedeen (freedom fighters).112 
According to this scheme, which remained intact throughout the War, the CIA funneled aid 
through the ISI, which then distributed the supplies to the mujahedeen.113 The scheme provided 
the Pakistani military and the ISI with the means to control the mujahedeen and to a large extent 
enhanced Pakistan’s ability to influence the outcome in the war.114 Beyond this limited level of 
cooperation, the Pakistani leader was aiming for a more substantial amount of side payments. The 
Carter administration’s offer was not good enough and Zia was hoping for a better future.  
Fortunately for the Pakistani leader, one of the priorities of the incoming Reagan 
administration was to forging a close relationship with Pakistan to punish the Soviet invasion in 
Afghanistan as a part of its larger effort to check Soviet expansion in the Third World.115 The 
United States and Pakistan came to an understanding, similar to the scheme used by the Carter 
administration, of how to wage a covert war in Afghanistan: the Pakistani military and the ISI 
would act as intermediaries between the CIA and the mujahedeen groups.116 The United States 
now offered, much to the satisfaction of the Pakistanis, a generous package—a $3.2 billion, multi-
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year commitment divided between economic and military aid.117 As the covert operation expanded 
and American officials urged the Pakistanis to “grow the war” as much as possible, Zia advised 
his military to practice caution in order not to provoke major Soviet retaliation, as he wanted “to 
keep the pot boiling, but not have it boil over.”118 Indeed, the Pakistani leader had every incentive 
to “keep the pot boiling” as he was able to extract massive amount of side payments including 
advanced military equipment and the state-of-the-art F-16 aircraft (which were limited to NATO 
allies and Japan).119 Zia knew how to keep the American patron interested in Pakistan: he 
successfully invoked anti-communist fear and labelled the Soviet strategy as a new “great game” 
in which Afghanistan was a gateway to the Russian push toward the Arabian Sea.120 As long as 
the war “pot” in Afghanistan was “boiling,” American aid to Afghan mujahedeen (which implied 
more aid to Pakistan) would continue to flow.   
An expanded U.S.-Pakistan cooperation in the wake of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
was a blessing for the Pakistani leader. It enabled Zia to consolidate his power at home and to 
enhance his international prestige as a leader who was standing up to the Soviet aggression. The 
massive volume of side payments from the United State enhanced Zia’s political power and 
survival potential. By late 1982, the United States was providing Pakistan with $600 million a year 
in economic and military aid. With Pakistan on the front line, massive aid from the United States 
and matching amount from Saudi Arabia, there was a growing and potent insurgency against the 
Soviet forces in Afghanistan.121 The infusion of billions of dollars helped Pakistan’s lagging 
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economy and large amounts of military aid and equipment kept the military satisfied. In keeping 
with previous understanding, the United States refrained from criticizing Zia’s handling of 
domestic politics or Pakistan’s nuclear program. When Pakistan’s nuclear program caused trouble 
again in the U.S. Congress in 1984 and 1985, the Pakistani leader assumed, correctly, that the U.S. 
government would prioritize getting Pakistan’s cooperation in Afghanistan than getting tough over 
the nuclear issue. Thus, Zia believed that as long as Pakistan did not explode a nuclear device and 
the Red Army was in Afghanistan (which Zia thought would remain there for a very long time), 
U.S. military and economic aid to Pakistan would continue. Indeed, President Reagan certified in 
October 1986, as required by the Pressler Amendment, that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear 
device even though mounting evidence suggested otherwise.122 As the Afghan war grew in 
intensity by 1986, the United States doubled the funding for covert operation from $300 million 
to $600 million annually. By the end of 1986, with matching contribution from Saudi Arabia, more 
than $1 billion a year worth of supplies were being pumped into Pakistan for the Afghan 
insurgents.123   
Although the United States and Pakistan wanted to defeat the Soviet forces and their allies 
in Afghanistan, they had different objectives in the final outcome of the war. As the Soviet 
withdrawal seemed more likely by 1987, Pakistan sought a favorable political outcome (in the 
composition of the Afghan government, not just a simple Soviet withdrawal) in the Afghan war. 
Zia believed that victory by the mujahedeen could produce, for the first time since 1947, a 
government in Kabul friendly toward Pakistan. This outcome would enable Pakistan to gain 
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“strategic depth” against India, a long goal of the Pakistani military.124 Pakistan’s overall 
objectives in the Afghan war also came in conflict with American objective. Whereas U.S. was 
interested in getting the Russians out, according to U.S. ambassador to Pakistan Arnold Raphael, 
“Zia and the ISI . . . felt that after eight years of war Pakistan was entitled to run its own show in 
Kabul.”125 A final accord, the Geneva accords, was signed on April 14, 1988 to end the war and 
the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan on February 15, 1989. Although the large 
amounts of side payments was a boon for the Pakistani leader, a long term consequence of this 
massive infusion of money and military equipment to the Pakistani military was that it funded and 
nourished well-entrenched fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan.126  
As the covert war in Afghanistan came to an end, the United States sought stability in the 
region. Pakistan, however, continued to support and financed groups capable of igniting instability 
in Afghanistan to promote its strategic interests in the region. Pakistan’s support for the Kashmiri 
insurgents, who were fighting against the Indian rule, brought the state closer to being declared as 
a state sponsoring terrorism by the United States. The ISI, using guerilla-warfare expertise gained 
during the Afghan war, actively supported the insurgency by providing them with supplies, 
training, and harboring hundreds of young Islamic extremists inside Pakistan.127 Pakistan became 
the arbiter in the Afghan civil war that erupted after the Soviet withdrawal among various ethnic 
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and religious factions. The state’s strategic ambitions of having strategic depth in Afghanistan by 
installing a friendly government in Kabul seemed achievable by the mid-1990s. Pakistan’s chosen 
group in the Afghan civil war was the fundamentalist Taliban (“students”) movement, a powerful 
force that emerged in the summer of 1994 around Kandahar in southern Afghanistan.128 With 
substantial help from the Pakistani military and the ISI, the Taliban was able to capture Kabul by 
September 1996 and mounted a relentless war against the Northern Alliance, which controlled the 
northern Afghanistan and at odds with Pakistan’s strategic objectives, to gain a total control of 
Afghanistan. Pakistan’s support for the Taliban added a new friction to the US-Pakistan relations 
by 1998. Importantly, intelligence reports concluded that Osama bin Laden, a Saudi citizen and 
the leader of al-Qaeda responsible for terrorist attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 
was in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban government.129 Thus, as the Cold War and 
the war in Afghanistan came to an end, divergent interests in the US-Pakistan relations became all 
too apparent. For the United States, Pakistan was no longer considered strategically important; it 
became a nuclear troublemaker and a source of regional instability. The ups and down in Pakistan’s 
strategic importance to the United States led Pakistanis to charge that the United States proved to 
be a  “fickle friend”, as one Pakistani diplomat charged, “With the Afghan war over, the United 
States no longer need[s] Pakistan. You Americans have discarded us like a piece of used 
Kleenex.”130                   
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ii) The War on Terror: American ambivalence toward Pakistan ended after the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. As the United States commenced on the 
War on Terror in Afghanistan where the Al-Qaeda leadership had been under the protection of the 
Taliban regime, Pakistan again became an important frontline state. Deputy Secretary of State 
Richard Armitage delivered a stern message to General Mahmud Ahmed, the head of the ISI, 
“Pakistan must either stand with the U.S. in the fight against terrorism or stand against us. There 
was no Maneuvering room.” Armitage also offered incentives to the Pakistanis: if Pakistan took 
the right choice, the U.S. would lift the sanctions and there would be a positive relationship 
between the two states.131 Pakistan’s military ruler General Musharraf declared Pakistan’s support 
for America’s War on Terror by making a difficult switch from Pakistan’s support for the Taliban 
to the United States.132  
The level of divergent interests between the allies in pursuing the War on Terror was high. 
The United States and Pakistan had diametrically opposed preferences regarding the outcome of 
the war in Afghanistan. While the United States sought Pakistan’s cooperation in defeating groups, 
such as the Taliban, Pakistan did not want the Taliban defeated in Afghanistan. A number of 
factors, however, made Pakistan’s cooperation possible. First, the Pakistani leaders thought that 
they could protect Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan by joining the U.S.-led coalition. 
Second, Musharraf calculated that if Pakistan declined American demands, the United States might 
sought India’s cooperation which would enable India to win U.S. support for its position on the 
Kashmir dispute. The fear of a U.S.-Indian alliance was apparent in Musharraf’s address to the 
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nation. He argued that India would benefit if Pakistan did not cooperate with the Americans: “Our 
critical concerns, our important concerns can come under threat. . . When I say critical concerns, I 
mean our strategic assets and the cause of Kashmir. If these come under threat it would be worse 
situation for us.” 133 Third, the United States was willing to pay a high price for Pakistan’s 
cooperation. Musharraf’s willingness to cooperate with the United States, however, did not 
guarantee Pakistan’s wholehearted support for the War on Terror. The primary objective of 
Pakistan’s security apparatuses has always been to be prepared for the “elusive” threat from India, 
not fighting terrorism.134  
The United States and Pakistan reached a quid pro quo arrangement. According to the 
arrangement, Pakistan would deny Al-Qaeda shelter in Pakistan, break diplomatic relations with 
the Taliban regime, and importantly, cooperate with American war efforts in Afghanistan by 
offering the United States Pakistan’s base facilities and military installations.135 In return, the 
United States offered a generous side payment package that included substantial amounts of 
military and economic aid, lifted sanctions, and promised to forgive $2 billion of Pakistan’s 
debt.136 Musharraf expected significant opposition from various domestic forces for supporting the 
U.S. war effort, but the anticipated rewards outweighed the anticipated costs. Under the new 
arrangement, the United States provided Pakistan with large amounts of economic and military 
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aid, including, the F-16 aircraft, some frigates for the navy, and sophisticated equipment for the 
army. Between 2002 and 2012, Pakistan received a total of $25 billion in aid and reimbursement.137       
There were considerable debates within the Pakistan military about how much should 
Pakistan cooperate with the United States. The Pakistani military did not want the Taliban defeated 
in Afghanistan lest the Northern Alliance, the anti-Taliban forces that favored India more than 
Pakistan, might come to power. Many Pakistani strategists feared that a northern alliance-led 
Afghanistan would make Pakistan a sandwich between India and Afghanistan.138 On the domestic 
front, according to Anatol Lieven, a majority of Pakistanis viewed the Taliban as engaged in a 
legitimate war against foreign occupation, similar to the resistance against Soviet occupation in 
the 1980s.139  The government of Pakistan clamped down on some extremists groups while left 
other untouched. By 2005-06, the Taliban resurfaced in Afghanistan and American intelligence 
reports suggested that the ISI was aiding and directing the Taliban activities from Pakistan.140 For 
the people of Pakistan, the government’s “halfhearted participation” in the War on Terror made 
Pakistan vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Pakistan’s defense establishment framed terrorist attacks 
in Pakistan as the price Pakistanis had to pay for supporting the United States. Pakistani officials 
then demanded greater monetary compensation for the losses Pakistan suffered by aligning itself 
with War on Terror. Indeed, this has been a familiar technique to extract more side payments from 
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the United States, as Haqqani observes that “whipping up public sentiment was often the Pakistani 
military’s modus operandi for seeking a new deal for aid and arms.”141  
 
C) The Effects of Domestic Political Changes in Pakistan 
The trade-off theory predicts that leadership change will have minimal or no effects on the 
continuity of an existing alliance. Leadership changes in Pakistan, most of which occurred through 
military coups that installed military rulers in power without fundamentally altering important 
institutions of the government, had minimal effects on the continuation of the alliance. Side 
payments from the United States enormously benefited the military. The rentier character of the 
military and its ability to extract material support from the United States enhance its political power 
at the expense of political parties and other civilian organizations.142  
The Pakistani military rulers courted the United States for side payments and supported the 
continuation of the alliance. Although the Pakistani leaders were disappointed by America’s 
increasing economic and military aid to India, none of them wanted to sever the alliance. Ayub 
Kahn, Pakistan’s first military ruler, assured the United States that he would strengthen the U.S.-
Pakistan relations and told American officials that the continuation of U.S. aid was a “matter of 
life and death to Pakistan”143 Even though Ayub devised the triangular diplomacy to bolster the 
regime’s nationalist credentials at home, he had little incentives to terminate the alliance with the 
United States, which remained the largest source of economic and military aid for Pakistan.144 
                                                          
141 Haqqani. pp.312-18 
142 Jalal; Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy (Pluto London, 2007). 
143Ayub reminded U.S. lawmakers in a joint session of congress: “If there is real trouble, there is no other country in 
Asia where you will be able to even put your foot in. The only people who will stand by you are the people of Pakistan.” 
Khan. P. 137; Kux; Khan.. Pp. 98-101  
144 By the early 1960s Pakistan was receiving $400 million in economic assistance annually from the United States, 
which amounted to half of the foreign assistance that Pakistan was receiving. Kux. Pp. 144-46, 156.  




Pakistan’s two last military rulers, General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf, 
benefited enormously from American aid. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan proved to be a boon 
for Zia. Pakistan became a frontline state in the Afghan war and channeled American military 
equipment to the Afghan mujahedeen.145 In the 1980s, billions of dollars in American side 
payments provided a tremendous strength to the military regime of General Zia. The United States 
provided Pakistan with two aid packages amounting $3.2 billion and $4.2 billion as well as 
advanced weapons and equipment that enhanced the military’s standing and Zia’s political position 
at home.146 The massive infusion of U.S. aid in the post 9/11 arrangement enabled General Pervez 
Musharraf, who came to power through a military coup in October 1999, to appease his primary 
supporters, the higher echelons of the military, and subsidized the military’s ability to penetrate 
the state and undermine civilian institutions and political leadership.147 Billions of dollar in side 
payments, indeed, enhanced Musharraf’s ability to stay in power for almost a decade. As in the 
1980s, American side payments to Pakistan in exchange for its cooperation in the War on Terror 
were never intended to promote better governance in Pakistan. The Pakistani leaders could not 
afford to sever Pakistan’s bilateral alliance with the United States; doing so would probably have 
drifted the United States toward India. Thus, the finding that leadership change in Pakistan had 
very little effects on the continuity of the alliance is consistent with the hypothesis.   
  As in leadership changes, regime changes in Pakistan (from military dictatorship to 
democracy) had very little effects on the state’s alignment with the United States. Most regime 
changes in Pakistan occurred at times when the alliance was suffering from severe strains or the 
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United States lost interest in Pakistan. As a result, leaders like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, 
and Nawaz Sharif had little bargaining leverage to extract large side payments from the United 
States.   After Pakistan’s defeat in the 1971 war Bhutto succeeded Yahya Khan in 1972, a traumatic 
time for Pakistan when Bhutto faced enormous challenges including boosting the country’s morale 
and fixing serious unrest within the military. Although Bhutto had a reputation of being a firebrand 
critic of American foreign policy, once at the helm of power Bhutto stressed the importance of 
maintaining good relations with the United States.148 The Pakistani leader made an earnest effort 
to rekindle the alliance by invoking the familiar argument that the stability in the Middle East was 
interconnected with that of South Asia and American interests in both regions were being 
threatened by the Soviet Union. Bhutto even offered bases to the United States and agreed to host 
American military in Pakistan.149 Even though the United States provided economic and military 
aid to Pakistan after the embargo was lifted,150 Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions strained the intra-
alliance relations. Bhutto delivered the military’s demands for advanced American weapons and 
technologies. However, his domestic policies hurt the military’s pocketbooks and its 
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organizational autonomy.151 Finally, Bhutto, Pakistan’s first democratically elected leader in the 
post-1971, was ousted by the army on July 5, 1977 and was eventually hanged on April 4, 1979.152  
Pakistan’s democratic experiment in the 1990s was chaotic. From 1988 to 1997 four 
general elections brought the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) (led by Benazir Bhutto) and the 
Pakistan Muslim League (led by Nawaz Sharif) to power twice respectively. However, Pakistan’s 
president used a constitutional provision, a legacy of Zia’s effort to enhance presidential power, to 
dismissed three democratically elected governments—Bhutto was dismissed twice and Sharif 
once—for corruption, nepotism and maladministration. Throughout this period the military 
remained a very powerful actor responsible for Pakistan’s nuclear and foreign policy matters.153 
The U.S-Pakistan relations in 1990s were strained by serious disagreements on Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons and its support for the Taliban and other insurgents groups in the region. The powerful 
influence of the military in the state’s foreign and security policies ensured the continuity of the 
alliance, but a high level of divergent interests and a lack U.S. interests in Pakistan left Pakistan 
democratic leaders with little leverage to extract large amounts of side payments from the United 
States. This chaotic pattern of leadership change ended when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was 
deposed by the military in 1999. The Military was in charge again for the fourth time. The ensuing 
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War on Terror and an expanded bilateral cooperation revived the alliance, of course for a large 
amounts of side payments.  
As we have seen, regime change and transition to democracy in Pakistan had little impacts 
on the alliance relations. This finding is inconsistent with the prediction. The hypothesis predicts 
that regime change in small state will lead to the termination of the alliance or the new regime 
demands more side payments for alliance maintenance. Neither of these outcomes was present in 
the Pakistan case. A powerful explanation of this pattern lies in the dominant role of the military 
in the state’s politics and decision-making process. Stephen Cohen succinctly summarize the 
primacy of Pakistan’s military: “There are armies that guard their nation’s borders, there are those 
that are concerned with protecting their position in society, and there are those that defend a cause 
or an idea. The Pakistan army does all three.”154  
Politically powerful Pakistan’s military has been able to penetrate into the state, society, 
and the economy. The military has always had a central role in shaping the state’s foreign policy 
and national security agenda.155 The Indian threat made the military more prominent than other 
domestic players and defined Pakistan as a state that viewed its existence in terms of its hostile 
relations with India.156 Since 1947, the military experienced direct power four times. Once in 
power, the military would create its own patronage network to mitigate resistance to military rule 
through threats and inducements. All military rulers instituted changes to preserve the army’s 
institutional goals, its influence over Pakistan’s security policies, and to enhance the continuation 
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of its political power.157 These changes inevitably undercut the viability of national political 
institutions.158 As the military becomes a stakeholder in Pakistan’s politics, it expanded its 
economic interests as well, such as the expansion of an extensive network of economic 
organizations run by the military and its retired personnel. Each military ruler rewarded the senior 
echelons of the military to ensure their loyalty and to preserve his political power.159 There has 
been a symbiotic and mutually dependent relationship between the military and the political 
elites.160  
For the Pakistani leaders, civilian or non-civilian, the military has been a crucial part of 
their winning coalitions. Political survival requires the leaders to fulfill the military’s demands and 
to promote the military’s preferred foreign policies, including a strong-tie with the United States, 
which has remained the largest source of external resources for the Pakistani leaders. The infusion 
of these external resources has enabled the leaders to provide rewards to the member of their 
winning coalitions, importantly, the military, and keep them loyal. As the military maintained its 
powerful presence in the important institutions of the government and in the decision making 
process, civilian leadership (democratically elected governments) rarely had decision-making 
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Politicians view the military as a tool to extract benefits. Fair, "Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating Us Relations 
with Pakistan."; Siddiqa. P. 22; Jalal; Cohen; Zulfikar Khalid Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan 
(Oxford University Press Karachi,, Pakistan, 1995); Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars 
Within (Oxford University Press, USA, 2008).  




autonomy independent of the military. As Hasan-Askari Rizvi, a Pakistan scholar and military 
analyst, explains the military’s role in shaping Pakistan’s national interest:  
“During the Zia era, the military directly controlled nuclear policy and the conduct 
of the Afghan War. Nuclear policy has remained their close preserve, even under civilian 
rule. Benazir Bhutto complained in September 1991 that she was denied information about 
highly sensitive aspects of the country’s nuclear program during her first term as Prime 
Minister. The role of the foreign office and the civilian leadership in formulating and 
implementing the Afghanistan policy increased after the 1989 withdrawal of Soviet troops, 
but senior Army commanders and the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) continue to have a 
significant input. Similarly, the Army maintains deep interest in policy in policy toward 
India, including Kashmir. . . Unless the military is satisfied that there are credible 
guarantees against India’s efforts to interfere, it will resist surrendering its nuclear-
weapons option and advice caution on normalizing relations.”161 
It is then very likely that some critical aspects of Pakistan’s foreign policy (fiercely anti-
Indian stance, maintaining strategic interests in Afghanistan, and the continuation of strategic 
alliance with the United States) are likely to remain intact across all political regime types—
military dictatorship or democratic regime.    
 As this section shows, domestic political changes in Pakistan have had little effects on the 
maintenance of the alliance. The theory hypothesized that leadership change should have minimal 
effects on the continuity of the alliance. The Pakistan case is consistent with the hypothesis. All 
new leaders, civilian or military, in the wake of any political changes relied on American aid to 
consolidate the support of their winning coalitions. As for regime change, the theory hypothesized 
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that the new regime would either terminate the alliance or demand a higher price for the 
maintenance of the alliance. We should note that the elaborate role of the military in Pakistan’s 
politics and decision-making process inhibited the emergence of a regime detached from the 
interests of the military leaders, who prefer to maintain the alliance with the United States. As a 
result, we saw that regime changes in Pakistan did not lead to any drastic changes, such as the 
termination of the alliance. A new regime’s ability to extract more aid from the United States was 
conditioned upon the strategic importance of Pakistan to the United States. As pointed out before, 
in most cases, the new regimes found it difficult to obtain large amounts of aid when the alliance 
experienced a high level of interest divergence. 
 
D) Reviewing Theoretical Expectations and Aid Flows 
 
The following table (table 4.1) summarizes interest divergence, organized according to 
different periods of analysis, between the United States and Pakistan during the maintenance phase 






































 The importance of the Badaber base to the U.S. ( + ) 
 Pakistan’s membership in anti-communist Alliances (+) 
 Pakistan’s relations with China and the USSR ( - ) 
 U.S. aid to India and a lack of U.S. commitment to defend 
Pakistan against India ( - ) 
o Pakistan’s demand for 













 The importance of the Badaber base started to wane (- ) 
 Pakistan’s relations with China ( - ) 
 Lack of U.S. commitment to defend Pakistan against India ( - ) 
 Pakistan’s role in U.S. rapprochement with China ( +) 
 The U.S. imposed arms embargo on Pakistan ( - ) 
o Pakistan sought 
military aid during the 
1965 war   












  Pakistan’s nuclear program (-) 
 Disagreements about the proper price for Pakistan’s role in 
Afghanistan (-) 
 
























 Pakistan’s interest in defeating pro-gov’t forces in Afghanistan 
(+) 
 Pakistan’s strategic importance to U.S. in the Afghan War (+) 
 Pakistan’s nuclear program expanded (-)  















 U.S. sought stability in Afghanistan; Pakistan’s active role in the 
Afghan civil war (-) 
 Pakistan’s support for the Kashmiri insurgents (-) 
 Pakistan built nuclear weapons (-) 
 The U.S. imposed sanctions (-) 
o Pakistan sought to 
negotiate the removal 














 Pakistan’s support for the Taliban in the Afghan civil war (-)  
 Pakistan’s support for the Kashmiri insurgents (-) 
 Pakistan tests nuclear weapons (-) 














 U.S. valued Pakistan’s cooperation in the War on Terror and 
was willing to pay a higher price (+) 
 Pakistan’s support for the Taliban (-) 
o Pakistan’s role in the 






(1) The hypothesis predicts that a) when the level of DI is very low, small amounts of SD are expected; b) when 
the level of DI is very high, very large amounts of SP (for a successful negotiation) or no SP (for an 
unsuccessful negotiation) are expected; and c) when the level of DI is in the medium range, large amounts of 
SP are expected. 
 +/- Signs reflect the positive or negative effects of the issues on the bilateral relations.  
 
 




The trade-off theory predicts that when the level of divergent interests becomes very high 
or very low, the amounts of side payments the small state receives from the great power are likely 
to be small. When the level of divergent interests was in the medium range, the amounts of side 
payments are expected to be large.  Throughout the course of the alliance, the allies rarely had a 
very low level of divergent interests. However, the allies had a very high level of divergent interests 
during multiple periods that adversely affected the transaction of side payments. As the second 
part of the chapter demonstrates (and table 1 shows), except for two periods (1960-1965 and 1984 
-1989) the United Sates and Pakistan had a high degree of interest divergence throughout the 
maintenance phase of the alliance. These variations affect the theory’s predictions about the 
amount of side payments Pakistan was expected to receive. Figure 4.3 below shows the amounts 
of aid Pakistan actually received during the corresponding periods noted in table 4.1.   
 




 As we see in Figure 4.3 (which shows percentage change in U.S. aid to Pakistan during 
the maintenance phase of the alliance.162) from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s, Pakistan received 
significantly lower amounts of side payment due to a high level of divergent interests. Then the 
alliance was revived during the Afghan War and the War on Terror. The allies have had a high 
degree of interest divergence in the War on Terror, yet Pakistan has been able to receive a large 
amount of side payments for its cooperation with the United States. At least three critical factors 
can explain this outcome. First, the Pakistani leaders sought to protect important national interest 
in Kashmir by cooperating with the U.S. (even though they did not want see the Taliban defeated 
in Afghanistan). Second, the United States was willing to pay large amounts of side payments for 
Pakistan’s cooperation. Third, coercion may have played a role. Musharraf reported later, 
regarding the American demands, “we should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age” 
if Pakistan did not cooperate with the United States.163 As the theory suggests, if the great power 
values the ally’s cooperation highly, then a successful negotiation can result in a large amount of 
side payments for the small state even though the allies have a high degree of interest divergence. 
The United States, indeed, has highly valued Pakistan’s cooperation in the War on Terror.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter analyzes the formation and maintenance of the U.S.-Pakistan alliance. The 
chapter tests a number of hypotheses about the formation and maintenance of the alliance. I 
hypothesize that 1) threats to leaders’ political survival motivate small states to form asymmetric 
alliances; 2) the use of side payments is necessary when parties have divergent interests in forming 
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the alliance. Regarding the maintenance phase of the alliance, the chapter tests the following 
hypotheses: 3) the amount of side payments a great power provides to the small state is a function 
of the level of divergent interests allies have in maintaining the alliance; 4) all else equal, regime 
changes in small states increase the likelihood that a) the alliance will be terminated, or b) the 
alliance will be maintained for an increased amount of side payments; and 5) in the short run, 
leadership changes in small states will be less likely to affect the continuation of asymmetric 
alliances. The findings in this chapter are largely consistent with the above mentioned hypotheses.          
The trade-off theory claims that threats to leaders’ political survival motivate them to form 
alliances. The case study illustrates that the Pakistani ruling elite had powerful domestic political 
imperatives to seek external assistance by forming an alliance with the United States. Pakistan 
faced external challenges from India and Afghanistan. However, an exclusive focus on external 
threats cannot explain the Pakistani leaders’ decision to form the alliance. If the Indian threat was 
the only factor determining Pakistan’s decision, then we cannot explain why the Pakistani leaders’ 
chose to sign the agreement even when the United States refused to offer any security guarantee 
again India. We have to take domestic political factors into account to explain the Pakistani 
leaders’ alliance decision. Soon after independence, Pakistan’s leaders faced the daunting tasks of 
state-building. If the new state was to survive as a viable political unit, it had to create a new 
administrative structure for the central government, resettle millions of refugees, establish an 
industrial infrastructure, and modernize its defense forces and the Pakistani leaders had to 
undertake these challenging tasks without adequate financial resources.164 Political instability, an 
increasing chasm between the center and the provinces, and the lack of a broad-based national 
political organization made it difficult to establish a clear authority structure. In highlighting the 
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domestic political challenges of the new state, the deputy commander-in-chief of the Pakistan 
army, lieutenant general Nazir Ali confided to an American official in 1952 that he was “more 
worried. . . over the actions of politicians than he was of the Indian army.”165 Facing these 
multitude of internal and external challenges, Pakistan’s ruling elites needed a strong security 
apparatus and a functioning economy. They sought a powerful external ally, the United States, 
who could provide them with military and economic aid.  
The United States and Pakistan entered into the alliance for different reasons. Whereas the 
United States enlisted Pakistan as a partner in bolstering the defense of the Middle East, Pakistan 
was more concerned about India than about any menace from the communists. The United States 
saw the security accord as directed strictly against the communist threat and was wary of becoming 
entangled in Pakistan’s dispute with India.166 The United States offered side payments to Pakistan 
as a compensation mechanism that filled the deficit in benefits, due largely to interest divergence 
between the parties, for the Pakistani leaders. The United States gained in autonomy by 
incorporating Pakistan into the western alliance systems (and by implication denied the Soviet 
Union access to Pakistan) in the emerging Cold War and by having the permission to use Pakistani 
bases for its own strategic purposes. Pakistan gained much needed economic and military aid that 
helped the Pakistani leaders to strengthen the state’s internal and external security. 
 The alliance experienced many ups and downs since its inception. From 1965 to 1978, one 
of the difficult phases of the bilateral relations, divergent interests in the alliance caused parties to 
have different expectations about their obligations toward each other. The United States expected 
Pakistan, as a recipient of U.S. aid, to behave like a reliable ally: American policymakers wanted 
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Pakistan to limit its relations with China (until 1971) and expected Pakistan’s contribution (i.e. 
sending troops) in America’s anti-communist wars in Asia (such as in Vietnam and Laos).167 The 
Pakistani leaders, however, declined to make any concrete commitments but entertained such 
possibilities if Pakistan received more military aid and equipment from the United States. 
Moreover, the Pakistani leaders stressed that as an ally, Pakistan deserved unrivaled U.S. support 
in its dispute with India on the Kashmir Issue, which the United States refused to do. American 
officials emphasized that American military equipment given to Pakistan would be a part of 
common support against communism, not against India.168 For the Pakistani leaders, the United 
States betrayed Pakistan, a formal American ally, by providing economic and military aid to India, 
which had been a self-proclaimed neutral state, and by imposing an arms embargo in Pakistan’s 
time of need.169 The Pakistan leaders in turn attempted to reduce the state’s reliance on the United 
States by warming up relations with the Soviet Union and by cultivating a close relationship with 
Communist China. These strains in the bilateral relations adversely affected the alliance cohesion. 
From the mid-1970s on, Pakistan’s nuclear program has remained a source of tensions between 
the allies. A high degree of divergent interests adversely affected the amounts of side Pakistan 
received from the United States during many phases of the alliance. The Iranian Secretary General 
of CENTO remarked that the U.S.-led alliances were “like insuring your house against fire; the 
policy does not cover damages by earthquake or theft” accurately portrayed the strains in the U.S.-
Pakistan alliance.170 The United States had never intended the alliance to become an all-inclusive 
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security guarantee (against India), the alliance was intended to contain the Soviet and Communist 
penetration into South Asia.     
Despite these strains, the bilateral alliance remained intact. A powerful explanation as to 
why the Pakistani leaders declined to sever the bilateral relations with the United States, as we saw 
before, has been the praetorian nature of the state’s political structure.  Survival driven leaders, 
civilian or military alike, must ensure that the military’s foreign policy priorities (primarily 
keeping the perception of Indian threats alive) and material interests are intact. Meeting these 
demands required the leaders to maintain the alliance with United States, which has remained the 
largest provider of external resources to Pakistan. Although the Pakistani leaders attempted to 
reduce the state’s dependency on the United States, in the absence of an alternative great power 
willing to meet Pakistan’s economic and defense needs, the Pakistani leaders maintained the 
alliance with the United States. Although the Pakistanis considered China as an “all weather 
friend”, China refused to make any formal commitment to Pakistan and its material assistance to 
Pakistan in the 1960s and the 1970s was inconsequential compared to massive level of economic 
and military aid the United States provided to Pakistan.     
International relations scholars often take side payments for granted; that various economic 
and military aid programs have little or no impact on states’ alignment decisions. In resource 
strapped developing countries, the possibility of having access to external resources can be a great 
incentive for the leaders to make certain foreign policy decisions, such as aligning with a great 
power. As this chapter shows, this was certainly the case for the Pakistani leadership. In the 
absence of American economic and military aid, would Pakistan have aligned with the United 
States? It would have been highly unlikely. Had the United States balked at Pakistan’s requests for 
side payments or showed little interest in enlisting it in an anticommunist defense network, 




Pakistan would have sought alignment with the other great power (the Soviet Union, possibly), a 
patron capable enough to provide it with economic and military aid. This inference is not merely 
a counterfactual; Pakistan’s civilian and military elites, doubtful about the reliability of American 
commitment, in the 1960s and 1970s attempted and succeeded to some extent in diversifying 









THE U.S.-PHILIPPINES ALLIANCE 
 
The Spanish-American War (1898) was a watershed event for both the United States and the 
Philippines. While American victory in the war cemented the position of the United States as a 
Pacific power, the post-war settlement prolonged the subjugation of the Filipinos by replacing 
Spain with the United States as the new colonial power. Following the war President William 
McKinley assured the Filipinos on 21 December 1898 that the United States “come not as invaders 
or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employment, and in 
their personal and religious right.”1 However, the 1898-99 debate in Washington was settled in 
favor of retaining the Islands and thus, the Philippines became a formal colony of the United States. 
The decision was inspired by an imperial grand design as well as a missionary zeal. While 
American strategists expected the Philippines to serve as a conduit for promoting U.S. economic 
and strategic interests in Asia, ardent missionaries envisioned the retention of the islands as an 
opportunity to bestow the blessings of American civilization on the Philippines. After serving more 
than four decades as a colony the Philippines was granted independence on July 4th, 1946. The 
United States and the Philippines soon signed a number of security agreements to formalize their 
alignment. 
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Throughout the course of the alliance America’s security interests has guided the strategic 
importance of the Philippines and the value of the alliance to the United States. The archipelago 
was ranked low on the U.S. security agenda at the outbreak of World War II. American awareness 
regarding the importance of the emerging nations in the Third World heightened when the 
superpower competition spread to the Third World during the 1950s and 1960s. The Philippines 
gained in importance on the U.S. security agenda as the United States extended the Cold War 
containment strategy to Asia.2 Political changes in the region, such as the Communist revolution 
in China, the start of the Korean War, and American military build-up in Vietnam elevated the 
perceived importance of the Philippine bases and U.S security relations with the islands. Thus, 
while the military value of the Philippines was dimmed in 1947, the islands were rated high in 
importance in subsequent years during the height of the Cold War in Asia. The U.S-Philippines 
security relations were tied to the American bases in the Philippines. An adequate level of 
compensation for the bases had been a contentious issue between the allies. The bilateral security 
relations were in abeyance during the 1990s after the closure of the American bases in 1992. The 
alliance was then revived again as a useful tool to fight terrorism in Southeast Asia. The alliance 
relationship, thus, has swung ups and downs in evolving American security interests in Asia-
Pacific.  
The Philippines case serves a useful purpose for testing the trade-off theory. The 
Philippines shares some similarities with another major case, Pakistan, used in this study: both 
states were economically poor with several domestic political and economic challenges; also, 
because of their strategic locations, both states were considered important to America’s foreign 
policy agenda during the early stage of the Cold War. The cases, however, differed in some 
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important ways. While the United States and Pakistan had high level of divergent interests, the 
Philippines, as the Pakistan case study shows, had a very low level of divergent interests (or a high 
level of shared interests) with the United States. Contrary to Pakistan, the Philippines has had 
experiences with democratic institutions for most of its existence as an independent state, although 
the quality of democracy was problematic at times. These differences help me to evaluate the 
strength and relevance of the hypotheses in different conditions.   
The chapter tests two hypotheses of the trade-off theory about the formation of U.S.-
Philippines alliance. First, threats to leaders’ political survival in small states increase the 
likelihood that they form asymmetric alliances. We should see that the Philippine leaders sought 
to form an alliance with the United States to counter threats to their political survival. Second, 
having divergent interests between a great power and a small state increases the likelihood that 
side payments will be used to cement the alliance. The hypothesis leads us to expect that having 
interest divergence between the United States and the Philippines makes it more likely that the 
United States would use side payments to compensate the Philippines’ autonomy concessions. The 
chapter then tests several hypotheses about the maintenance phase of asymmetric alliances. First, 
all else equal, the amount of side payments used to maintain the alliance depends on the degree of 
divergent interests between the allies. The theory hypothesized three possible scenarios about the 
relationship between the degree of divergent interests and amounts of side payments: a) when the 
level of divergent interests is very low (that is, parties share a high degree of mutual interests), 
small amounts of side payments are necessary to maintain the alliance; b) when the level of 
divergent interests is very high, a very large amount of side payments is expected if negotiations 
are successful, but no increase in side payments otherwise. Lastly, c) when the level of divergent 
interests is medium (neither very low nor very high), parties can bargain policy concessions in 




exchange for large amounts of side payments. The theory also predicts the effects of domestic 
political changes in small states on the continuation of asymmetric alliances. Second, we expect 
that all else equal, regime change in the Philippines increases the likelihood that a) the new regime 
terminates the alliance, or b) the alliance will remain intact in exchange for an increased amount 
of side payments. Third, in the short run, leadership changes in small states will be less likely to 
affect the continuation of asymmetric alliances. Thus, we expect leadership changes, which do not 
alter the existing institutions of the government, in the Philippines to have minimal impacts on the 
continuity of the alliance. 
Consistent with the predictions, the case study finds that threats to the Philippine leaders’ 
political survival motivated them to form an alliance with the United States. The chapter shows 
that a low level of divergent interests (or a high degree of shared interests) handicapped the 
Philippine leaders’ ability to extract large amount of side payments even though the Philippines 
made extensive autonomy concessions. We will see that a low level of divergent interests in the 
1950s and 1960s adversely affected the bargaining leverage of the Philippine leaders and the 
amount of side payments they received form the United States. However, by the 1970s and 1980s 
the Philippine leaders were able to extract higher amounts of side payments than before due to a 
modest increase in divergence of interests. Leadership changes in the Philippines had little impact 
on the continuity of the alliance since the Philippine leaders relied on U.S. aid to enhance their 
political survival. However, regime changes in the Philippines had some qualitative effects on the 
alliance. Although the alliance remained intact and the amount of side payments increased after 
the first regime change (1972),  in the wake of the second regime change (1986) the parties failed 
to renew the bases agreement. The United States withdrew from the Philippine bases in 1992, 
which in turn adversely affected the alliance tightness in the 1990s.     




The chapter is organized in the following order. The first part of the chapter probes the 
formation of the U.S.-Philippines alliance. The second part focuses on the maintenance of the 
alliance. It traces the relationship between divergent interests and the amount of side payments the 
Philippines received from 1955 to the beginning of the War on Terror. In the concluding section I 




The U.S.-Philippine alliance was underpinned by three bilateral agreements: the 1947 Military 
Bases Agreement (MBA), the 1947 Military Assistance Agreement (MAP), and the 1951 Mutual 
Defense Treaty. These agreements solidified the bilateral relations and allowed the United States 
to maintain a large military presence in the islands. The negotiations over the terms of these 
agreements were complex and linked to multiple areas of interests. In addition to these bilateral 
agreements, the Philippines also joined the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), an 
American-led multilateral security pact. As we will see, the political survival of the Philippine 
leaders was a crucial factor in their alignment decision. Since the level of divergent interests 
between the parties was very low, forging the alliance cost very little to the United States. This 
section begins with a discussion of the Philippine and American interests in forming the alliance. 
It then focuses on the bargaining process that led to the signing of the agreements mentioned above. 
The section then ends with a review of the trade-offs that both parties made in forming the alliance. 
 
 




A) Philippines’ Incentives for the Alignment 
 
i) External Threats: In the early twentieth century the Filipino elites and American 
authorities perceived the emerging great power politics in the region as a threat to the Philippines. 
Japan’s aggressive design in the Asia-Pacific came in conflict with the American presence in the 
Philippines and Hawaii. Japan emerged as a powerful regional actor in the wake of its triumph 
over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. Although the United States and Japan reached a 
settlement in 1905, the American position in the Philippines seemed less secure.3 To counter 
serious threats from Japan, the leadership of the Philippine commonwealth attempted to placate 
Japan in the late 1930s. A lack of confidence on the part of Manuel Quezon, who became the first 
president of the Philippine commonwealth, in American willingness to defend the Philippines led 
him to seek a separate agreement with Japan.4 Quezon met the Japanese leadership in June 1938 
and urged the Japanese to give him a formal pledge to respect Philippine neutrality. The Roosevelt 
administration, however, thwarted Quezon’s plan for neutrality and the Japanese leadership did 
not make any commitments to the Philippine leader.5  
This threatening external environment disappeared after the end of the Second World War. 
The Philippines faced no external threats in the post-war regional environment. The Japanese 
threat to the Philippines ceased to exist by the end of the War. By 1947 the Japanese empire was 
liquidated, China was paralyzed by civil war, and the Soviet Union  had not yet shown a 
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preparedness to try to expand its influence in Asia, perhaps because of its overwhelming burden 
of recovery following the war. The external threat oriented perspectives (that states form alliances 
to check against external threats), such as neorealism, on alliance formation cannot explain who 
the United States would be defending the Philippines against. American policy makers did not see 
any credible external threat to the Philippines at this time.6 Although the Philippines did not face 
external threats, the domestic political environment in the Philippines was far more challenging 
for the ruling elites.  
ii) Internal Challenges: The Philippine ruling elites faced a threatening political 
environment long before the islands gained independence. Political instability in the Philippines 
in late 1930s, according to one observer, was like “a social volcano, constantly rumbling with 
discontent, erupting periodically in local revolts.”7 The worldwide economic slump had shrunk the 
foreign market for Philippine exports like sugar and coconut oil. Conditions in the countryside 
deteriorated, driving the average income below subsistence level. According to a census report (of 
the 1930s), out of a population of sixteen million, a fourth of them were dispossessed “agricultural 
day laborers.” Agrarian reforms were attempted but did not materialize as the land owning class 
opposed such measures.8  The Philippine elites had reasons to be worried about rebellions. In fact, 
the commonwealth of Philippines experienced a rebellion in May 1935 when more than sixty 
thousand peasants, known as Sakdalists, rose in revolt in Manila.9  
  It was the social-economic conditions and the profound dissatisfaction that the peasants 
felt about the status quo that kept the possibility of violent rebellions alive. In the late 1940s a new 
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threat to the Philippine leadership was a domestic force known as the Huks. The Huk ranks 
overwhelmingly consisted of poor peasants who were fighting for economic reforms rather than 
for revolution. They opposed the abuses of feudalism and were willing to serve as tenants as long 
as landowners gave them easy credit, a fair share of the crop and protection against repression by 
local authorities. The Huk leaders entered the political process in 1945 and formed a coalition 
known as the Democratic Alliance. The coalition’s platform was hardly revolutionary. According 
to the movement’s leader, Luis Taruc, the coalition did not advocate revolution, or socialization, 
or change in the society, but aimed to develop “a healthy industrialized capitalist country out of 
the feudal agricultural condition” through “the ballot and the peaceful petition.”10 The big 
landowners and the traditional political elite, for whom any change in the status quo would pose a 
threat to their political and economic power, did not tolerate the coalition. Manuel Roxas, the first 
President of independent Philippines, denied the party’s role in the political process, outlawed the 
movement as “subversive,” and vowed to liquidate the Huks. The Huks responded by commencing 
on a strategy of attrition against the government army.11  
  The Huks were characterized by Filipino and American officials as a part of the 
international communist conspiracy. A closer look, however, reveals that such characterization 
was perhaps exaggerated and strategically made to delegitimize the movement and its core 
demands. Although the Philippine Communist party was a part of the united front that started the 
guerilla movement Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon (the Huks), the Huk was, in essence, a protest 
movement against economic inequality and elite oppression of the poor peasants.12 One Huk 
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fighter later said: “Nobody would give us our rights or hear our demands. They said we were 
Communists. I didn’t even know what Communism was, and I still don’t. But they called you a 
Communist, that was that. It made no sense to deny it, because they wouldn’t believe you.”13 
Indeed, few Huks were hostile to the United States; they were an active part of anti-Japanese 
resistance during the war and helped the American forces to liberate the Philippines. Although the 
Huks were portrayed as the agents of the Soviets, according to one observer, there is no evidence 
to indicate that the Russians were tracking or managing their activities. Also, there is no proof that 
the Huks ever received Chinese Communist aid.14 
While American policymakers saw an international communist conspiracy in Huks, the 
Filipino elites saw the group as a threat to their postwar political aspirations. Aware that the United 
States disliked left-leaning movements and the postwar U.S. military leadership in the Philippines 
was determined to preserve the political power of the traditional elite, the ruling elites denounced 
the Huks as dangerous Communists. Not surprisingly, the Huk insurgency drew attention in 
Washington in the emerging Cold War international environment. Elpidio Quirino, Roxas’s 
successor, used a scorched earth military policy that imposed heavy damages on villages. This 
policy, however, generated more sympathy and new recruits for the insurgents. Quirino found it 
difficult to cope with the Huks and feared that a protracted fight against the Huks would be a costly 
venture at a time when the country was experiencing difficult economic conditions. Agrarian 
reforms might have been a political answer, but the elite class resisted any change to the status quo 
as such changes would hurt them economically and politically.15 
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The Philippine leadership sought American help to defeat the Huks. One Philippine official 
reminded the Americans that “Philippine independence is the handiwork of the United States,” 
and this handiwork was under threat from “communist conspiracy.”16 Despite the claim of an 
elaborated international communist conspiracy, the real threat to Philippine security was domestic 
political instability stemming largely from the weakness of the national government and the 
possibility of civil revolt.17 The Philippine leaders needed American help to preserve their hold on 
power. They sought an alignment with the United States and a renewed American engagement in 
the Islands to remedy the precarious nature of their political fortune.         
iii) The State of the Economy:  The Philippines began as an independent state with a 
number of serious economic problems.18 Like most countries of the Third World, the Philippines 
inherited a colonial economic legacy. The economy remained agrarian and very much dependent 
on the United States. The state was ravaged by the Second World War—the estimated costs of the 
War for the Philippines ranged from $220 million in 1945 to as high as $1.6 billion in 1947.19 In 
addition to the destructive consequences of the War, the Post-independence economic arrangement 
(the Trade Act) with the United States made the Philippines heavily dependent on Washington.20 
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As a major purchaser of Philippine products the United States could destabilize the economic 
health of the Philippines by raising tariffs or cutting quotas. A major recession or changes in 
American consumer demands for Philippine goods could harmed Philippine exports. Historian 
H.W. Brands observes that the Trade Act, by requiring parity, setting quotas and establishing 
tariffs, pegging the peso to the dollar made the Philippine economy “hostage” to American 
actions.21 The war’s devastation and desperate economic conditions made the Philippines reliant 
on American assistance. As one observer noted that the Philippines were “never more dependent 
than on the eve of independence.” The Filipino leaders wanted special access to American markets, 
continued American investment, and Washington’s payment for war damages claims.22 In sum, 
the Philippine elites sought American assistance in order to maintain the viability of the state as 
well as to secure their hold on power. 
 
B) American Interests 
In the immediate aftermath of World War II American defense planners gave the Philippines 
a low priority. The United States assigned more importance to Japan, Korea, and Guam than to the 
Philippines as sites for air and naval stations and ground force deployments. The navy favored 
Okinawa (Japan) and Guam because they were easier to defend. Dwight Eisenhower, then army 
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chief of staff in 1946, proposed that the United States withdraw all army personnel from the 
Philippines.23 Robert Patterson, Secretary of War in the Truman administration, concurred with 
Eisenhower and explained that the fundamental problem was a mismatch between American 
responsibilities and available funds. He made it clear that the United States could not afford “. . . 
to waste our strength by maintenance of a force of any considerable size in the Philippines.” To 
underline his concern, Patterson even cancelled military construction projects in the Philippines.24 
Even though the Philippines was not rated high in importance in the late 1940s, the emerging 
Cold War regional and international environment altered American calculations about the islands’ 
strategic worth. This elevated strategic importance of the Philippines was aided by the Cold War 
logic that prompted the superpowers to court allies in the periphery. Strategically, the archipelago 
formed a vital link in the Pacific island chain that formed America’s fallback line of defense against 
Asian communism. Politically, the Philippine government could serve the useful purpose of 
supporting American initiatives in international forums like the United Nations.25 George Kennan, 
the first director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, helped guide American policy 
toward Post-independence Philippines and the Far East in order to check the Soviet Union and to 
preserve American interests. According to Kennan, the United States should preserve the 
Philippines as bulwark of U.S. security in the area.26 A National Security Council paper 
(November 1950)—in the backdrop of the Communist victory in China, the ongoing Korean War 
and the deepening troubles in Indochina—described the Philippines as crucially important to the 
United States. The Philippines formed an “essential part of the Pacific island chain that constituted 
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America’s vital defensive perimeter in the Far East. The islands was considered an important 
strategic location from which the United States could project power throughout the East and 
Southeast Asia region.        27  
In the emerging Cold War tension between the superpowers, American policy toward the 
Philippines had both security and economic dimensions. On the security front, America’s security 
interests in the Philippines involved the maintenance of the Philippine bases, which had been on 
the agenda as far back as 1900. Although financial constraints made American policymakers 
hesitant about costly involvements in the islands earlier, the United States was now willing to bear 
the burden of becoming a global power.28  Having permanent bases in the Philippines was now 
deemed important because they would help to contain the spread of Communism and to protect 
U.S. interests in the region. The second objective was to keep Philippines’s market open to 
American investors and exporters.29 American policymakers envisioned the Philippines as the 
gateway to the “great” China market and to the rich resources of Asia-Pacific. They imagined the 
Islands as springboards from which American ships, aircraft and troops could be vaulted into other 
parts of the region.30 
Incentives for Alignment: A Summary:  In the immediate aftermath of World War II 
the Philippines did not face any external enemies. The Philippine elites, however, had to counter 
serious economic, social and political unrest that posed threats to their political power. One 
observer succinctly summarizes the situation in the new state: “Productivity in what little industry 
there was and in the war-ravaged agricultural sector hovered at low levels. Already strained 
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relations between Manila and the countryside grew more and more tense as the war-spawned 
Hukbalahap (Huk) movement gained strength. Clashes between the armed forces and Huk 
guerillas raised the spectre of revolution against the weak regime in Manila.”31 As explained in 
this section, the Philippine leaders needed to reengage the United States in the Islands to counter 
domestic threats, primarily the Huk insurgency, to their political survival. They sought an 
alignment with the United States. America’s strategic interests in the Islands had evolved from a 
relative indifference in the late 1940s, when the detailed outline of the Cold War in the Asia Pacific 
had not been drawn, to a useful strategic asset in the early 1950s. The Philippine bases were 
envisioned to have important purposes in the emerging Cold War regional politics. In this context, 
American strategists shared the Philippine leaders’ concerns about the “Communist” Huk and the 
need to defeat the insurgency. Thus, it can be argued that by the late 1940s the United States and 
the Philippines had very little or no divergent interests in forming an alliance. 
 
    
C) Bargaining and the Alliance formation 
 
 The Military Bases Agreement and the Military Assistance Agreement, two 
complementary agreements signed in 1947, were important contractual aspects of the U.S.-
Philippines alliance. The bases were a primary issue during the rounds of negotiation that led to 
the signing of these agreements.  American and Philippine negotiators had to decide how many 
bases should be granted, where these bases would be located, and how much compensation should 
the Philippines received.32 The Philippine leaders wanted to use the bases as a lever to extract 
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economic and military aid from the United States. However, a low level of divergent interests 
between the parties diminished the Philippine leaders’ bargaining lever and adversely affected 
their ability to extract large amounts of side payments from the United States.  
 
i) The Bargaining: Although formal negotiations for the bases started in 1946, informal 
bargaining began before the Philippines gained independence. The Philippine leaders made 
commitments, in public and in private, to grant the United States the basing rights. For example, 
Quezon, President of the Philippine Commonwealth, asserted in 1942 that the United States should 
have naval bases in the Philippines “from where you can strike against any country that may try to 
impinge on your rights.”  Similarly, Quezon’s successor Sergio Osmena expressed unqualified 
support for American retention of the bases in the Philippines.33 The Philippine leader signed a 
preliminary agreement with President Truman in May 1945 concerning America’s basing rights 
in the Philippines.34 American officials were highly confident about the Philippine leaders’ consent 
on the bases issue even before the negotiations began. American attitude can be understood by 
Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s comment (concerning some U.S. lawmakers’ objections to 
formal negotiations for the bases) that while the requirement of negotiations was meaningless to 
us, negotiations would be a courtesy and a face-saving scheme for the Philippine leaders.35 Thus, 
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American negotiators were dealing with a situation in which the degree of interest divergence 
between the parties was very low and the Philippine leaders were eager to grant bases and to form 
an alliance with the United States. As a result, the Philippine leaders’ bargaining lever and their 
ability to extract side payments were limited. For the United States, the objective of the 
negotiations was, perhaps, to get the cheapest deal possible.    
 Although American officials had not anticipated any serious opposition from the Philippine 
leaders to the bases issue, they faced Philippine objections to certain provisions in the proposed 
agreement.  When the Negotiations for a bases agreement began, the Philippine leader (Roxas) 
agreed to most of the demands made by the United States.36 However, Roxas objected to two 
American demands. The first objection was concerning the location of the bases. The United States 
insisted on having extensive military facilities within Manila, the capital city. Roxas, however, 
objected to hosting major American bases in Manila, which he thought would be an affront to 
Philippine nationalism. As Roxas asserted, “When the national capital is the nation’s greatest 
center of population and of the nation’s economic life, the presence of alien military establishments 
becomes truly intolerable.”37 He feared that these bases in the capital would be a “constant source 
of friction” and a “convenient object of attack by individuals and groups interested in maligning 
the nature of our relationship with the United States.” Thus, Roxas noted, such bases were 
“politically unpalatable”, “strategically unnecessary”, and a source of fear that in case of a war, 
the nation’s capital will be subjected to attack and destruction.”38 The second objection was 
regarding the criminal jurisdiction provisions. The proposed draft gave the United States authority 
                                                          
36 Some examples of these demands are the following: that the United States would acquire the bases for ninety-nine 
years; that the United States would be permitted to use public utilities under conditions no worse than those applicable 
to the Philippine armed forces; that the Philippines could not give third nations base rights without U.S. approval. See 
Shalom; Berry Jr. 
37 Quoted in Brands. P. 232 
38 Quoted in Shalom 




over all offenses committed by the members of the U.S. armed forces regardless of who the victim 
was and whether the offense was committed on or off the base, on or off duty.39  The Philippine 
leader viewed the American proposals on this issue as tantamount to the revival of 
extraterritoriality. To the Philippine leader, such provisions would be difficult to sell to the 
Philippine Congress.40 The criminal jurisdiction provisions became a contentious issue and the 
negotiations reached an impasse by October 1946.   
As the Philippine leadership pressed on these objections, the United States began to 
reevaluate the importance of retaining military bases in the Philippines. While the negotiations 
dragged on longer than expected, Roxas decided to submit the bases agreement, which had not 
been concluded, to the Philippine Senate for ratification. It is worth pointing out that Roxas did 
not need the Philippine Congress, where opposition to granting the United States basing rights had 
gained steam, to ratify the agreement.41 Roxas’s decision was perhaps motivated by the desire to 
protect himself politically by getting the Philippine Congress involved in the bases agreement. It 
was also possible that the decision may have been a calculated move to put pressure on the United 
States to soften its position on difficult issues, such as the criminal jurisdiction provisions. In a 
letter to President Truman Roxas noted that he could not compromise on two issues: first, no 
military bases could be built in Manila or in other metropolitan areas; and second, the Philippines 
must have exclusive jurisdiction over off-base offenses “irrespective of the persons involved.”42 If 
the Philippines had sought to put pressure on the United States by hardening its position, the 
strategy was upended by the U.S. War Department’s decision to withdraw all U.S. Army forces 
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from the Philippines and to halt all permanent construction of Philippine bases. It is not clear 
whether the U.S. decision was a result of economic constraints or a bargaining tool to pressure 
Roxas to accept American demands.          
The Philippine leadership sought to extract side payments from the United States in 
exchange for the bases. The Philippine negotiators wanted a separate military assistance agreement 
that would guarantee military aid for the Philippines. One Philippine official advised Roxas: “We 
feel and know that strategic and economic position and policy of the United States, especially as 
regards to oil, demand that she maintain military, naval, and air bases in the Philippines, which is 
the key to the great oil reserves of the Indies.” He urged Roxas “to use the base talks as the 
bargaining instrument” to gain “military assistance we actually need and want for use as we want 
it, and under the terms we wish to impose.”43  However, the Philippine leaders had limited 
bargaining leverage which became even more apparent when the United States sought to halt the 
construction of permanent bases in the Philippines. Given the Philippine leaders’ willingness to 
grant the United States basing rights, as explained previously, American officials did not expect 
to pay large amounts of side payments for the bases.44 Finally, the United States and Philippines 
concluded the bases agreement that satisfied almost all American demands with the exception of 
building military bases in Manila. William Berry argues that the U.S. decision to reduce the 
American military presence and not to seek military bases in Manila was determined by economic 
and strategic considerations. The Truman administration and the War Department was concerned 
that the Congress would not fund the construction of new base facilities in the Philippines in 
addition to increasing demands on American resources in Korea, Australia, Japan, and Germany. 
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In addition, American strategists considered Guam and Okinawa as more attractive to the U.S. 
military than were military facilities in the Philippines.45 The United States sweetened the deal by 
assuring (without pledging any specific amount) the Philippine leader of a military aid pact.   
The Philippines subsequently signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States in 
1951 and joined the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) as a founding member in 1954. 
Although the Mutual Defense Treaty and SEATO did not significantly modify the existing U.S.-
Philippine security relations, they added more layers of treaties to the alliance. The United States 
signed the Defense Treaty with the Philippines to obtain the Philippine support for the Peace Treaty 
with Japan (the San Francisco Peace Treaty). Although the Philippine leaders initially opposed the 
peace treaty, they finally agreed to join the treaty in return for Japan’s acknowledgement of an 
obligation to pay reparations and a long-term military and economic aid commitment from the 
United States.46 The Philippines also sought to be part of a regional pact (a Pacific pact) modeled 
after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).47 In the early 1950s the Philippine leaders 
thought the United States might reward an initiative to resist communism with more economic aid, 
which would then compensate the Philippines for the loss of interim reparations payments from 
Japan.48 American defense planners were not initially interested in a new Pacific Pact, but changes 
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in the geo-political dynamics in the region (especially the French defeat in Indochina) made them 
reconsider the initiative. The Philippines hosted the negotiations for a regional pact and joined the 
Manila Pact or the Southeast Asia Treaty organization (SEATO) in 1954.49  
ii) The Alliance and its provisions:  The Military Bases Agreement was signed on 
March 14th, 1947. The Philippines made major concessions on most American demands. The 
agreement granted the United States “the right to retain the use” of 16 bases in the Philippines and 
to use 7 other bases if the U.S. deemed “military necessity” of such action. These 23 bases were 
granted to the United States rent-free for a period of 99 years (until 2045). Prominent among these 
base sites included the naval and air base complex at Olangapo-Subic Bay-Cubi Point on Luzon 
Island, serving as the home base of the U.S. 7th Fleet. The 60,000 acre Subic base became the U.S. 
navy’s primary repair facility for its ships in the Pacific. Another prominent base was the Clark 
Air Base, located in Pampanga Province, where the U.S. 13th Air Force was stationed. In addition, 
the Philippine negotiators made major concessions on the criminal jurisdiction provisions.50 
Following the completion of the bases agreement a Military Assistance Agreement was signed on 
March 20th, 1947. As noted earlier, the agreement did not specify the extent of American military 
aid to the Philippines. It established a Joint U.S. Military Advisory Groups (JUSMAG) in the 
Philippines to advice, train, and equip the Armed Forces of the Philippines.51  
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 The Mutual Defense Treaty tied the Philippines to American foreign policy goals in the 
Asia-Pacific region. The treaty insisted that “an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the 
parties, would be dangerous to own peace and safety.” A feature of the treaty was the stipulation 
that in cases of armed attack each country “would act to meet the common danger in accordance 
with its constitutional processes.” In practice, this stipulation had important implication for the 
parties as to how they were expected to react in crises. Whereas the Philippine government could 
hardly withstand strong American pressure to become involved in U.S. military adventures 
regardless of Philippine interests, the United States government could ignore Philippine pleas for 
U.S. help in any situation that did not seriously affect American interests.52 Senator Claro M. 
Recto, a Filipino critic of the Treaty, argued that the U.S. commitment in the Mutual Defense 
Treaty was vague and amounted to no commitment at all. According to Recto, the Philippines 
would have benefited if the Treaty followed the NATO formula—the provision that an armed 
attack against either parties in the Pacific area should be considered as an attack against both—so 
that in the event of an armed attack against the Philippines, the United States would take immediate 
action to repel the attack. The United States, however, was unwilling to take make such a 
commitment.53    
 Lastly, the SEATO (the Manila Pact) was designed to serve as a collective security 
mechanism for South East Asia. The Treaty stipulated that in the event of an armed attack in the 
treaty area against any of the parties, the signatories would act to meet the common danger in 
accordance with their constitutional processes and that they would consult together to agree on 
measures for common defense if anyone of them considered the inviolability, territorial integrity, 
sovereignty, or political independence of any party to the treaty threatened by armed attack (from 
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communist countries).54  The United States resisted the inclusion of any automatic war trigger 
provision in the treaty. American negotiators insisted that war declarations must be in accord with 
the constitutional processes of the signatories, which the Philippine officials complained was a 
mere legalism to avoid making any clear commitments. Although U.S. Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles privately reassured the Philippine leader about the U.S. commitment to Philippine 
security, he did not accept the Filipino demand to turn the SEATO into a NATO-style organization. 
Importantly, Dulles made it clear that the United States was pledging itself only to resist 
communist aggression and would not get involved in other conflicts of the signatories.55  
      
D) Trade-off  
The alliance enabled the United States to make extensive gains in foreign policy autonomy in 
Southeast Asia. The Military Bases Agreement was an attractive deal for the United States. Indeed, 
the Philippine government granted the United States extensive privileges with regards to the bases. 
The government permitted almost total freedom for U.S. air force planes to operate in the country’s 
air space, including use of its flight information services and its internationally assigned radio 
communication frequencies. The Bases Agreement carved out enclaves for the United States 
“where Philippine sovereignty stopped at the gates.” The Philippine courts had no jurisdiction over 
crimes committed by U.S. servicemen on the bases, including crimes against Filipino citizens. 
Natural resources located on the base lands could not be exploited by Filipinos.56 The agreement 
provided the United States with a major springboard for pursuing it foreign policy objectives in 
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Asia, knitted the Philippines closely to the Cold War. In addition to the bases, the United States 
gained greater economic privileges in the Philippines. One observer noted that Americans, 
paradoxically, acquired greater privileges in the Islands during the post-colonial years than they 
had during the colonial period.57  
The alliance facilitated the Philippines’ support for American foreign policy objectives in 
military ventures as well as in international diplomacy. The Philippines took part in almost every 
military conflict the United States got involved in the Asia-Pacific. For example, the Philippines 
sent five Filipino battalion in succession to Korea to support U.S. armed forces in the Korean War. 
When the U.S. 7th Fleet, operating from its main base in the Philippines at the Subic Bay, 
intervened in the Formosa Straits area to provide protection for the Chiang Kai-Shek’s regime in 
Taiwan, the Philippines became a partner in the hostility against China. During a military coup in 
Indonesia in 1958, the U.S. Clark Air base in the Philippines was used for CIA-directed bombing 
raids on Indonesia and made the Philippines complicit in the U.S. intervention in Indonesia.58 
Lastly, the U.S. bases in the Philippines were greatly expanded as some of the main staging areas 
for air and naval attacks on both North and South Vietnam. The Clark Air base was used for 
operations in Vietnam while the Subic was used as the chief base for bombs and shells for naval 
aircraft and ships attacking Vietnam. Some claimed that the United States had stockpiled nuclear 
weapons on its Philippine bases and had nuclear submarines operating from those bases (without 
Philippine permission) intended to use against China and other communist countries.59 As for 
international diplomacy, the United States consistently received Philippine support for its security 
and foreign policy agenda in the United Nations. At the 1955 Bandung Conference of Asian and 
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African countries, the Philippines defended American foreign policy and refused to accept the 
nonalignment agenda. During the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1955 and the Vietnam War the Philippines 
stood firmly behind the United States.60  
The Philippine leaders made extensive concessions on the bases and the criminal 
jurisdiction provisions.  In return, however, the Philippines received a very small amount of side 
payments.61 Although the United States sweetened the bases agreement with the Military 
Assistance Agreement (MBA), which committed the United States to provide military aid to the 
Philippines, was a compensation for the Bases, the MBA cost very little to the United States.62 In 
fact, the bases agreement specified that the bases would be granted free of rent. The Purpose of 
the MBA was not to furnish the Philippines with big items military equipment, but to boost the 
Philippine internal security. The Philippine leaders and their allies in the ruling class sought an 
alliance with the United States to secure their political survival in the post-independent Philippines. 
Although there was no plausible external threat to the Philippines in 1947, the ruling elites faced 
serious internal threats to the status quo, looming primarily from the marginalized peasantry.63 
They needed to reengage the United States in the Islands and sought American assistance in 
boosting the Philippine internal security. In the first decade, the Joint United States Military 
Advisory Group (JUSMAG), which was created as a result of the MBA, spent $169.3 million to 
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support and reorganize the Philippine Constabulary, and to train and equip the Philippine 
military.64 This military aid figure is indeed small compare to, for example, American military aid 
commitment to Pakistan, which formed an alliance with the U.S. in 1954. During the first few 
years of the alliance. According to the Pentagon, the U.S. military aid commitment to Pakistan 
amounted to $505 million by the end of the 1950s.65 Figure 5.1 shows U.S. aid to the Philippines 
from 1946 to 2010. It is important note that the Rehabilitation Act (1946) provided for a sum of 
$620 million for damaged public and private property during the Second World War. The United 
States fulfilled its rehabilitation commitment by 195266. In addition to the rehabilitation fund, the 
United States also provided the Philippines with aid for veterans’ welfare, which were not tied to 
the bases agreement or the MBA.67   
  The trade-off theory predicts that when parties have a low level of divergent interests (i.e. 
similar interests), a small (or no) amount of side payments is needed to compensate for the small 
state’s autonomy concessions. As explained in the previous section, the United States and the 
Philippines had very little or no interest divergence in forming the alliance. In the late 1940s the 
United States was relatively indifferent toward establishing bases in the Philippines. American 
policymakers, however, were open to a cheap deal. Roxas and his predecessors had expressed their 
willingness, both in private and in public, to host American bases in the Philippines. Although the 
Philippine leaders objected to certain American demands, such objections were mitigated by their 
strong desire to form the alliance as a means to protect their political power in a threatening 
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domestic political environment. By portraying the Huks as a part of world-wide communist 
conspiracy, the Philippine ruling elites successfully delegitimized the organization and the root 
causes of insurgency. The United States, which had an interest in helping the Philippine ruling 
elite and the political establishment in order to protect its basing rights, responded by providing 
economic and military aid to boost the Philippines’ internal security.68 In addition, the elite class 
had economic interests in the alignment. The Philippine elites benefitted enormously from their 
trade relations with the United States during the colonial eras. Philippine independence, however, 
threatened to disrupt the special relations. Having an alliance with the United States and granting 
the bases to U.S. ensured the continuation of profitable economic relations.69 Thus, as the level of 
divergent interests was very low (the parties had a high degree of mutual interests), the United 
States did not need to provide a large amount of side payments to Philippines to cement the 
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With American support, the Philippine ruling elites were able to defeat the Huks and 
secured their political position at home in the short run. The Philippine leaders, however, soon 
realized that the compensation they received for the bases was much smaller than what other 
countries received with the similar level of concessions. According to William Berry, compare to 
the status-of-force agreements the United States reached with the NATO allies, the Philippines 
received insignificant compensation for its bases agreement and there was “ample evidence that 
Filipinos were justified in their belief that they received unequal treatment from the United 
States.”70 As we saw in the previous pages, the Philippine leaders were much too eager to grant 
the United States the basing rights to strike a hard bargain and to extract large amounts of side 
payments.  The next section illustrates that a low level of divergent interests continued to affect 
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the Philippine leaders’ ability to obtain large amounts of side payments until American 
involvement in Vietnam intensified.    
   
II. Cooperation and Discord   
 
The United States rated the Philippine bases high in importance during the height of the Cold War 
tension in Southeast Asia in the 1950s. One Pentagon report suggested that the American bases in 
the Philippines would be of “extreme importance” in holding the Pacific island chain together and 
“these bases are therefore as essential part of a worldwide base system designed to deter 
communism.”71 The alliance proved to be a steady one as the Philippines’ reliability was never in 
doubt in Washington. From the early 1970s, however, interests diverged modestly. The second 
part of the chapter delves into cooperation and discord in the alliance. It analyzes how changing 
circumstances gave rise to divergence of interests and how such changes affected the alliance 
tightness and the amounts of side payments the Philippines received from the United States. 
 
A) A Steady Alliance: American Indifference to a loyal Ally  
i) A Loyal American Ally: Although the bases were a contentious issue in the bilateral 
relations, the Philippines remained a loyal ally of the United States throughout the 1950s and 
1960s. While American strategists considered the Philippine bases important to America’s Cold 
War containment strategy, for many Filipinos the bases were a sign of colonialism and a source of 
agitation. The Eisenhower administration sought accommodation with the Filipino demands 
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(especially concerning the criminal jurisdiction issues), but refused to consider any demands that 
might curtail America’s free use of the bases.72 The Philippine leaders repeatedly asked for more 
aid and even attempted to use the bases as a lever. During this period of the alliance, however, the 
parties had a low level of divergent interests, which limited the Philippine leaders’ ability to extract 
large amounts of side payments from the United States.  
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Philippine leaders remained loyal followers of 
American foreign policy. Of these leaders, Ramon Magsaysay (1953-1957) was well-known for 
his un-wavering support for the United States. The Philippines during the Magsaysay presidency 
was heavily involved in the early stages of U.S. intervention in Vietnam and allowed the CIA to 
operate freely from the Philippine bases. For example, a Freedom Company training camp was set 
up on the Clark Air base reservation areas to train South Vietnam’s counter-guerilla force.73 Like 
their predecessor, Carlos Garcia (1957-1961) and Diosdado Macapagal (1961-1965) maintained a 
close relationship with the United States. The Garcia administration faced various internal 
problems including rampant corruption, social unrest, and the rising influence of the Philippine 
nationalists who called for cutting all ties with the United States. Despite a rising anti-American 
sentiment in the Philippines, President Garcia attempted to demonstrate his loyalty to the 
anticommunist cause, something he knew American policymakers would appreciate. Similarly, 
Macapagal followed the American lines in regional and international politics.74  
  Despite their support for American foreign policy, the Philippine leaders’ pleas for more 
aid fell on deaf ears in Washington. Magsaysay justified his request for more compensation to 
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Secretary of State Dulles by suggesting that the bases were worth more to the United States than 
America was paying and complained that other countries with American bases were getting more 
than the Philippines. The Philippine leaders, as friendly as Magsaysay, failed to raise the 
compensation amounts for the bases. Magsaysay’s successors Garcia and Macapagal experienced 
the similar indifference in American response to their requests for more aid. Garcia asked for more 
aid to make the Philippines a “showcase of democracy” and tried to exploit Washington's fear of 
Communism. He claimed that unless the United States provide more aid, the Philippines would 
see Communist resurgence in the countryside.75 American officials, however, did not see 
justification for more aid since the Huks and Communist inspired groups were largely quiet and 
no longer posed a threat. They dismissed the demand for more compensation for the bases as the 
work of “cheap politicians” who simply wanted to get more out of the United States.76 The 
Philippine leaders, however, got attention in Washington when hostilities broke out in the Gulf of 
Tonkin in Vietnam. As the conflict intensified, the United States and the Philippines reiterated 
their commitments to the SEATO against communist expansion in the region. 
ii) The Philippines’ Role in the Vietnam War: American military build-up in Vietnam 
put pressure on the Philippine government to contribute to the war effort. The United States started 
to increase the use of the Philippine bases to prosecute the war and wanted the Philippines to send 
forces to Vietnam. The Johnson administration craved the support of America’s allies, including 
the Philippines, for the war in Vietnam. Macapagal, however, was unable to persuade the 
Philippine Congress to send troops to Vietnam. The Philippine leadership did not share American 
fear about the consequences of a domino falling in Vietnam for the Philippines. For most Filipinos, 
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“there existed positive resistance to taking part in what increasingly seemed America’s war.”77 
While the extent of the Philippines’ contribution could be negotiated with the United States, 
Ferdinand Marcos, who assumed power in 1965, cared about how the outcome in Vietnam might 
change the value of the Philippines to America’s regional strategies.          
 Marcos was aware of the elevated importance of the Philippine bases to the United States 
and intended to exploit the bases to maximize the amount of side payments from the United States. 
Soon after getting elected as President, Marcos let American officials to know that he was 
noncommittal about the bases. Although U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk was able to persuade 
Marcos to send a modest number of troops to Vietnam, Marcos expressed vague support for the 
Vietnam War. When the Philippine leader visited the United States (in September 1966), it was 
clear what the allies wanted from each other: Marcos asked for more American aid and Johnson 
wanted a larger Philippine force in Vietnam. The visit turned out to be a beneficial one for Marcos: 
he got a pledge of more than $80 million in American aid in return for troop contribution to the 
Vietnam War and a continued support for the war.78 While Marcos, as a Senator, previously 
opposed Macapagal’s proposal to send Philippine forces to Vietnam, as President he sent a 
Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) to Vietnam for a price. He calculated that as long as 
the United States was in Vietnam, he could attract American aid for his support for the war. The 
Senate subcommittee on the United States Security Agreements and Commitments revealed that 
Marcos received at least $39 million for sending the PHILCAG to Vietnam.79  
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From the mid-1950s to 1972 the U.S-Philippines alliance experienced no discernible 
divergence of interests (see table 1 for a summary of interest divergence during various periods of 
the alliance).   As explained above, in the absence of any perceptible interest divergence, the United 
States had little incentives to increase the amount of side payments. American policymakers 
concluded: why pay more when the Philippines was securely in the American fold. The 
Philippines’ bargaining leverage increased somewhat as American involvement in the Vietnam 
War intensified.  
 
B) The Politics of “Pay for Play” 
Interest divergence between the parties widened concerning the importance of hosting 
American bases in the Philippines and American commitment to the security of the Islands. As the 
pressures mounted to withdraw American forces from Vietnam, policymakers in Washington 
began to reassess the American foreign policy for East and Southeast Asia. In the ensuing 
reexamination of American interests in the region, there appeared to be some uncertainties whether 
the United States should retract or retain its strategic investment. For the Philippines, this 
uncertainty was a bad omen—the Philippines’ importance might be diminishing in Washington, 
which meant less bargaining leverage for the Philippine leaders. In response, Marcos undertook 
new diplomatic initiatives to reduce his reliance on the United States. As interests diverged, the 
Philippine leader’s ability to bargain more side payments improved. Thus, From the mid-1970s 
on, as this section illustrates, Marcos extracted a substantial amount of side payments by 
threatening to deprive the United States of access to the bases that American strategists thought 
indispensable for containing the Communist sphere of influence in the region.    




i) Uncertainties in U.S. Foreign Policy: In the mid-1970s there were two currents of 
thinking in the U.S. approach to Southeast Asia.80 One approach urged a reexamination of 
American foreign policy and called for a reduction in the U.S. role in Southeast Asia. Newly 
announced U.S. foreign policy doctrines seemed to be supportive of this approach. For example, 
the Nixon Doctrine promised that the United States would keep its treaty commitments and would 
provide a nuclear shield if a nuclear power threaten an American ally, but the United States would 
no longer intervene, as it did in Vietnam, with ground troops in another state. The doctrine 
stipulated that the nations in Southeast Asia would have to bear the responsibilities of their own 
defense; American intervention could not again be called for except in the unlikely event of an 
overt aggression by outside forces. Nixon’s successor Gerald Ford issued a similar formulation in 
1974 that minimized American roles in conventional defense of an ally unless U.S. interests were 
directly involved.81  
Some strategists and lawmakers in Congress feared that the United States might get 
entrapped in the Philippines’ internal conflicts. The SEATO was criticized as an obstacle to better 
relations with China, with which the United States had made rapprochement in the early 1970s. 
U.S. interests in Southeast Asia, including in the Philippines, were judged important but not vital 
or worth fighting for. The loss of Vietnam might have damaged American prestige but it did not 
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constitute any threat.82 Regarding the Mutual Defense Treaty, some policymakers sought to make 
it clear that the United States was obligated to defend the Philippines only in the instances of an 
“external armed attack,” not in the cases of domestic insurgency. Although there was no significant 
evidence of the Chinese or the Soviet involvement with the domestic dissident groups in the 
Philippines, some in Washington feared that the treaty might drag the United States into unwanted 
internal wars on behalf of the Philippine government.83 Moreover, according to this line of 
thinking, the importance of the Philippine bases diminished somewhat since there was no 
significant threat of armed aggression by major powers in Southeast Asia. As the continuing utility 
of the Philippine bases was in doubt, the major issue was to determine how much rent the United 
States should pay the Philippines for the bases.84  
A second approach called for a continued American presence in Southeast Asia. Even 
though there were no immediate external threats to the Philippines during the Marcos era, the 
proponents of this approach considered the bases indispensable for carrying out the global policies 
of the United States. The retentionist camp, supported by the defense department, argued that after 
the fall of South Vietnam, the Philippine bases became more important than ever. For example, 
Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. made the case that the strategic location of the Philippines made the 
islands vital to the defense of Japan, Australia, and the Indian Ocean. The bases, according to 
McCain, represented “our farthest forward outpost, our last dam, our frontline trenches and were 
we to lose the Philippines, our next fall back would be Guam, then Honolulu, and then the State 
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of California.”85 Admiral McCain and like-minded strategists argued that the bases gave the United 
States the flexibility and operational efficiency to respond to any contingency and to maintain 
military readiness in the Western Pacific. The retentionist camp, thus, advocated the maintenance 
of American bases in the Philippines, even for an increased amount of rent payments. 
ii) Marcos’s Response: Keeping the options Open: Marcos had to consider the 
possibility that the United States might withdraw its forces from Southeast Asia and might reduce 
its commitments to the Philippines. For the Filipino leader such a scenario was a cause for concern 
since it meant that in time of trouble he could not rely on U.S. assistance. Marcos called for a 
reexamination of the entire security relationship with the United States. The Philippine leader 
contemplated strategies that would preserve the Philippines’ importance to the United States in the 
post-Vietnam period and would improve his bargaining leverage to extract large amounts of side 
payments. Marcos sought to gain the greatest return possible for the bases.  
Marcos devised a new foreign policy initiative called the New Developmental 
Diplomacy—a result largely of some uncertainties in American commitment to Southeast Asia 
and the Philippines.86 The Philippine leader now took a firmer position toward the United States 
and called for the renegotiation and revision of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the SEATO 
agreement. Filipino officials revived an old demand that instead of obliging the United States to 
take action in accordance with its constitutional processes, the SEATO should, like in the NATO, 
make the United States committed to defend the Philippines in the event of an armed attack.  It 
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was also argued that American obligations toward the Philippines in the Mutual defense Treaty 
were so vague that the treaty was almost meaningless. The treaty, according to this view, failed to 
meet Philippine demands for an automatic American response to the defense of the Islands. It 
committed the Philippines to take actions on behalf of the United State—serving American 
interests rather than that of the Philippines.87 In a speech of May 23, 1975, Marcos said: “It is 
difficult if not impossible to stake the nation’s survival on whimsical interpretations of the mutual 
defense agreements which are apparently dependent not on legal commitments but on the mood of 
the nation in any historical period.”88 In addition, Marcos raised questions of whether the bases 
served the mutual interests or whether they promote only America’s geo-strategic interests in 
Asia.89   
In an effort to offset dependency on the United States, Marcos initiated an active campaign 
to diversify Philippine foreign policy. He launched an intensive campaign to attract Japanese 
economic assistance to the Philippines. Marcos loosened ties with Taiwan in order to normalize 
relations with the People’s Republic of China—a dramatic reversal of Marcos’ perception of threat 
concerning China, which he had singled out earlier as a force of aggression in the region.90 In 
addition, Marcos adopted an open-door policy toward all communist countries including the Soviet 
Union. The Philippines became the spokesman in the region for the recognition of the new 
governments in Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos and led the discussions for incorporating these 
states into a new regional organization. When Vietnam announced its unification, the Philippines 
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was among the first to extend recognition.91 The improved Philippine-Chinese relations caused 
little or no alarm in Washington, but the United States did not appreciate the Philippine leader’s 
“cozy” relations with the Soviet Union and other communist countries of the Soviet bloc. More 
disturbing from the American perspective was a nonaggression and non-subversion Pact Marcos 
signed with now unified Vietnam in 1978. These policy initiatives were taken largely to offset the 
expected decline in American commitments to the Philippines. 
 In an attempt to broaden his options Marcos sought to rent the Philippine bases to other 
parties to earn more. Marcos wanted to maximize the rent money for the bases. If the United States 
was not willing to raise the payment amount for the bases, Marcos was willing to shop for the 
highest bidder. He saw no reason why the facilities at the bases could not be made available to the 
Japanese, the Russians, or anyone else who wanted to use them for a higher payment.92 By the 
early 1970s the Philippine leadership could see the disparity between the amounts the United States 
paid for its bases in other countries and what the Philippines had been receiving. During the 1970s 
the United States made agreement with three Mediterranean states on American basing facilities: 
a five-year agreement with Spain contained a $1.2 billion compensation clause; a four-year 
agreement with Turkey entitled Ankara $1 billion in compensation; and a similar agreement with 
Greece involved a payment of $700 million. During the same time period, Thailand received over 
$400 million in military assistance and South Korea received over $600 million. However, the 
Philippines received only $50 million in grant aid.93 Figure 5.2 below makes a comparison between 
the amount of military and economic aid Thailand and the Philippines received from the United 
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States from 1950 to 1976, when Thailand hosted American bases. Marcos could easily point to the 
disparity in American aid for the Philippines and Thailand, which received more economic and 
military aid than did the Philippines even though the Philippines hosted the largest American bases 
in the region. Perhaps more disturbing for Marcos, Indonesia was getting as much military aid 
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iii) (Re) Negotiations for the Bases:  The Philippine leadership feared that the United 
States might abandon the Philippines just like Vietnam. Fortunately for Marcos, the retentionist 
camp prevailed in the post-Vietnam foreign policy debate in Washington. Marcos was aware of 
this outcome and “played Washington like a virtuoso.” Even though Marcos portrayed himself as 
the leader who would secure American interests in the Philippines, he hinted at abrogating the 
bases agreements unless the Americans offered “satisfaction” (which meant more side 
payments).95 Multiple rounds of negotiations for the modifications of the bases agreement, which 
was supposed to run until 1991, began in 1975 to settle disagreements between the parties.96  
The 1975 negotiations for the bases agreement entailed protracted rounds of bargaining in 
which the key issues that had to be settled were a set of terms for American use of Philippine bases 
and the amount of compensation in rent the United States had to pay for the bases.97 Marcos’ chief 
negotiator Carlos Romulo, foreign minister, set the demand at a higher amount (which ranged in 
more than a billion dollar) for a deal. Marcos wanted an increased amount of economic and military 
aid to combat internal threats that included difficult insurgencies and to bolster support for his 
martial law regime.98 The negotiations were suspended due to disagreements over the amount of 
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side payments.99 When the negotiations resumed in 1977, Marcos intensified a campaign designed 
to put pressure on Washington. He encouraged members of his regime to denounce the American 
bases as symbols of neocolonialism. The government-sponsored youth groups organized anti-
bases rallies and protests with banners that read “Yankee, go home.”100 These actions, the 
Philippine leader hoped, would serve to appease Filipino nationalists who disliked the American 
bases and would allow him to strike a hard bargain and extract more side payments from the United 
States. As American ambassador to the Philippines, David Newsom observed, “President Marcos, 
like any master strategist, realizes that in any game it is wise to keep one’s options open. . . . He 
therefore may flirt without compunction with the Third World, China, or the Soviet Union, if this 
suits his immediate purposes.”101 Meanwhile the Carter administration was under increasing 
pressure from its domestic critics for losing America’s influence in the Third World. The 
administration was determined not to jeopardize the Philippine bases by raising questions about 
the martial law regime or by evoking the regime’s human rights abuses.102  By the end of 1978 the 
United States and Philippines concluded an agreement, according to which the United State agreed 
to provide the Philippines $500 million in military aid for five-year period.103 The Carter 
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administration also pledged economic aid to the Philippines. Between 1979 and 1980, the United 
States provided the Philippines $155 million in economic aid and helped the Philippines to get 
$721 million in loans from multinational development banks.104  The Carter Administration made 
efforts to deliver Marcos the promised amount as the administration was well aware that if 
Washington, according to Brands, “failed to deliver, he doubtless would scuttle the agreement.”105  
The next round of negotiations, which began in 1983, was less acrimonious and quicker 
than the last one. By the mid-1980s, the Philippine bases had become largely a convenience for 
the United States. The bases were not used as forward bases for significant U.S. Pacific forces, 
which were located in Hawaii and Japan.106 President Ronald Reagan, however, sought to reach 
an agreement as the administration perceived the Soviet presence in Southeast Asia as a threat to 
American interests in the region. The Reagan administration revived the idea that there was a 
global communist conspiracy inciting violence and unrest in the Third World, although the 
American embassy in Manila reported that there was no Russian connection to political violence 
in the Philippines.107 While American interest in the retention of the bases grew, for many Filipinos 
the idea that the bases did not serve the Philippines’ national interest, having the bases was an 
affront to the state’s sovereignty, and a possible target in a superpower confrontation persisted.108 
The revived Cold War fears in Washington boded well for Marcos. Thus, the 1983 compensation 
agreement made a significant increase in compensation from $500 million in 1979 (for a five-year 
period) to $900 million for five years.109  
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The trade-off theory suggests that small states have a better chance of gaining large 
amounts of side payments from great powers when the parties have a medium level of interest 
divergence.  As this section has shown that the alliance experienced a medium level of interest 
divergence during the Marcos’ martial law regime that lasted from 1973 to 1986 (see table 1). 
Disagreements about the relative importance of the bases to the Philippines and the degree to which 
the bases served Philippine national interest was a major issue between the allies. The heightened 
importance of the Philippine bases during the Vietnam War improved the Philippines’ bargaining 
leverage with the United States that boded well for Marcos. Although the United States was not 
prepared to leave the Philippine bases altogether as the Vietnam War was winding down, the 
strategic importance of the alliance as well as the bases diminished somewhat. The Philippine 
leader highlighted interest divergence between the allies when America’s commitment to the 
Philippines was uncertain in a changed political environment in Southeast Asia. In response, 
Marcos kept his options open: he warmed up diplomatic relations with communist countries 
including the Soviet Union; in addition, he hinted the willingness to let third parties use the bases 
in order to maximize the compensation amounts. In the end, the Philippine leader masterfully 
negotiated deals that ensured higher payments for the bases. The next section delves into the effects 
of political changes on the U.S.-Philippine alliance.   
  
C) Political Changes in the Philippines:  
The trade-off theory predicts that all else equal, leadership changes will be less likely to 
affect the continuity of alliances in the short run. As the analyses in the second part of this case 
study shows, all Philippine leaders until Marcos remained overtly loyal to American foreign policy 
objectives. From the 1950s to the mid-1960s the Philippine leaders’ close affinity with the United 




States ensured a steady alliance relationship. Magsaysay, for example, exemplified this pattern of 
un-waivered loyalty to American foreign policy objectives. As historian H.W. Brands observes, 
“Washington and Manila have never got along better than during the years of the Magsaysay 
administration. . . . Magsaysay was the epitome of what Washington was looking for in an Asian 
leader, the model it held up for its other client countries.”110 A consequence of such a close affinity 
(i.e. a low level of interest divergence) was that it diminished the Philippine leaders’ bargaining 
leverage and thus, adversely affected their ability to extract large side payments for autonomy 
concessions. Periodic leadership changes in the Philippines had little impact on the continuity of 
the alliance.  
The first regime change in the Philippines occurred in 1972 when Marcos declared martial 
law. Like his predecessors, Marcos sought American economic and military aid to consolidate his 
political power at home. His terms as a democratically elected leader were mired by several 
internal troubles. American analysts listed the domestic hazards to Philippine stability: “land 
hunger in the countryside, unemployment in the cities, and the grinding poverty of the 
overwhelming majority of the people.”111 He faced armed rebellions (for example, the Moros 
uprising in the late 1960s and early 1970s in Muslim populated Mindanao) and widespread 
dissatisfaction with the government’s failure to improve the living standard of the poor mass, 
which contributed to the rise of a leftist insurgency. A plausible solution to these domestic 
insurrections was basic reforms. However, the Filipino leadership, drawn largely from landowning 
families, did not feel any strong commitment to major changes in the countryside, since their 
family and personal interests lie in perpetuating the status quo.112 Instead of addressing domestic 
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discontents, Marcos and his cronies fostered widespread corruption, utilized patronage and money 
to enrich his loyal supporters.113 As bleak economic conditions exacerbated social unrest in the 
Philippines, Marcos had to contend with increasing demands for change from all sectors of the 
society.114 In the face of multiple domestic threats to his political power, Marcos imposed martial 
law on September 23, 1972.115 
The theory suggests two possible outcomes as a result of a regime change . The new regime 
may want to disassociate itself from the policies of the previous regime and thus may terminate 
the alliance; or it may demand more side payments as a compensation for the maintenance of the 
alliance. An important condition in the latter case is the level of importance the great power 
attached to the continuity of the alliance. The prediction is predicated on the idea that a regime 
change entails a complete restructuring of the state’s political institutions and leadership. In the 
case of first regime change in the Philippines in 1972, while there were changes in political 
institutions, there was no leadership change. Thus, following the theory’s logic, we expect Marcos 
to maintain the alliance. The regime change made Marcos’ need for American support and aid 
even more urgent. The martial law regime changed the distribution of power among the Filipino 
elites. Since Marcos relied on the military to stay in power, military leaders became an essential 
part of his winning coalition at the expense of some groups in the traditional elite class. Marcos 
rewarded the military handsomely: appropriations for the Philippine armed forces and 
constabulary tripled between 1972 and 1977; the Military’s share of the GDP doubled to 23 
                                                          
113Ibid. P. 284  
114 See George M. Guthrie, ed., Six Perspectives on the Philippines (Manila: Bookmark, 1971); Benigno S Aquino, 
"What's Wrong with the Philippines?," Foreign Affairs  (1968).   
115 Marcos justified the imposition of martial law, in Proclamation 1081 (September 22, 1972), by referring to the 
endemic social and political unrests caused by rural insurgencies, communist conspiracies, and a socialist agrarian 
reform movement. However, it is not difficult to understand that Marcos declared martial law as a way to stay in 
power after serving two consecutive terms as President. See Buss. Pp. 64-65    




percent.116 American aid helped Marcos to keep his core supporters happy and allowed him 
maintain a strong grip on power.  In the absence of a reliable source of external resources Marcos 
had to continue the alliance with the United States.  The United States continued to support Marcos 
for the sake of securing uninterrupted access to the bases irrespective of the regime’s human rights 
violation and lack of respect for democratic values.117 As we saw in the previous section, Marcos 
successfully renegotiated the Bases Agreement and extracted more side payments for the bases 
than his predecessors. Even before the negotiations began, U.S. military aid to the Philippines 
almost doubled in the first three years of the martial law regime compare to the last three years 
before martial law: whereas U.S. military aid to the Philippines from 1970 to 1972 totaled $60.2 
million, the amount increased to $118.7 million during the 1973-1975 period.118   
The regime’s hold on power began to slip during the early 1980s. Armed insurrections, 
economic recession, and rampant corruption at various levels of government weakened Marcos’ 
authoritarian regime.119 More and more members of the elite who were deprived of being part of 
Marcos’ winning coalition resented the monopolization of power and profit-making opportunities 
by Marcos and his cronies. Finally, the assassination of Philippine opposition leader Benigno 
Aquino in August 1983 upended the regime’s hold on power as an anti-regime uprising (known as 
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the “People’s Power”) forced Marcos to resign in 1986 that led to the second regime change in the 
Philippines.   
While Marcos played the quid pro quo game with the United States very well by using the 
bases as a lever, his successor, Corazon Aquino, who was elected president in 1986, faced a 
different set of political constraints. Aquino elevated herself as the antithesis of Marcos and faced 
strong pressure, emanating from a broad coalition of the people, to distance herself from the 
Marcos policy including American presence in the Islands. Aquino stated on many occasions that 
she would respect the terms of the MBA until 1991, but after that she wanted to “keep her options 
open” regarding the future of the bases.120  The Philippine leader sought large amounts of side 
payments from the United States to show her large winning coalition the benefit of maintaining 
the bases agreement. Aquino’s preference for a large side payments is consistent with the trade-
off theory’s logic that the new leadership in the aftermath of a regime change in small states may 
demand a large amount of side payments as compensation for the maintenance of the alliance. The 
United States in this instance, however, was not willing to pay large compensation for the bases. 
 The degree of interest divergence remained at the medium level after the regime change in 
1986 (see table 1). One of the contending issues was Aquino’s handling of rebel groups in the 
Philippines. While the Reagan administration wanted the Aquino government to take a hardline 
approach to fighting the communist insurgency in the Philippines, President Aquino sought to 
pursue reconciliation with the rebels.121 Another source of diverging interests was the 
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understanding among the Filipinos that the alliance no longer serve Philippine national interests. 
It was a commonly held belief among many Filipinos that the United States was not paying enough 
for the bases. The negotiation that commenced in 1987 over the compensation amount broke down 
at the initial stage because the U.S. offer was deemed inadequate. The Philippine Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs, Raul Manglapus, made the familiar complaint that the United States was not 
paying as much as it should for the use of the bases. He argued that the bases served only American 
(not Philippine) national interests since the Philippines did not confront any credible external 
security threat. Therefore, the United States should be willing to pay a sufficient amount of 
compensation for the bases. Some Philippine officials also proposed a debt-for bases swap: The 
United States would pay the Philippines’ foreign debt, which totaled $30 billion, in exchange for 
the continued access to the bases. As the Cold War was coming to an end, the United States did 
not consider the Philippine bases worth paying large amounts of side payments. In response to the 
demand for more rents, American officials made it clear that if pressed the United States might go 
somewhere else.122 Moreover, they wanted to have some assurances that the United States would 
continue to have access to the bases after 1991—a pledge that President Aquino was not willing 
to make. U.S.  Defense Department officials have scrambled to find alternatives. None of the 
proposed sites, including Singapore and Japan, seem to offer Subic's advantages, which include 
huge deep-water facilities and access to the strategic waters of the South China Sea.123 
  The United States and the Philippines reached a tentative deal in October 1988 under 
which the United States agreed to pay $962 million for the use of the bases for two years. A long 
round of negotiation then followed for a new bases agreement. After nearly eleven months of 
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negotiations, a new base agreement, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security (TFCS), 
was signed in June 1991 that required approval from the Philippine Senate. The new deal stipulated 
that the United States would phase out Clark and Subic bases over ten years and in return, the 
Philippines would receive $203 million annually in compensation for the bases.124 The debate 
among Filipinos over the compensation amount continued to focus on whether the bases served 
the Philippine interests. The Philippine leaders did not share America’s post-Cold War security 
concerns. They did not see any immediate external threat to the Philippines and threats coming 
from internal sources could not be addressed by the U.S. military presence in the country. To the 
Aquino administration, the post-Cold war alliance with the United States would require increased 
level of military and economic aid that could soothe domestic opposition to the American military 
presence and would entice the Philippine Senate to ratify the new base agreements.125 Meanwhile 
the eruption of the Pinatubo volcano in the spring of 1991 covered the Clark base with ash to the 
extent that the United States decided to drop the base from the deal.126 Now, the Philippine demand 
for a large compensation amount was indeed deemed excessive by the United States.  
Finally, after passionate debate, the Philippine Senate, on September 16, 1991, rejected the 
agreement (TFCS). Many analysts suggested that the Senate decision was driven by a nationalist 
sentiment; the bases were considered a “vestige of colonialism and an affront to Philippine 
sovereignty” and the decision was a call for ending a relationship of “crippling dependence” with 
the United States. Another contributing factor was the U.S. refusal to guarantee that no nuclear 
weapons would pass through the base .127 The Senate vote also reflected the view that the 
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compensation package was too small. The U.S. offer of $203 million a year was far less than the 
amount the Filipinos had sought. The United States never raised the compensation amount.128 
Although Aquino supported the treaty, she had to go with the Senate in the face of an impeachment 
threat from the opposition. The Philippine senate decision forced the U.S. to withdraw from the 
Subic Naval Base by the end of 1992.129 The United States, as expected, reduced economic and 
military aid to the Philippines by 60 percent for the fiscal year 1992.130 In addition, military 
relations between the U.S. and the Philippines were downscaled substantially: port visits by the 
U.S. Navy were discontinued in 1996, and no joint military exercises were conducted in Philippine 
territory.131 The U.S.-Philippines alliance was not terminated after the closure of American bases 
in the Philippines. But it lacked any significance in the bilateral relations and remained this way 
throughout the 1990s.  
Thus, to sum up, leadership changes in the Philippines had few or no effects on the 
continuity and tightness of the alliance. Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, regular leadership 
changes did not harm the alliance tightness. The alliance remained steady after the first regime 
change in 1972 when Marcos imposed martial law. The martial law regime received more aid than 
before (See figure 1 and 3). Following the second regime change in 1987 (when the Philippines 
returned to democratic institutions), the effort to negotiate an agreement on the bases collapsed. 
The U.S. offer (compensation) for the bases was considered inadequate. President Aquino, who, 
unlike Marcos, relied on a large coalition, had to give in to the nationalist sentiment that opposed 
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the continuation of the U.S. bases. For the United States, the Philippine demands, including large 
compensation for the bases, was considered too costly. The Philippine Senate decision caused 
strains in the alliance and the eventual eviction of the United States from the Philippine. The 
alliance became a moribund affair between the United States and the Philippines.  
        
D) The Revival of a Moribund Alliance   
The South China Sea dispute and the global War on Terror facilitated a gradual revival of 
the U.S.-Philippines security relations. The Chinese military construction projects on the Mischief 
Reef in the mid-1990s were interpreted in the Philippines as a sign of China’s expansionist and 
hegemonic designs in the South China Sea.132 Philippine officials, given the state’s lack of 
resources to modernize the ill-equipped AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines), considered a 
revived alliance with the U.S. as a hedge against possible conflicts with China over the Spratly 
Islands. They sought to revitalize the security ties with the United States that would bring in an 
increased level of military aid.133 For the United States, the usefulness of a revived U.S.-Philippine 
security ties stemmed from two motives: a) the Philippines might play a useful role in a possible 
containment strategy against China in the future, and b) the Philippines’ cooperation could 
strengthen U.S. effort to fight terrorism in Southeast Asia.  
Competing claims over the Spratlys in the South China Sea have been made for decades. 
The U.S. reluctance to support the Philippine claims to most of the Spratly islands had been a 
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contentious issue in the alliance since the 1970s.134 In the 1990s, the key U.S. security interests in 
Southeast Asia were preserving freedom of navigation and protecting sea lanes of 
communications, and preventing instability in the region.135American policymakers were 
concerned that the dispute in the South China Sea might incite historical antagonism among 
various Southeast Asian states that might led to an unstable regional order.136  Although the United 
States has not taken a belligerent stand (vis-à-vis China) in the South China Sea dispute, American 
defense planners saw China’s projection of power in the region with alarm and found the 
Philippines’ interest in improving ties with the U.S. appealing. The United States sought a 
rotational deployment of American forces in the islands that would allow for an improved 
infrastructure to enable the rapid start of operations in a future crisis in the region.137 Thus, in 
February 1998, the United States and the Philippines signed the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), 
which was followed by the resumption of American military aid to the Philippines.138  
External threat-centric explanations of changes in the U.S.-Philippine alliance posit that 
the alliance became dormant in the 1990s because of the disappearance of the Soviet threat after 
the end of the Cold War; the alliance was revived in 1999 because of China’s provocations in the 
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South China Sea.139 However, some observers suggest that these explanations are inadequate. They 
point out that Mischief Reef is not closer to the Philippines than several islands in the Spratlys that 
China had previously occupied, and that China had regularly contested the Philippine claims in 
the South China Sea in the previous decades. Thus, China’s actions in the 1990s hardly constituted 
a new security threat to the Philippines.140 These observers have argued that the Philippine 
government portrayed China as a threat in order to induce public support for revitalizing the 
security ties with the United States.141 The idea that China’s rise is being perceived as a security 
threat that has evoked the Philippines to engage in balancing behavior is not as clear as the 
proponents suggest. A better assessment would be that the Philippines, like other countries in 
Southeast Asia, has been engaged in a strategy of accommodating China and benefit from China’s 
growing economic power while maintaining good relations with the United States.142 Both in 
bilateral and multilateral (ASEAN) settings, China and the Philippines have maintained diplomatic 
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efforts to address the Spratly Islands issue.143  The Philippines has benefited from its rapidly 
improving economic relations (in bilateral trade and investment) with China.144   
Getting the Philippine cooperation in the War on Terror gave a second impetus to 
improving the bilateral ties. Alarmed by suspected links between Abu-Sayyaf, an organization 
based in the Philippines, and other militant organizations, the United States deemed it important 
to support the Philippine in its own campaign against the Islamists groups.145 The Philippines 
became one of the first Asian states to declare support for the U.S. War on Terror. Philippine 
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo offered the United States access to the Philippine bases for 
possible military operations. The United States and the Philippines signed a Military Logistics and 
Support Agreement (MLSA) that allowed the United States to use the Philippines as a supply base 
for military and made the Philippines an important partner in the U.S. War on Terror in Southeast 
Asia.146 Since joining the U.S. War on Terror, the Philippines received increasing level of aid from 
the United States including a training package for the AFP, delivery of military equipment, and 
the creation of a new bilateral defense consultative mechanism. U.S. aid to Philippines increased 
tenfold from $1.9 million in 2001 to $19 million in fiscal year 2002.147 In 2002 the United States 
deployed 1200 U.S. troops, as military advisors to the AFP, directed at fighting al-Qaeda affiliated 
organizations in the Philippines. Unlike U.S. forward deployment during the Cold War, the recent 
deployment was limited in ambitions in that U.S. troops were to assist the Philippine government 
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to neutralize and defeat terrorist organizations.148 In addition to military aid, the Philippine leader 
secured an attractive trade and investment package worth approximately $1 billion from the United 
States in November 2001. U.S. aid served an important political purpose for the Philippine leader. 
The military gained access to needed arms and equipment. U.S. military aid helped the Arroyo 
regime to improve its relations with the military, an important constituency in Philippine 
politics.149  
The U.S.-Philippines alliance was revived from its dormant status in the 1990s since the 
Philippines joined the anti-terrorism campaign. The level of divergent interests during the revival 
phase (2001-2010) can be characterized as ranging from low to medium. Although the bilateral 
relationship improve vastly since 2001, it was not without constraints. The Arroyo government 
faced fierce domestic opposition against the signing of the MLSA and even impeachment threat 
from congressional opposition for the possible deployment of 3000 American combat troops to 
the Philippines in 2003. Despite her support for “the Coalition of the Willing” (set of countries 
that supported U.S. war effort in Iraq), the war was so unpopular in the Philippines that the Arroyo 
administration could not send forces to Iraq.150 Another source of disagreement between the parties 
was the inclusion of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), based in Mindanao (the second 
largest and southernmost major island in the Philippines), into the U.S. State Department’s list of 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The Philippine government feared that the inclusion of the MILF 
into the list would derail its peace building efforts with the group.151 These domestic constrains 
made it difficult for a democratic leader like Arroyo to make concessions or to cooperate with the 
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United States on unpopular issues/policies. Thus, a new-found role of the Philippines on the U.S. 
War on Terror and a low to modest level of divergent interests allowed the Philippine leader to 
gain some attention in Washington and to receive more aid than the last few years. It should be 
noted, however, since the focus of the War on Terror has been in South Asia and in the Middle 
East, the Philippines received a relatively small amount of U.S. aid compare to, for example, the 
amount Pakistan received after 2001.   
 
D) Reviewing Theoretical Expectations and Aid Flows 
Table 5.1 summarizes theoretical expectations between interest divergence and the amount 
of side payments during the maintenance phase of the U.S.-Philippines alliance. It explains the 
causes of interest divergence and the effect of such variations on the amount of side payments the 
Philippines received from the United States.   
 
Table 5.1: The relationship between the level of Divergent interests (DI) and the amount 



























 The continuation of the bases ( + ) 
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 The continuation of the bases (+) 
 The Philippines’ relations with communist countries (-) 
 Disagreement over the importance of having U.S. bases in 
the Philippines (-)  



















 Relative importance of the bases to the U.S. and the 
Philippines; renewal of the bases agreement  (-) 
 Some disagreement about how to deal with the communist 
insurgency in the Philippines (-) 
 



















 The United States withdrew its bases and dormant bilateral 
relations (-) 
 Shared interest between the parties over the South China 















  The Philippines’ support for the War on Terror(+) 
 Public opposition in the Philippines against the deployment 






(2) The hypothesis predicts that a) when the level of DI is very low, small amounts of SD are expected; b) when 
the level of DI is very high, very large amounts of SP (for a successful negotiation) or no SP (for an 
unsuccessful negotiation) are expected; and c) when the level of DI is in the medium range, large amounts of 
SP are expected. 
 +/- Signs reflect the positive or negative effects of the issues on the bilateral relations.  
 
The theory predicts that when the level of divergent interests is very low (i.e. a high degree 
of shared interests), the small state is likely to receive a small amount of side payments. When the 
level of divergent interests was in the medium range, the amounts of side payments are expected 
to be large.  Unlike the Pakistan case, the U.S.-Philippines alliance did not suffer from a high level 
of divergent interests (that is, a high level of conflicting interests).  The United States and the 
Philippines had a very low level of divergent interests during multiple periods that adversely 
affected the Philippine leaders’ ability to extract large amounts of side payments.   





As we see in Figure 5.3 (which shows percentage change in U.S. aid to the Philippine 
during the maintenance phase of the alliance152) the relationship between the degree of divergent 
interests and changes in American aid to the Philippines are consistent with the hypotheses. During 
the three periods, 1956-1965153, 1966-1972, and 1993-2000, when the level of divergent interests 
was low, the amounts of side payments to Philippines dropped compared to other periods. 
However, when Marcos was in power, (from 1966-1986, both as an elected leader and as an 
authoritarian dictator), the level of divergent interests can be characterized as ranging from low to 
                                                          
152 The aid data (from 1947-2010) are organized into periods. In each period, the figure shows, percentage change in 
average amount of U.S. aid from the previous period.     
153 According to the analysis presented in Figure 3, during the period 1956-1965 there was a 48% decrease in average 
aid from the previous period, 1947-1955. As mentioned before (see page 23), the United States provided the 
Philippines with large sums of aid (not related to bases or the alliance agreement) for war rehabilitation purposes as 
well as payments for Philippine veterans from 1947 to 1955. During this period, the Philippines received an average 
of $123 million. The average aid level dropped to $64.4 million during 1956-1965. The aid level further dropped to 
$58 million in the next period, 1966-72. Thus, it is plausible to question the change in aid (-48%) during 1956-1965 
because there were rehabilitation related payments in the previous years. Note that change in aid for the next period, 
1966-72, is consistent with the hypothesis.    









This chapter tests the trade-off theory’s hypotheses about the formation and maintenance of the 
U.S.-Philippines alliance. The theory predicts that 1) threats to the Philippine leaders’ political 
survival led them to form an alliance with the United States; 2) having divergent interests between 
prospective allies increased the likelihood that side payments were used to cement the alliance. 
Regarding the maintenance phase of the alliance, the theory predicts that 3) the amount of side 
payments the United States provided to the Philippines was a function of the level of divergence 
interests between the parties: i) when the degree of divergent interests was very low (that is, parties 
shared a high degree of mutual interests), small amounts of side payments were necessary to 
maintain the alliance; ii) when the level of divergent interests was very high, the Philippines was 
expected to receive no side payments (for an unsuccessful negotiation) or a very large amount of 
side payments (for a successful negotiation); and, iii) when the level of divergent interests was in 
the medium range (not very low or very high), large amounts of side payments were more likely 
to be used to maintain the alliance; 4) all else equal, a regime change in the Philippines is expected 
to cause one of the following outcomes: i) the new regime may terminate the existing alliance or 
ii) the alliance would  remain intact in exchange for an increased level of side payments; and 5) 
leadership changes in the Philippines were less likely to lead to the termination of an asymmetric 
alliance. The findings in this chapter are consistent with the above mentioned hypotheses.   




 The Philippine leaders formed an alliance with the United States to enhance their domestic 
political survival. In the immediate aftermath of World War II the Philippines did not face any 
external threats. The Philippine elites, however, had to counter a number of domestic threats. As 
explained in the first section of this chapter, the Philippine leaders needed to reengage the United 
States in the Islands to counter domestic threats to their political survival. They sought an alliance 
with the United States. America’s strategic interests in the Islands had evolved from a relative 
indifference in the late 1940s, when the detailed outline of the Cold war in Asia Pacific had not 
been drawn, to a heightened importance of the bases in the 1950s. For the Philippine elite, the 
alliance with the United States gave them access to its sugar market and the military aid to ensure 
that they maintained their power against the marginalized mass who posed a threat to the status 
quo. A primary source of domestic threat to the Philippine elite came from the Huk insurgency 
whose rank and file consisted of poor peasants and from other lower classes. They joined the 
insurgency not necessarily to impose an ideology, but to force the government to make economic 
reforms.154 Thanks to American aid, the Philippine ruling elites were able to defeat the insurgency 
and secured their political survival, at least in the short run. 
American interests in the alliance had been dominated by the maintenance of the Philippine 
bases. As Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State, said, “Our relationship with the Philippines 
is dominated by our interest in the maintenance of unhampered use of our military facilities at 
Subic and Clark . . . These facilities are essential for our strategic posture in the Far East as well 
as the Indian Ocean areas.”155 Although critics charged that the presence of U.S. military bases 
impaired Philippine sovereignty and the Philippines had become a pawn in the U.S. global game,156 
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the Philippine leaders traded the bases for much needed economic and military aid from the United 
States. Hosting American bases had some important economic benefits for the Philippines. In 
addition to the compensation, the bases produced some positive externalities for the Philippine 
economy. For example, the bases contributed more than $200 million annually to the Philippine 
economy.157 According to some estimates, by the 1980s, the U.S. bases contributed as much as 3-
4% of GDP.158 For the United States, the bases and alliance agreements were concluded on 
attractive terms: as a result of a high degree of interest convergence and a much willing Philippine 
leadership, the alliance (including the basing rights) cost very little to the United States. The 
Philippine leaders, for decades complained about the compensation amount for the bases. As 
American diplomat Francis T. Underhill summarized the Filipino sentiment in the 1970s: “The 
Filipinos have long since persuaded themselves that bases serve only U.S. interests and that their 
generous acceptance of a serious abridgement of their sovereignty has been inadequately 
recognized and shabbily rewarded.”159  
    The Chapter traces the relationship between the level of divergent interests the parties 
had in the alliance and the amount of side payments the Philippines received for its concessions 
on autonomy.  During the formative years of the alliance (1947-1954), the Philippines received 
smaller amounts of side payments for the bases than other countries with the similar level of 
concessions. This outcome is consistent with the trade-off theory’s prediction that when parities 
have a low level of divergent interests, a small amount of side payments is needed to compensate 
for the small state’s autonomy concessions. The Philippine leaders were much too willing to grant 
the United States the basing rights to strike a hard bargain and to extract large amounts of side 
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payments. The chapter shows that during several periods of the maintenance phase of the 
alliance—1956-1965, 1966-1972, and 1993-2000—the level of divergent interests was low. As a 
result, as the trade-off theory suggests, the Philippines received a small amount of side payments 
(See figure 3). A low level of divergent interests adversely affected the Philippine leaders’ ability 
to obtain a large amounts of side payments until American involvement in Vietnam intensified in 
the late 1960s and Marcos hardened his bargaining strategies vis-à-vis the United States. During 
the martial law regime of Marcos (1973-1986) the level of divergent interests increased to a 
medium level which enabled Marcos to bargain harder and obtain large amounts of side payments 
from the United States. As Brands explains, Marcos “clearly considered the United States 
primarily a cow to be milked for whatever it was worth . . . the relationship between the two 
countries was much more a business proposition than before.”160         
Leadership changes in the Philippines had few or no effects on the continuity and cohesion 
of the alliance. Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, regular leadership changes did not harm the 
alliance tightness. The alliance remained steady after the first regime change in 1972 when Marcos 
turned the Philippine democracy into an authoritarian dictatorship. The Philippines under the 
Marcos’ martial law regime received more side payments than before (See figure 1). Following 
the second regime change in 1987 (when the Philippines became a democracy again), 
disagreements between the parties about whether the U.S. bases served Philippine national 
interests and the rise of nationalist sentiment in the Philippines led to the eventual eviction of the 
United States from the Philippine bases. We expected that the new democratic regime of Aquino 
would demand a higher price for maintaining the existing terms of the alliance or the regime 
change might lead to the termination of the alliance. We saw in this chapter that the Aquino 
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government demanded a higher amount of compensation for the bases. The United States, 
however, refused to raise the compensation amount. The failure in the negotiation and the 
subsequent termination of the bases agreement significantly affected the cohesion and the tightness 
of the alliance.   
 Although the alliance remained dormant in the 1990s, The Philippines support for the War 
on Terror and the evolving dispute in the South China Sea offer promising signs of renewed 
cooperation and the revival of the alliance. In light of the recent Chinese activities in the South 
China Sea areas, the Philippine leadership is seeking American military aid to boost their defense 
capabilities.161  The United States perceived a revitalized security relation with the Philippines 
would provide an added basing infrastructure for any future contingencies in the region.162 Thus, 
the United States signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement in April 2014 with the 
Philippines. Under the agreement, the U.S. military will enjoy greater access to bases across the 
Philippines archipelago for a 10-year term and would allow the U.S. Navy greater operational 
flexibility in the South China Sea.163 America’s renewed focus on Asia including the new 
agreement with the Philippines is part of a strategy known as “the Pivot” (or Pivot to Asia).164  
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THE LOGIC OF REALIGNMENT: 
THE HORN OF AFRICA 
 
 
Like many parts of the Third World, the Horn of Africa became a fertile ground for proxy wars 
among various local and regional forces supported by the Cold War rivals. The Horn’s geography 
and its proximity to the oil-rich Middle East, a part of the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean—
vital for trade and the supply of oil to the world market—made the region strategically important 
to the contending superpowers’ geo-political interests.1 Both the United States and the Soviet 
Union invested heavily in their respective allies—the United States in Ethiopia and the Soviet 
Union in Somalia—in the 1960s. However, Ethiopia and Somalia switched sides and realigned by 
the late 1970s and the early 1980s respectively. The purpose of the chapter is to provide an 
explanation of why small states realign. By using realignment cases in the Horn of Africa, the 
chapter argues that small states’ realignment is a function of leaders’ calculation about expected 
future benefits from realignment vis-à-vis the existing alliance. Leaders are more likely to realign 
when they expect to gain more side payments from realignment than the current level of side 
payments from the existing alliance.  
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  Regional political dynamics combined with its strategic location turned the Horn into a 
focus of international diplomacy during the Cold War.2 The Horn’s two primary actors, Ethiopia 
and Somalia, were in conflict over territories and disputed borders. Soon after independence in 
1960, Somalia pursued its historic claims over the Ogaden province of Ethiopia in order to unify 
the province’s majority ethnic Somali population under one greater Somalia. Whereas Somalia’s 
claims on the territory were based on a strong sense of Somali nationalism, Ethiopia’s claims were 
based on its emperors’ long-held suzerainty on the territories and on boundary agreements with 
the European powers.3 Somalia’s territorial claims spread beyond the Ogaden territory. According 
to David Laitin, the Somalis had multi-irredentist claims (symbolized by five stars on the state’s 
flag and three of these stars (regions) were “unredeemed”): North-eastern province of Kenya, the 
Ogaden province of Ethiopia, and the French territory of Afars and Issas (Djibouti).4  These 
competing claims and local disputes became a source of international tensions as both superpowers 
supported rival forces as a means to preserve their interests in the Horn of Africa.  
From 1953 to 1977 the United States was Ethiopia’s primary external ally and a major 
source of economic and military aid. During this period the United States gave Ethiopia 
approximately $300 million in military aid and $350 million in economic aid. In the 1960s, 
Ethiopia was the location of the largest American economic and military assistance program and 
largest embassy in Sub Saharan Africa5. Ethiopia, in turn, served as a loyal American ally in 
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Africa.6 However, by 1977 the U.S.-Ethiopian alliance came to an end and Ethiopia realigned with 
the Soviet Union. Somalia, a loyal ally of the Soviet Union throughout the 1960s, cut its relations 
with the USSR and realigned with the United States in the early 1980s. One observer commented 
that “In terms of international relations, there had never in the post-war world been a reversal as 
dramatic as that which, in the course of months, transferred Somalia from almost total dependence 
on Russia to a situation of abject reliance on the west, and which, simultaneously, broke Ethiopia’s 
ties with the west and made it into the recipient of massive Soviet bloc aid. . .”7  How do we explain 
these dramatic reversals in alignment in the Horn of Africa? What prompted Ethiopia and Somalia 
to realign? The trade-off theory offers an explanation based on leaders’ calculation about the 
expected future gain from realignment.   
As in the formation phase, side payments play an important role in the maintenance phase 
of asymmetric alliances. The trade-off theory of asymmetric alliances suggests that the amount of 
side payments a small state receives should be low when the degree of interest divergence between 
the parties is either very low or very high. In the former, since both parties have a high level of 
interest convergence, the small state has little or no bargaining leverage to extract a high amount 
of side payments from the great power. In the latter case, since the parties have a high level of 
interest divergence, negotiations for the existing arrangements or for new arrangements may fail: 
the small state may demand a higher price that the great power deems too expensive. In some 
cases, however, a high degree of interest divergence may allow the small state to extract a very 
large amount of side payments given that the great power values the ally’s cooperation highly.  It 
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is in between the two extremes where parties can negotiate and maintain a stable trade-off 
arrangement: the small state receives side payments (as determined by the bargaining outcome) in 
exchange for its autonomy concessions to the great power.       
The realignment cases in the Horn offer an opportunity to test two hypotheses proposed in 
this study. One hypothesis predicts the effects of regime change on the continuation of asymmetric 
alliances. I contend that, all else equal, a regime change in small states will cause one of the 
following outcomes: a) the new regime may terminate the existing alliance or b) the alliance 
remains intact in exchange for an increased amounts of side payments. The continuation of an 
asymmetric alliance is also contingent on the degree to which the great power values the alliance. 
If the alliance remains important to the great power, it will survive; otherwise, the alliance will be 
terminated. A second hypothesis predicts under what circumstances small state leaders are likely 
to realign. The magnitude of side payments and the availability of substitute great powers as 
prospective allies will affect small state leaders’ decision whether to continue or terminate the 
existing alliance.  If there are substitute great powers who are willing to offer more (or the same 
volume) side payments than the small state is getting from the existing alliance and the expected 
costs for small states are equal to (or less than) the existing level, then the net value of realignment 
with another great power will increase. The small state leader, then, has an incentive to realign 
with another great power. Thus, I hypothesize that a small state will be likely to realign if the 
expected net gain from realignment outweighs the expected gain from the existing alliance. 
 An alternative explanation is Stephen David’s omnibalancing theory, which argues that 
leaders of third world countries align or realign with great powers that will do whatever is 
necessary to help them to stay in power. David, however, misplaces emphasis on the role of 
material incentives (various types of aid which I call side payments in the context of alliance 




bargaining) in leaders’ alignment decisions. Although the trade-off theory’s explanation is 
consistent with omnibalancing as far as the objective of alignment (leaders’ domestic political 
survival) is concerned, the trade-off theory adds that small state realignment is an outcome of a 
bargaining process in which side payments play a powerful role in leaders’ realignment decisions. 
As we will see in the following pages, the leaders of Ethiopia and Somalia chose to realign based 
on a rational calculation as to which competing superpowers would provide them with more side 
payments, deemed necessary for their political survival. The next section provides a brief 
background on great powers’ involvement in the Horn of Africa followed by an analysis of the 
effects of regime change on the alliance. Section three and four then probe why and under what 
circumstances the leaders of Ethiopia and Somalia chose to realign.   
 
I. Great Powers in the Horn of Africa, 1953-1974 
The United States entered the Horn by signing a Mutual Defense Treaty with Ethiopia in 1953 that 
established a quid pro quo arrangement between the parties. Although the Ethiopian leader did not 
share American Cold War objectives, both parties perceived the Soviet Union as a threat for 
different reasons. In the early 1950s, the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie Mariam sought to 
capitalize on growing U.S. fear of Soviet expansion and requested American aid. The emperor 
wanted to ally with a great power, preferably with the United States, that would provide him with 
military and economic aid in order to deter various internal and external threats. Although the 
emperor had the Soviet Union as an alternative, he preferred the United States for some practical 
and political considerations. First, Haile Selassie relied on a conservative ruling coalition 
(consisted of the Ethiopian nobility, the Ethiopian Coptic Church, and the military) that viewed 
revolutionary ideas and propaganda disruptive. The emperor, thus, feared that the semi-feudal 




nature of his empire would become a fertile ground for revolutionary propaganda often supported 
by the Soviet government.8 Second, the Emperor’s desire to build a sophisticated Ethiopian army, 
he thought, would be possible quickly and efficiently with American help.  Despite the Emperor’s 
declared loyalty to the West9, the United States viewed Ethiopia as a lower priority than other 
countries in the Middle East. In order to attract American interests, the Ethiopians offered the 
United States the use of Kagnew communications facility. On May 22, 1953, the United States 
and Ethiopia signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDAA) and a Defense Installations 
Agreement (DIA). The two treaties laid the foundation for U.S.-Ethiopian alliance relations. The 
agreements created the basis for a quid pro quo, arms-for-base-rights exchange: the United States 
would provide Ethiopia with military assistance and military training, in exchange, Ethiopia would 
provide the United States guaranteed access to Ethiopian military installations—including a 
strategically important former British base at Kagnew as well as airfields and ports in the Asmara-
Massawa area.10  
The amount of side payments was a contentious issue at the outset of the U.S.-Ethiopian 
alliance. Under the 1953 agreements Ethiopia received only about $5 million in military aid per 
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year, which reflected Ethiopia’s lack of importance to the United States and a source of 
dissatisfaction for the emperor, whose bargaining power in Washington was limited during the 
early years of the bilateral relations. By the late-1950s, however, Ethiopia gained in importance as 
a strategic location which could become valuable in the event of direct U.S. intervention in the 
Middle East, where the Soviet Union had gained a foothold in important strategic locations.11 The 
United States initiated negotiations with Ethiopia in 1957 for extended base rights to Ethiopian 
military facilities. American defense strategists deemed it necessary to solidify the 1953 arms-for-
base-rights agreement.12 The negotiations ended in stalemate because both sides could not agree 
on the level of side payments. The Ethiopian demand for $10 million per year as a compensation 
(side payments) was deemed too costly by the United States.13 Emperor Haile Selassie tried to play 
“hard ball” and attempted to improve his bargaining position by nurturing the possibility of a 
defection to the Soviet Union or becoming non-aligned, both of which were considered viable in 
light of increasing Soviet influence in the region; either outcome would have diminished American 
influence in Ethiopia.14   
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and Yemen received Soviet arms worth $60 million and 7.5 million from Moscow. These states received large amounts 
of aid without granting bases to the Soviet Union. Ethiopia, on the other hand, despite its consistent support of U.S. 




The emperor succeeded in using the Soviet Union as a lever to force the Americans to pay 
more attention to his needs. The Eisenhower administration valued uninterrupted access to military 
installations and bases in Ethiopia. In 1958 the United States offered Ethiopia an aid package worth 
almost $25 million (including $14.7 million in military aid) and agreed to provide aid to the 
Ethiopian Air Force, a highly valued demand of the emperor. The increased amount of aid was 
followed by the conclusion of an executive agreement between the United States and Ethiopia on 
August 29, 1960 that laid out a framework for security cooperation between the two countries. In 
exchange for continued access to Ethiopian military facilities, the United States agreed to train and 
equip an Ethiopian army of 40,000 soldiers. In addition, the United States also agreed to provide 
about $10 million in military aid to Ethiopia annually over the next fifteen years (1961-1975)—a 
vastly improved level of side payments compared to about $5 million in military aid the United 
States gave Ethiopia annually from 1953 to 1960.15         
The changes in U.S. perception of Ethiopia’s strategic importance were tied to the Kagnew 
communications facility. As Jeffrey A. Lefebvre observes, “American interests in Ethiopia and, 
many would argue, began and ended with the Kagnew communications facility.”16 In the 1950s 
and the 1960s the type and amount of side payments the United States was willing to pay was 
dependent on the degree of importance it attached to maintaining access to the Kagnew 
communications facility.17 As the communications and intelligence functions at the Kagnew 
picked up pace and expanded to include a space research project (the Stonehouse project), the 
United States increased side payments to Ethiopia, agreed to support the Ethiopian air force, and 
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to train and equip the Ethiopian national army. The linkage between the Kagnew and American 
side payments to Ethiopia was acknowledged by the Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, “If it were not for Kagnew, I would hope that our military involvement would be 
substantially reduced.” In the face of Ethiopia’s unease about America’s overt involvement at 
Kagnew, the United States compensated Ethiopia by providing the Imperial air force with F-5 
aircrafts.18   
In the early 1960s, a rift between Somalia and the West provided the Soviet Union an 
opportunity to open its account in the Horn. The Somalian leadership requested military aid from 
the West to expand and strengthen the state’s small military forces; but the effort was of little avail. 
A consortium of western countries--the United States, Italy, and West Germany--offered a small 
package worth $10 million and agreed to provide training for an army of 5,000-6,000 troops with 
an emphasis on boosting internal security.19 A disappointed Somali leadership viewed the Western 
offer as inadequate and thus rejected it. Somalia soon accepted a Soviet offer in October 1963, 
which included $30 million in military aid to expand the Somalian army from 4000 to 20,000 
troops and to assist in the development of an air force.20 Soviet military aid bolstered the Somalian 
army and allowed the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa. The Soviet 
military build-up in Somalia picked up pace by the 1970s. A military coup d’état in Somalia in 
October 1969 brought to power General Mohammed Siad Barre, who reinvigorated Somalia’s 
irredentist claims on Ethiopia and stepped up military build-up with the help of the Soviet Union.21 
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The Soviet strategists assessed that expanding Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean required 
support facilities, which Somalia could provide. In February 1972 Soviet Union signed a military 
cooperation agreement with Somalia under which the Soviet Union agreed to provide Somalia 
with $60 million worth of military aid to upgrade and extend the Somali armed forces. In return, 
Somali granted the Soviet Union access rights to Somalia military facilities, including the 
construction of port facilities at Berbera overlooking the Red Sea.22  
An increasing Soviet influence in the Horn ratcheted up the Cold War competition, which 
in effect enhanced the Ethiopian leader’s bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States. By early 
1964 military skirmishes in the Ogaden between Somalia and Ethiopia escalated into a small-scale 
border war. As the United States adopted a posture of impartiality in the dispute, the Soviet Union 
offered to provide Ethiopia as many arms as needed and agreed to cut aid to Somalia if Ethiopia 
adopted a pro-Soviet policy and forced the United States to leave the Kagnew base. If the Ethiopian 
leader accepted the Soviet offer or chose a neutralist path, he would get Soviet military assistance 
and would improve his image in newly independent African states where anti-imperialist forces 
had a powerful role in regional politics. On the other hand, making such policy changes would 
definitely cost him American support and would endanger a deal involving the supersonic F-5 
aircraft that the United States agreed to provide Ethiopia in 1962.23 American policymakers, who 
tended to believe in the logic of falling dominos and were concerned about the Soviet influence in 
the Horn, delivered the F-5s to Ethiopia (in 1966-67) and became more attentive of the Emperor’s 
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needs to prevent further Soviet encroachments into the region. In the final analysis, the emperor 
opted for the continuation of Ethiopia’s alliance with the United States.   
The Ethiopian leader sought more aid from the United States to improve his threatened 
political position at home. The emperor’s regime was in trouble in early 1974. The global oil crisis 
hit the state badly: the government had serious difficulties with its balance of payments, and as a 
result, it cut down on expenditure at home.  Many Ethiopians detested corruption and inefficiency 
in Haile Selassie’s administration. They blamed the emperor for the lack of a coordinated response 
from the government during the devastating famine of 1972-73.24 Moreover, The Emperor faced 
the Eritrean insurgency aided by the Arabs and the Soviet bloc in the north and by the Somalis, 
armed by the Soviet Union and Cuba, in the south and east. The Ethiopian leader needed American 
military assistance to strengthen the capabilities of the Ethiopian army which was already 
overstretched and weakened in dealing with the Eritrean insurgency.25 An over extended Ethiopian 
army left Ethiopia vulnerable to an external attack by Somalia.26 The Emperor requested a $450 
million worth of modern military equipment from the United States in 1973. However, he failed 
to persuade the U.S. government to grant him such an expensive shopping list.27 As noted before, 
U.S. side payments to Ethiopia were justified by the American desire to have a continued access 
to the Kagnew. By the early 1970s, however, U.S. strategic dependence upon the Kagnew was on 
the decline because of improvement in satellite technology. The United States was phasing out the 
Kagnew operations by 1973 and it appeared likely that the U.S. would not renew the twenty-five 
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year lease, which was scheduled to expire in 1978.28 The depreciation in Kagnew’s strategic values 
meant that the Ethiopians had very few or no valued asset to offer the United States in exchange 
for military aid. 
Even though the utility of the Kagnew base was waning by the 1970s, the United States 
was still concerned about increasing Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean region. Of 
particular interest to American defense strategists was Soviet military construction activities at 
Somalia’s port of Berbera in 1972. The Soviet presence in the region and stepped up activities 
were perceived by American strategists as a threat to the western sea lines of communication 
(SLOCs) connecting the Middle East and South Asia with the Western world. Access to Eritrean 
ports of Massawa and Assab and control over Ethiopia’s Dahlak island chain was considered 
important in countering any threat to shipping in the Southern Red Sea and northwest part of the 
Indian Ocean.29  Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger declared in 1974, “The Horn of Africa is 
of particular strategic importance due to its geographical proximity to the troubled Middle East.”30 
The United States, thus, feared that the termination of aid programs to Ethiopia would allow the 
Soviet Union an opportunity to control the Horn and to threaten American interests in the region. 
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II. The Effect of Regime Change 
 
The quid pro quo relationship between the United States and Ethiopia seemed stable during the 
long reign of Emperor Haile Selassie.  The emperor’s semi-feudal regime was toppled in 1974 by 
a group of military officers known as the Derg (committee), which created a Military 
Administrative Council (PMAC) to rule Ethiopia.31 The Derg commenced on violent purges and 
targeted killings of its opponents to consolidate its power. By the end of 1974 the Derg killed the 
nominal head of the state, General Aman Andom, for his attempt to negotiate with the Eritrean 
liberation movements and within three years of the coup, the original 120 in the junta were reduced 
in number by half. The ruling group was then taken over by Major Mengistu Haile Mariam in late 
1974.32 Although the regime change marked the beginning of the end of the alliance, the 
correlation between the regime change and the termination of the U.S.-Ethiopian alliance does not 
explain whether the regime change itself was a cause of the change in the alliance.  
In the absence of an alternative source of external resources, the Derg needed to maintain 
its ties with the United States. The Derg had to counter, as I explain in more details in the following 
section, numerous secessionist insurrections within Ethiopia and hostile and now militarily 
threatening Somalia. The Eritrean insurrection, developed slowly in the 1960s and gained 
momentum with the help of external support especially from the Soviet Union, became a serious 
threat to the Derg by 1974. Mengistu believed that his political survival was dependent on the 
successful handling of the Eritrean problem. The regime was facing armed conflicts of varying 
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degrees in each of Ethiopia’s fourteen provinces.33 In addition, the regime had to contend with 
various domestic dissident groups. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), a Marxist 
group consisted of students and Marxist intellectuals, was the most threatening among these 
civilian groups. Mengistu himself was a target of assassination believed to be perpetrated by the 
EPRP.34 Faced with these threats, the Derg leadership was determined to maintain America’s 
economic and military support until a better alternative was found to replace the United States. In 
the early years of the regime, the Ford administration attempted to maintain the U.S.-Ethiopian 
relations.35 This policy was predicated on the assumption that as long as the Soviet Union 
supported Ethiopia’s enemies, such as Somalia and insurgents in Eritrea, the new regime would 
not endanger its relations with the United States. Thus, the United States maintained a continuous 
flow of military aid to Ethiopia.36 In the absence of a reliable alternative, Mengistu needed 
American aid to counter various internal and external threats to his political power. Indeed, U.S. 
aid to Ethiopia increased in the early years of the Derg regime. Mengistu, however, demanded 
more, which for the United States was too costly a price for Ethiopia’s strategic worth. Thus, it is 
not necessarily the regime’s change, but a disagreement between the parties over the amount of 
side payments and the availability of an alternative (to the United States) that explain Ethiopia’s 
realignment.    
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The regime change in Somalia in 1969 had little adverse effects on the state’s existing 
alignment with the Soviet Union. Somalia’s democratic governments led by President Abdirashid 
Shermarke and Prime Minister Ibrahim Egal (who were elected in 1967 and reelected in 1969) 
seemed friendly toward the West. The Somalian leaders, however, were disappointed by the 
limited offer made by the United States and other western countries to their request for military 
aid. Somalia turned to the Soviet Union and accepted a more generous offer from the Soviets. The 
new regime under Mohammed Siad Barre, who seized power in a military coup on October 21, 
1969, strengthened Somalia’s ties with the Soviet Union.37 The bilateral relationship reached it 
height when both parties signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1974 and Somalia 
started to receive more Soviet arms and equipment than ever before. 
Siad Barre’s decision to strengthen ties with the Soviet Union was led by internal rather 
than external threats to his political power. Ethiopia, Somalia’s primary external enemy, at that 
point could not pose a military threat to Somalia. In 1974 the Ethiopian regime was in disarray, 
trying to recoup from multiple threats to its existence. Barre’s decision was a result of his need to 
maintain the support of the winning coalition, which was shaped by Somalia’s clan politics. Barre 
was dependent on the support of certain clans, who were located near the Ethiopian-Somalian 
border and wanted Barre to gain control over the Ethiopian controlled Ogaden territory, occupied 
by ethnic Somalis. Since these clans gained in importance in the government and constituted 
Barre’s crucial power base, he had to respond to the clans’ irredentist demands.38 To achieve this 
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objective, Barre needed external support to strengthen Somalia’s armed forces and the Soviet 
Union was a willing great power, prepared to satisfy Barre’s needs. Thus, the regime change in 
1969 strengthen Somalia’s alliance relations with the Soviet Union.   
One alternative explanation of why regime changes in Somalia (1969) and Ethiopia (1974) 
were followed by the strengthening of the Soviet-Somalian ties and a deterioration of the U.S-
Ethiopian relations is perhaps the new regimes’ ideological affinities with the Soviet Union. 
Ideology, however, had limited effects on these changes. Although Siad Barre of Somalia 
proclaimed his adherence to “scientific socialism,” the regime’s actions did not support Barre’s 
claims. He did little to change Somalia’s political structures. He joined the Arab League and 
maintained ties with conservative Arab states, who were regarded as hostile toward Communism 
and the Soviet Union. Thus, according to David, “From the very beginning of his relationship with 
the USSR, Siad’s pragmatism and nationalism appeared to guide him much more than allegiance 
to Marxism-Leninism.”39 Similarly, ideology explains very little as to why the U.S.-Ethiopian 
relations deteriorated after Mengistu came to power. There was no single ideology dominant 
among the officers of the Derg. The military junta was divided into liberals and radicals. 
Ideological battles ensued on major policy issues and disputes were settled through violent 
means.40 When Mengistu’s faction came out victorious, he did not make any commitment to 
change Ethiopia in accordance with Marxism-Leninism.41 Like any leaders, Mengistu’s actions 
were intended to strengthen his hold on power. To this end, he brutally oppressed Marxists 
followers and other leftist dissidents. Mengistu refused to form a civilian political party in Marxist 
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mold lest it turned against his political power.42 He accepted U.S. military and economic aid for 
three years after taking power and broke ties with the United States only when he found a better 
deal from the USSR. These patterns of behavior are inconsistent with a leader with strong 
ideological convictions.   
  
III. Ethiopia’s Realignment: Mengistu’s Search for a 
Better Alternative 
 
The United States did not initially oppose the Derg. American policy makers did not oppose the 
regime’s domestic goals and maintained a policy of non-interference in Ethiopia’s domestic 
politics.43 The Mutual defense Treaty between Ethiopia and the United States continued to be in 
effect and the American base in Kagnew remained operational.  Following the overthrow of 
Emperor Haile Selassie, the new regime secured more military and economic aid from the United 
States than did the previous regime. American military aid during the Haile Selassie’s last years 
had been held to about $10 million per year. In the summer of 1974, the United States approved a 
military aid program worth about $100 million. 44 Steven David notes that despite this record level 
of aid, the new leader Mengistu Haile Mariam choose to realign with the Soviet Union at the 
expense of the United States. If side payments were an important factor for Mengistu’s decision 
to end the alignment with the U.S., David’s narrative appears to show a puzzle. However, when 
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one looks into Mengistu’s dealings with both superpowers, it is clear that he was looking for the 
highest bidder. Figure 6.1 below shows a close correlation between major changes in the U.S.-
Ethiopian alliance and the fluctuation in U.S. aid to Ethiopia from 1946 to 1980.  
 
 
Causes for Realignment: 
A. Various Internal and External Threats:  The Derg faced numerous challenges to 
its political power. By 1976-77 the regime had to deal with several secessionist insurrections 
throughout Ethiopia, spurred largely by the belief that the instability and weakness of the Derg 
provided an opportunity to gain greater autonomy or even independence, that threatened to 
disintegrate the state.45 Of these, Eritrean revolt posed a serious challenge to the Derg. As the Derg 
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refused to compromise on the Eritrean issue, the Eritrean People’s Liberation front (EPLF), 
supported by the Soviet Union, South Yemen, and Cuba, gradually took control of most rural 
Eritrea.46 Eritrea’s strategic and economic importance to Ethiopia was such that the Derg 
leadership believed that the loss of Eritrea would lead to the downfall of the regime. Thus, the 
regime was determined to defeat the insurrection militarily. Soviet support for the Eritrean rebels 
was largely motivated by the desire to create an independent state in Eritrea where the USSR would 
exercise influence; at the same time, the success of the Eritrean insurrection would threaten the 
territorial integrity of Ethiopia, a friend of the United States. In addition to armed insurrections, 
the Derg also faced opposition from various civilian groups. The Derg’s attempt at land reforms 
met with fierce opposition from landowners in rural areas. The regime had to use the army to quell 
the opposition. In the urban areas the regime faced criticism from leftist organizations for not going 
far enough in reform. These dissident groups, located in the capital city, had a disdain for the Derg 
and wanted to topple the regime. Of these groups, the radical left, led by the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Party (EPRP), believed that “true” Marxist-Leninist revolution would not be 
possible with the military men in power. One Derg officer described the threat posed by the EPRP 
as more serious than the ongoing armed insurrections throughout the country.47 Unsuccessful at 
bringing all leftist factions into a unified movement, the regime started to prosecute its leftist 
critics, most of whom were arrested, executed, or sent into exile. Armed attacks against the 
government by separatists, left-wing groups, and by representatives of the old regime intensified 
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to the extent that by the end of 1976, few observers in Addis Ababa thought the regime would 
survive much longer.48 
As the prospect for a negotiated settlement between Somalia and Ethiopia diminished by 
1974, a Somalian attack against Ethiopia seemed likely. With Soviet military assistance Somalia 
became a formidable military power in the Horn. By the time the Derg took power, military experts 
agreed that Somalia had become stronger than Ethiopia. Soviet military aid to Somalia increased 
after the military coup in Ethiopia: from 1974 to 1977, the Soviet Union supplied military 
equipment worth about $300 million. Thanks to Soviet military aid, Somalia, a small country with 
three million people, developed the fourth largest army in black Africa (after Nigeria, Zaire, and 
Ethiopia).49 In addition, the Derg leadership understood that in order to stay in power, they had to 
use brutal force to suppress the civilian groups. The regime needed military equipment to fight 
against internal and external threats. However, with the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976, who 
made the provision of U.S. aid conditional on the recipient countries’ respect for human rights, the 
Derg could not count on the United States for much needed military and economic aid. 
          B. Inadequate Side Payments from the Existing Ally: The Derg leadership was 
skeptical about America’s willingness to continue to provide economic and military aid to 
Ethiopia. They pointed out America’s indifference toward Ethiopia by referring to the Nixon 
administration’s refusal to grant a request for a $450 million military aid package made by 
Emperor Haile Selassie in 1973.50 The Derg was disappointed by the American “wait-and-see” 
approach to Ethiopia’s urgent military needs. For example, The United States waited a month to 
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respond to an urgent Ethiopian request for light weapons and ammunition (totaling some $30 
million) and finally provided only $7 million worth of ammunition.51  Despite some delays in 
responding to the Derg’s arms requests, the Ford administration tried to protect the alliance with 
Ethiopia. In the spring of 1976 the United States offered two squadrons of F-5E fighter bombers 
to Ethiopia and agreed to take other Ethiopia requests (worth approximately $100 million) into 
consideration. The offer, however, failed to reassure the Derg officials. The Derg leadership 
doubted American support for the regime. For example, they saw U.S. warning against the Derg’s 
“peasants’ march” initiative (which was designed to kill the Eritrean rebels) as a sign of American 
hostility to the regime.52    
As the Derg was fighting for its political survival in a difficult political environment, 
Mengistu did not believe that the United States would provide the levels and types of resources 
that he needed to stay in power. The Ethiopian leadership was concerned that U.S. interest in the 
Kagnew base was waning because satellite communications had taken over most functions of the 
base. As a result, the Derg leadership was skeptical about its ability to bargain for a large amount 
of military and economic side payments. The United States provided Ethiopia with $80 million 
worth of military equipment in 1975 and 1976, but the level of military aid fell far short of what 
the Ethiopian leader had requested. When the United States listed Ethiopia as a country in violation 
of human rights in 1976, the Carter administration was now even more reluctant to provide the 
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Ethiopian regime with arms and equipment to quell internal unrest, which the Derg thought 
necessary to consolidate its power.53 Whereas the Derg was frustrated by America’s delayed 
response and foot-dragging to the regime’s urgent requests for arms, the Ethiopians saw the signing 
of a friendship treaty between the Soviet Union and Somalia and a massive shipment of Soviet 
arms to Somalia, an estimated $300 million in arms from 1974 to 1977. Indeed, The Soviet Union 
gave Somalia more in three years than the United States provided Ethiopia during the entire period 
of the U.S-Ethiopian relations, which amounted to $287 million in 24 years.54 
The trade-off theory suggests that when the degree of interest divergence between allies 
increases, negotiations for the maintenance of existing arrangements or for new arrangements may 
fail: the small state may demand a price that the great power finds too costly. The great power, 
thus, may decline the small state’s demands, giving the small state an incentive to realign. The aid 
data presented above show that the United States increased side payments in the first two years of 
the Derg in an attempt to allay the Ethiopian leader’s concerns about American commitment. 
However, the Derg’s demands for a high volume of side payments, especially weapons and 
equipment, were deemed too costly for American strategic interests in the Horn and in the Middle 
East. The Kagnew station, which had provided a justification for U.S. economic and military side 
payments, became obsolete and a redundant strategic facility by the early 1970s. In addition, a 
continued American presence in Ethiopia which was waging an “anti-Arab” war in Eritrea would 
strain an improved U.S. relations with some Arab states after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Thus, 
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U.S. side payments to Ethiopia significantly decrease in 1976 at a level comparable to the mid-
1950s.55    
American reluctance to provide the Ethiopian regime with sufficient side payments made 
Mengistu to reconsider alignment with the United States and to look for other options. The 
Ethiopian leader needed external resources, importantly military aid, to deal with various threats. 
If the United States was not willing to offer what he needed, then he had to be open to other options. 
The Soviet Union seemed to be a good candidate for switching alignment. The Derg leadership 
understood that the USSR had a greater willingness to arm its small state allies than that of the 
United States. The Soviet Union in the 1970s proved to be a generous patron, capable of proving 
enormous amounts of economic and military resources to its clients in Somalia and in the Middle 
East. As Stephen David observes, “the Ethiopian military was understandably frightened and 
envious of the huge military build-up taking place across the borders. If Ethiopia aligned with the 
USSR, presumably it could receive a similar bounty of weapons.”56 A possible realignment with 
the Soviet Union had to have met certain conditions: a) since the Soviet Union would risk its 
strategic investment in Somalia, it needed a more stable, larger, and more powerful client. 
Importantly, the Soviet leadership needed to ascertain the Derg’s commitment to Moscow; b) the 
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Ethiopian leaders must receive (or expected to receive) a bigger and more attractive side payment 
package from the Soviet Union than they received or expected to receive from the United States.                     
The Bargaining and Trade-off 
The possibility of Ethiopia’s realignment with the Soviet Union posed a dilemma for 
Moscow. The Soviet Union was concerned about how an alliance with Ethiopia might affect its 
stake in Somalia, the reliability and commitment of the Derg as a potential Soviet ally, and possible 
reactions in the United States to Ethiopia’s realignment.57 Making a long-term military 
commitment to Ethiopia would surely upset the Somalian leadership.  For nearly 15 years the 
Soviet Union had cultivated a loyal client in Somalia by providing economic and military aid and 
single handedly training the Somali armed forces. As of 1977, there were approximately 1700 
Soviet advisors stationed in Somalia and the Soviet fleet enjoyed access to naval facilities at 
Kismayu, Mogadishu, and Berbera. The Berbera port had extensive docking, communications, and 
missile support facilities constructed by the Soviet Union. By offering arms to Ethiopia, the Soviet 
Union faced the prospect of losing all its investment in security infrastructure in Somalia. Given 
that the Derg was fighting for its political survival in an unstable political environment in Ethiopia, 
the Soviet leadership feared the possibility of finding itself on the side of an unpopular and 
disintegrating regime. Moreover, the Soviet leaders were not sure how the United States would 
react to the decision to supply arms to Ethiopia, which had been linked closely to the United States 
as late as 1976.58   
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Despite the risks associated with changing policy in the Horn, the Soviet Union was 
intrigued by the revolution in Ethiopia. The Soviet leadership did not want to miss an opportunity 
to extend its influence in Ethiopia, which would remain in the Western fold if rejected by the 
USSR.59 The Soviet interest in Ethiopia stemmed, to some extent, from the desire to compensate 
for its declining position vis-à-vis the United States in the Middle East. In the mid-1970s the Soviet 
Union lost its foothold in Egypt and Sudan after both countries expelled the Soviet military and 
terminated their alliance agreements with the Soviet Union. According to one account, the Soviet 
decision to support the Derg was motivated by its desire to strengthen its foothold in the Horn of 
Africa to compensate for its declining influence in the Middle East and North Africa.60 The Soviet 
embassy noted in 1975 that a Soviet-Ethiopian military cooperation would strengthen the Soviet 
position in the Horn and in other countries of the Red Sea basin. Facing two choices—the existing 
ally (Somalia) and an attractive prospective ally (Ethiopia), Soviet strategists intended to maintain 
relations with both Somalia and Ethiopia.61  
The Derg began to probe the possibility of long-term commitments from the Soviet Union 
in 1974 at a time when the regime was still receiving American aid. The Ethiopians approached 
the Soviet Union again in January 1975 in search of military aid. The Ethiopian delegation declared 
the Derg’s commitment to socialism: “Ethiopia counts on the political, economic, and military 
assistance of the Soviet Union—the great power whose policy and ideology coincide with the 
policy and ideology of Ethiopia.” The Ethiopians made the case that the regime was dependent on 
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Soviet support to survive a multitude of internal and external threats.62 The Soviet leadership, 
however, had not overcome hesitations about the durability of the Derg. The Soviet embassy in 
Addis Ababa characterized the political changes in Ethiopia as “anti-feudal revolution” that was 
transitional in nature. In order to allay the Soviet hesitation about the new regime’s socialist 
credentials, the Derg accelerated its leftward move including economic reforms. (The schism 
within the Derg between pro-U.S. and pro-Soviet faction was resolved by February 1977 through 
violent means –known as the “red terror”—that  left Colonel Mengistu and his faction in control 
of the PMAC.)  
   The Derg leadership sought an alignment with the Soviet Union that would allow it to 
counter both internal and external threats. Mengistu calculated that an alliance with the Soviet 
Union would not only give him access to Soviet arms and equipment, but it would also have added 
benefits of improving Mengistu and his regime’s legitimacy among domestic supporters and 
opponents on the left, which challenged the socialist credentials of the Derg.63 As the U.S.-
Ethiopian relations were beginning to sour in the summer of 1975, the Soviet Union and Ethiopia 
were engaged in a secret diplomacy to negotiate possible weapons transfers. The Derg officials 
presented the Soviet Union with a comprehensive list of weapons and equipment. The Soviet 
leadership, however, had not been able to overcome its doubt about the Derg’s credibility and 
commitment to the USSR (as Moscow expressed concerned about pro-western officials in the Derg 
and in the Ethiopian government that prevented its ability to respond positively to the Ethiopia’s 
demands).64 The Ethiopian delegation did not receive any concrete answers. Moscow found the 
level of Ethiopian requests for military aid excessive and informed the Ethiopians that the Soviet 
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Union would reach such high levels of military cooperation with other countries only after the 
development of a fifteen-year relationship or more. The lack of a clear answer from the Soviet 
Union was disappointing for the Derg.  
 The Soviet Union finally made an offer to Ethiopia in November 1975. Mengistu, 
however, rejected the offer for being too small. Moscow offered assistance with military training 
and the delivery of communications equipment both for military and civilian purposes. The Derg 
officials made it clear that if a comprehensive agreement could not be signed, then Ethiopia would 
not sign any agreement with the Soviet Union at all.65 In the absence of a comprehensive deal from 
the Soviet Union, Mengistu continued to rely on the United States for arms and equipment.66  He 
could not sever ties with the United States while the Soviet Union was still refusing to give him 
military equipment he wanted. A frustrated Mengistu, thus, replied to an inquiry of why Ethiopia 
was still receiving American weapons, “What else can we do, the Soviets will not provide them.”67 
Mengistu continued to maintain relations with the United States and worked out new plans for 
military support from the U.S. Between mid-1974 and the fall of 1976, the United States provided 
Ethiopia with $180 million worth of arms and equipment.68  
Although negotiations between Moscow and Addis Ababa were strained over the amounts 
and scope of aid, Mengistu steadfastly pursued a comprehensive deal from the Soviet Union. 
Mengistu found helping hands in some Soviet officials who saw a Soviet-Ethiopian alignment as 
an opportunity to consolidate Soviet influence in the Horn. Soviet ambassador to Ethiopia, Anatolii 
Ratanov, lobbied the Soviet leadership in favor of an expanded deal with Ethiopia. The ambassador 
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stressed the operational possibilities for the Red Navy in the Red Sea and argued that if the Soviet 
Union did not make a positive response to the Ethiopia’s demands, the United States and China 
would take the opportunity and the Soviet Union might lose its position in Somalia.69 The Soviet 
leadership agreed, thanks to Ratanov’s lobbying, to offer a much broader package to Ethiopia in 
June 1976 that included arming the Ethiopian Navy, its anti-aircraft defense forces, and a new 
militia. The Derg rejected the second offer as well, much to the surprise of the Soviet leadership. 
The Soviet embassy in Ethiopia maintained that the Ethiopian hesitation was resulted from the fear 
that the Soviet offer was not comprehensive enough for a complete rearmament of the Ethiopian 
armed forces. The embassy recommended even a bigger deal to allay Mengistu’s fear.70 Finally, 
the Soviet leadership relented and agreed to offer Ethiopia extensive military aid. On December 
14, 1976, the Soviet Union and Ethiopia signed the first basic agreement on military cooperation.71 
The Soviet Union hinted to Mengistu that if the Derg could sever Ethiopia’s ties with the United 
States, the Soviets would take care of Ethiopia’s long term needs.72  
 Demonstrating the Derg’s credibility as a worthy ally became a priority of the Ethiopian 
leader. As a sign of his commitment to the USSR, Mengistu executed/purged pro-American 
officials.73 A final step would be the termination of Ethiopia’s Mutual Defense Agreement with 
the United States. President Jimmy Carter, meanwhile, ordered a review of America’s ties with 
Ethiopia, including the U.S-operated bases in Kagnew, communications bases at Asmara, 
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Eritrea.74 When the U.S. embassy in Addis Ababa notified the Ethiopian government on April 21, 
1977 that the United States would close the Kagnew base, Mengistu used the opportunity to 
announce that the Ethiopian government was ordering the immediate closure of the Kagnew base. 
On April 30, 1977 the Ethiopian government terminated the 1953 Mutual Defense Assistance 
Agreement with the United States, a year ahead of the treaty’s scheduled expiration.75 After having 
purged pro-American officials from the Derg and served ties with the United States, Mengistu was 
in a better position to claim his pro-Soviet credentials. The 1976 agreement was a prelude to a 
much bigger and substantial agreement that was signed in May 1977 when Mengistu visited 
Moscow. The 1977 agreement was characterized as the largest single arms agreements negotiated 
between the USSR and a Third World country. According to some estimates, the value of Soviet 
pledges worth $350 to $450 million or more. Much to the satisfaction of the Ethiopian leader, the 
Soviet Union declared its unqualified support of the Ethiopian position on the Ogaden dispute and 
stressed the importance of “the territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of state 
boundaries.”76 By signing the military assistance agreement, Ethiopia and the Soviet Union, for all 
intents and purposes, made the realignment a foregone conclusion.  
A pertinent question is then: was it reasonable for the Derg to expect that its realignment 
gamble would pay off? I content that Mengistu’s expectation about a successful bargaining was 
reasonable. First, in the context of the Cold War tension and superpower competition, it was a 
reasonable assumption on the part of the Derg that the Soviet Union might be open to an outcome 
that would drive the United States out of Ethiopia and strengthen the Soviet strategic position in 
the Horn. Second, once the Derg approached the USSR, the Soviet leadership never rejected the 
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possibility of a deal. The Soviet Union, instead, made multiple offers, which suggested its interest 
in Ethiopia and to the Derg leadership, there were rooms for more bargaining. Third, the Derg 
leadership was encouraged by third parties to hold on to its demands for a higher price.  According 
to historian Odd Arne Westad, the Ethiopian leadership had a high confidence in its ability to 
extract a much bigger deal from the Soviet Union. This high level of confidence, as the Soviet 
embassy in Ethiopia suspected, was due to the encouragement of and suggestions made by both 
Cuban and East European representatives to the Ethiopians that the Soviet leadership would 
eventually turn around.77 Thus, it was not irrational for Mengistu to remain steadfast to his 
demands and expect that the Soviet Union would be likely to give in.   
Ethiopia’s realignment altered the superpowers’ relations with the Horn. This changed 
political environment generated different consequences for the contending parties. The Soviet 
Union and Ethiopia made positive net gains from the realignment. Before analyzing Soviet gains 
in the realignment, we need to address why the Soviet Union, despite a heavy investment in 
Somalia, chose to defect to Ethiopia. Two motives can be discerned, one deriving from 
geostrategic ambition and the other from a growing Soviet frustration with Somalia. First, Soviet 
strategists initially hoped that by supplying arms to both sides, the Soviet Union could act as a 
mediator between the belligerent neighbors and prod Somalia and Ethiopia into joining South 
Yemen and Djibouti in a federation of Socialist Red states (a Pax Sovietica). Furthermore, the 
Soviet Union envisioned a plan that would grant autonomy to the Ogaden and Eritrea.78 Second, 
the Soviet leadership was frustrated by Somalia’s continuous relations with countries/parties (such 
as China, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the Arab League, etc.) that were considered hostile to the Soviet 
                                                          
77 Westad. Pp. 268-69 
78 Porter. P. 183 and 195. See also Korn. Pp. 29-30; Roy Lyons, "The Ussr, China and the Horn of Africa," Review of 
African Political Economy  (May-Aug, 1978).   




Union. In addition, by 1976 some Soviet officials noted the increasing influence of conservative 
Arab states (such as Saudi Arabia) in Somalia. They feared that a Somali government influenced 
by conservative Arab countries could not be trusted as a solid ally.79 When the Somalian leader 
rejected the Federation of Socialist Red States plan, the Soviet Union opted for Ethiopia, the larger 
and more powerful of the two sides. As far as accessing port facilities in the region was concerned, 
the Soviet strategists calculated that the possible loss of the Somalian port Berbera would be 
compensated by acquiring access to the Ethiopian ports of Massawa and Assab, located north of 
Berbera. Together with its facilities in Aden and expected access to Massawa and Assab, the Soviet 
Union could “make a Russian lake out of the Red Sea” and would become a dominant naval power 
in the region.80 
For the Ethiopian leader, the protracted bargaining strategies paid off well. Mengistu 
gained long-term Soviet commitments to supply arms and equipment. By the spring of 1977 as 
Somalian regular forces had joined the rebel groups fighting in the Ogaden and a war between two 
neighbors seemed very likely, the Soviet Union started to pour arms and military equipment into 
Ethiopia. Soviet aid was instrumental in Ethiopia’s victory in the Ogaden war. Beyond the War, 
from March 1977 to May 1978, the Soviet Union delivered approximately $1 billion worth of 
weapons to Ethiopia.81 The Ethiopian leader gained enormous sums of side payments without 
accruing additional costs of alignment: like they did before for the United States, the Ethiopians 
granted the Soviet Union access to Ethiopian military installations and base facilities. However, 
with the Soviet Union, Mengistu would not have to be worried about abiding by certain human 
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rights standards or be concerned about the Soviet hostility toward his regime as he did before with 
the Carter administration.     
Ethiopia’s realignment was a loss for America’s strategic interests although the extent of 
the setback was debatable. For the Carter administration, under pressure for losing Ethiopia, 
Somalia seemed to be a good candidate for a recourse that would offset the U.S. loss and the Soviet 
gain in Ethiopia.  Siad Barre appeared to be another losing party, at least in the short run, in the 
Ethiopian realignment. He lost Somalia’s long-term patron and a primary provider of military aid. 
For the Somalian leader, as we will see in the following section, the changed political environment 
in the Horn opened an opportunity to realign with the United States.  In the summer of 1977, the 
United States adopted a dual strategy of indirect support for Somalia and covert attempts at 
overthrowing the Derg regime in Ethiopia in order to set the country “back on the path to 
constructive political evolution in association with the Free World” and to drive the Soviets out 
from Ethiopia.82 Importantly for Barre, the United States signaled an openness to supply arms to 
Somalia.83 
 
IV. Siad Barre’s Dilemma and Somalia’s 
realignment 
As the U.S.-Ethiopian alliance was in trouble, the Carter administration began to consider 
replacing the troubled relations with a new alliance with Somalia.  The administration was 
concerned that the Soviet Union was positioning itself to control the West’s access to oil and other 
raw materials through interventions in Africa and the Middle East. The Ethiopian realignment with 
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the Soviet Union meant that the Soviets had now direct influence both in the Indian Ocean and in 
the Red Sea area, through its access to Eritrean ports—Massawa and Assab.84 In early April 1977, 
President Carter instructed Vice President Walter Mondale, “Tell Cy [Vance] and Zbig 
[Brzezinski] that I want them to move in every possible way to get Somalia to be our Friend.”85 
When the Ethiopian leader signed arms agreement with the Soviet Union and a realignment in the 
Soviet policy seemed likely, the Somalian leader was prepared to do the same: realign with the 
United States. In June 1977 a private channel of communication was established between Jimmy 
Carter and Somalia’s President Siad Barre. In a meeting with the Somali ambassador to the United 
States President Carter reportedly expressed sympathy toward Somalia’s defense needs and agreed 
to cooperate with other countries in helping Somalia to maintain its defensive strength.86 However, 
when Somali government forces entered the Ogaden to fight alongside Western Somali Liberation 
Front (WSLF) in August 1977, the United States refused to supply arms, direct or indirectly, to 
Somalia.  
Barre approached the United States for arms in June 1977 in light of the uncertainty about 
Soviet policy toward the Horn. He assumed Soviet neutrality in deciding to initiate the Ogaden 
War.87 It was when Barre failed to persuade the Soviet leadership to increase arms to Somalia (or 
reduce arms supplies to Ethiopia) in August 1977 and the Soviet Union cutoff arms pipeline to 
Somalia the next month that the Somalian leader decided to terminate the alliance with the Soviet 
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Union.88 Barre made a rational calculation believing that if he evicted the Soviets from Somalia, 
the United States would like to offset it loss in Ethiopia by aligning with Somalia and would come 
to Somalia’s aid in the Ogaden war. Thus, Barre renounced the 1974 Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation with the Soviet Union, terminated Soviet use of the base facilities at Berbera, and 
broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba (without breaking diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union).  
Despite having an extensive relationship with the Soviet Union, the Somalian leader kept 
his options open. Over the years Somalia maintain relations and received aid from countries that 
were considered hostile to the Soviet Union and its strategic interests. Somalia maintain close 
relations with China which competed the superpowers for influence in the Horn. According to one 
account, “Chinese economic aid to Somalia in fact far exceeded the Soviet contribution by 1973 
of $71 million of which military aid amounted to $50 million.”89 Somalia received aid from 
European countries, such as Italy, France, and West Germany; the United Nations became 
Somalia’s biggest source of multilateral aid by 1975. Although the Soviet leadership was not 
pleased with Somalia’s relations with the West, it was opposed to Barre’s flirtation with 
conservative Arab countries, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan. Somalia became the 
first non-Arabic-speaking country to join the Arab League in 1974.90 These alternative sources of 
aid may have provided Barre with a cushion and a means to reduce dependency on the Soviet 
Union.   
Although Barre failed at the initial attempt to gain American aid, he believed that the 
United Stated States would eventually turned around. With the abrogation of Soviet ties, Barre 
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hoped to attract the United States to Somalia’s cause: military aid to win the Ogaden war in the 
short-run, and a fruitful alliance in the long-run. Barre’s calculation can be justified for a number 
of reasons. First, the United States signaled on many occasions about its willingness to provide 
arms to Somalia and openness to an alignment. President Carter, both in private and in public, 
sympathized with Somalia’s needs and expressed a desire to make Somalia a “friend” of the United 
States. Moreover, the Somalian leadership may have felt Secretary of State Vance’s statement of 
July 1977 reassuring. Vance stated that the United States would “consider sympathetically appeals 
from states which are threatened by a buildup of foreign military equipment and advisors on their 
borders in the Horn and elsewhere in Africa.”91 Second, Barre received positive reports from third 
parties about American intent to help Somalia. He was courted by some Arab states and was 
offered incentives to break the alliance with the Soviet Union. Saudi Arabia offered an annual 
payment of $300 million and Egypt and Sudan offered arms if Barre expelled the Soviets from 
Somalia.92 According to one account, Barre received assurances that Saudi Arabia would finance 
the purchase of a big arms package from the United States. Both the Saudi and Egyptian leader 
advised Carter to take advantage of the unraveling relationship between Somalia and the USSR. 
The advice, according to David Korn, “fell on attentive ears.”93 Third, the Somalian leader could 
make a logical conclusion that given the Cold War competition over allies, bases, and influence in 
the Horn and in other parts of the Third World, the United States would be willing to compensate 
its loss in Ethiopia by aligning with Somalia.    
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 Despite sending numerous positive signals, the United States decided not to supply arms 
to Somalia.94 The decision was a result of a debate within the Carter administration that was 
eventually won by Africa specialists at the State Department, who advised against American 
involvement in the war on Somalia’s behalf. They feared that military assistance to Somalia might 
be misconstrued by other countries in Africa as American support for territorial dismemberment; 
such a perception could have serious consequences for the U.S. positon in the Horn and elsewhere 
in Africa. They argued that the Ogaden war should be dealt with as a local problem that did not 
require American attention.95 American refusal to supply arms to Somalia sealed the fate of the 
war: the Ethiopians prevailed, thanks to the generosity of its new patron.  
When Somalia’s defeat in the Ogaden war appeared certain, Siad Barre was presented with 
a Soviet peace plan in February 1978 that offered a way for Somalia to retain its alliance with the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet peace plan required Somalia to withdraw from the Ogaden, respect 
Ethiopia’s recognized boundaries, and to give up Somalia’s claims on Kenya and Djibouti. In 
addition, Somalia had to made its naval facilities available to Soviet Union, and participate in a 
political arrangement with Ethiopia and South Yemen. In return, Somalia would be given a 
promise of eventual autonomy for the Ogaden Somalis, a guarantee of the border with Ethiopia, 
and a resumption of Soviet military aid.96 Barre rejected the offer because accepting the deal would 
mean renunciation of stated objectives of Somali nationalism—uniting ethnic Somalis scattered in 
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different parts of the Horn under a “greater Somalia.”97 Barre, who was born in the Ogaden and 
whose core supporters in Somalia’s clan politics demanded action to liberate the fellow ethnic 
Somalis in the Ogaden from Ethiopia, was in no position to give up on the Ogaden territory. 
Complying with the Soviet offer would likely to have led to his ouster. Barre’s decision is not hard 
to understand. It was a general understanding in Somali domestic politics that that no leader could 
renounce the Somali nationalist claim on the Ogaden and hope to survive politically.98  While 
Barre rejected the Soviet offer, he was pursuing negotiations with the United States that appeared 
far more promising.  
The United States and Somalia began to explore the possibility of a bilateral relationship 
after the end of the Ogaden War. For the Carter administration it was strengthening America’s 
presence in strategically important region, and for the Somalian leader having the support of a 
great power patron to counter threats to his political power brought both parties to the bargaining 
table. In March 1978 the United States offered to provide “defensive weapons” and a limited, about 
$7 million, economic assistance program. Although the initial round of negotiation broke down 
because the Somalian leader refused to agree to American demands that Somalia respects the 
existing boundary with Ethiopia, which implied the abrogation of Somalia’s claim on the Ogaden 
territory,99 Said Barre reopened the negotiation after crushing a coup attempt in April. Fortunately 
for the Somalian leader, President Carter came under political pressure in the United States for 
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being weak on defense issues and the administration’s inaction in the Ogaden War.100 The Islamic 
revolution in Iran in 1979 and the subsequent hostage crisis put U.S. strategic positions in the 
Persian Gulf and the Middle East at risk. These changes, according to Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, “eroded 
Washington’s resistance to taking political risks in Somalia. . . Somalia began to figure 
prominently in Washington’s short-term political-military response to the deteriorating security 
situation in the region.”101 The United States sought access to military facilities in Kenya, Oman, 
and Somalia to improve America’s strategic position in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. In 
Somalia, American defense strategists were interested in gaining access to the Berbera base 
facility.102   
The Somalian leadership happily accepted the importance the Carter administration placed 
in Somalia’s cooperation. Although the United States had other options (Kenya and Oman), Barre 
perceived this new-found importance as an opportunity to bargain harder and extract a large 
amount of side payments from the United States in exchange for granting the U.S. access to Somali 
military facilities. Thus, in the early spring 1980, the Somalian leader demanded a $1 billion five-
year arms package for advanced military equipment.103 The Carter administration was planning to 
allocate $100 million for Kenya, Oman, and Somalia for the first year, of which Somali would 
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receive only 30 percent, which was less than one-fifth of the Somalia’s demands.104 In addition, 
Barre found it an opportune time to push for an agreement whereby the United States would 
recognize Somali claim to the Ogaden. Some American officials expressed concerns that Barre 
was demanding large scale military and economic aid in return for granting access to the former 
Soviet base at Berbera. They feared that such extended aid would embolden the Somalian leader 
to expand the guerrilla was against Ethiopia in the Ogaden region.105 In the final analysis, 
American defense strategists calculated that the risks of enabling Somali military intervention in 
the Ogaden by supplying arms was outweighed by broader strategic imperatives.106     
Finally, the United States and Somalia signed an agreement that established a quid pro quo 
arrangement. The negotiations dragged on for six months, according to Lefebvre, in “an 
atmosphere of a Middle Eastern bazaar”: “Washington had seen a ‘rug’ (the Berbera base) that it 
wished to purchase. Mogadishu had set an unreasonably high price for its goods. Now the game 
would be to see how much the American buyer could bargain down the Somali merchant. Given 
the circumstances, the American buyer appeared desperate enough to overlook certain commercial 
improprieties (such as Somali transgression in the Ogaden) on the part of Somalia. But in this 
bargaining game Mogadishu was dealing with a customer who could acquire from other merchants 
(Oman and Kenya) far superior (Masirah Island) and less fragile (Mombasa) goods.”107 After 
several months of protracted negotiations, the United States and Somalia signed a ten-year base 
rights access-security assistance agreement on August 22, 1980. According to the agreement, the 
United States would gain access to base facilities at Berbera and Mogadishu in exchange for $40 
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million in military over a tow-year period. Overall, Somalia would receive at least $151 million in 




In the face of perilous domestic political environments Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and 
Siad Barre of Somalia followed a similar alignment path: both leaders chose to realign with a more 
generous benefactor that would provide them with necessary side payments to stay in power. 
Regime changes in Ethiopia and Somalia were not the immediate cause of realignment, but the 
bargaining process in changed political environments resulted in alignment calculus that both 
leaders followed to optimize their political survival. I offer two hypotheses in this chapter: first, 
all else equal, regime change in small states may cause one of the following outcomes: a) the 
termination of the existing alliance or b) the alliance survives in exchange for an increase in side 
payments; second, a small state leader will be likely to realign if the expected net gain from 
realignment outweighs the expected gain from the existing alliances. The findings in this chapter 
are consistent with the trade-off theory’s hypothesis about realignment in asymmetric alliances. 
This chapter illustrates that regime changes in Ethiopia and Somalia lead to an increase in side 
payments from their respective great power allies. Importantly, both leaders realigned with a great 
power that they expected would provide them more side payments than the existing ally for a lower 
cost.  
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 The regime change in Ethiopia did not pose an immediate threat to the U.S-Ethiopian 
alliance. As we saw before, the new regime received more side payments from the United States 
in the first few years than the emperor’s last years in office. However, by 1977 Mengistu’s hold 
on power was precarious in the face of a prolong war in Eritrea, multiple secessionist insurrections, 
rising discontents in the capital and in other parts of the country, and a hostile, Soviet armed 
Somalia. The Derg leadership needed more military aid to resolve the Eritrean rebellion by force, 
to suppress the domestic dissidents, and respond to Somalia’s growing military strength. The 
Ethiopian leaders were frustrated by American wait-and-see response to Ethiopia’s urgent requests 
for aid. Put simply, the amount of side payments that the Ethiopian leaders received and expected 
to receive in the future was not enough for the regime’s political survival. For the United States, 
however, the Derg’s demands were too costly for American strategic interests in the Horn and in 
the Middle East. Ethiopia’s decision to realign demonstrated rational calculations on the part of 
Derg’s leaders as to which superpower was willing to supply more side payments for a cheaper 
price. While Mengistu opened negotiations with the USSR for an alliance, he worked out new 
plans for military support from the United States. As the negotiation with the USSR progressed, 
the Ethiopian leader rejected at least two Soviet offers because they were too small and limited109. 
Finally, in 1977 Moscow agreed to offer a more extensive aid package that satisfied the Ethiopian 
leader.110 In a matter of months Ethiopia was transformed into a client state of the Soviet Union, 
became dependent on its new patron from defense against the Somalian force that the USSR had 
built up for a decade.111  
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Somalia, like Ethiopia, aligned and realigned in pursuit of a more beneficial alliance 
arrangement. Somalia turned to the Soviet Union in the early 1960s after rejecting a small offer of 
military aid from the West that the Somalian leadership deemed inadequate. A transition from 
democracy to military authoritarianism that brought Siad Barre to power changed very little in the 
state’s irredentist agenda supported by the Somalian nationalists who had a powerful role in 
Somalia’s clan politics. After assuming power Barre strengthen Somalia’s ties with the Soviet 
Union in the hope of gaining necessary military aid to pursue the state’s irredentist claims over 
territories in the neighboring countries inhabited by ethnic Somalis. From 1967 to 1976 Somalia 
saw an infusion Soviet economic and military aid in exchange for having for the Somalian base 
facilities. After the Ogaden War the Somalian leadership was presented with two choices: first, 
accept the Soviet peace plan that would have implied surrendering Somalia’s historic claims to 
territories inhabited by ethnic Somalis in exchange for a resumption of Soviet military aid; and 
second, sever ties with the Soviet Union and pursue a promising bargaining with the United States 
for a long-term relationship. It is not surprising that Barre opted for the second option since 
accepting the Soviet offer would have been very costly and would likely to have led to his ouster. 
Somalia signed a base rights access-security assistance agreement in August 1980 without 
incurring added costs of surrendering the state’s territorial claims and capitulating to the enemies 
(as the Soviet plan would have implied). Somalia received a total of almost $300 million in 
American security assistance between 1980 and 1986.112 
Domestic politics played a critical role in Mengistu and Barre’s realignment decisions. 
They bargained with great powers to attain a more beneficial arrangement than what they had 
expected to gain from the existing alliance. They reconciled between domestic politics imperatives 
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(political survival) and external pressures and, alike any leaders would be expected to do, use 
foreign policy, alliance policy to be specific, as a tool to maximize their survival potential. These 
dynamics, as the chapter illustrates, will surely be missed if one emphasizes on the variations in 
external threats, as in the neorealist tradition, as a determinant of state’s alignment and realignment 
policy.            
 
 







All alliances involved some risks associated with abandonment and entrapment. These risks are 
pronounced in asymmetric alliances when allies do not have a high degree of shared interests. 
Forming alliances with great powers can be risky for weaker states. Although ideally asymmetric 
alliances should provide security and protection for weaker side, such benefits are not guaranteed. 
By aligning with a great power a weaker power can become a de facto enemy of competing great 
powers. The Greek historian Thucydides narrates the tragic fate of Melos, a small island nation 
who was an ally of Sparta, when Athens, a competing great power fighting against the Spartans 
during the Peloponnesian War, invaded the island in 416 BC.  Students of international relations 
are familiar with Thucydides’ description of the bargaining between the Melos and the Athenians 
before the invasion in the Melian Dialogue1.  Sprinting from the power politics in the ancient world 
to the twentieth century, consider the Pakistani leader Ayub Khan’s discomfort in 1960 as a result 
of Pakistan’s alliance relations with the United States. When the Soviet Union shot down a U-2 
spy plane launched from the U.S. facilities in Pakistan in May 1960, the Soviet leader Nikita 
Khrushchev soon singled out Pakistan and warned: “Do not pay with fire, gentlemen! . . . If any 
American plane is allowed to use Peshawar as a base of operations against the Soviet Union, we 
will retaliate immediately.”2 Granting extensive concessions to foreign powers can cause a weaker 
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state to loss some aspects of its autonomy and may jeopardize the leader’s political survival in 
domestic political setting.    
 In addition to being a target in great power politics, a weaker power has to worry about 
abandonment by the ally in its hour of need. The Shah of Persia learned the risk of abandonment 
the hard way in 1804. The British Empire—concerned about the expansionist design of Napoleon 
as well as potential threat of war from neighboring Afghanistan against the Empire’s “Crown 
Jewel”, India—signed a security agreement with the Persian ruler in 1800. The agreement was 
designed to a) prevent any French presence in the Shah’s domains, and b) oblige the Shah to 
declare war against Afghanistan if the Afghans threatened India. To the Persian ruler, a defense 
agreement with a great power, such as Great Britain was perceived as a security guarantee against 
all external threats to the Persian territory. The Shah’s perception, however, was proven wrong 
when Tsar Alexander of Russia annexed the independent kingdom of Georgia, which Persia 
regarded as within its own sphere of influence. As the Russian troops moved closer to Tehran, 
open hostilities broke out in 1804 when the Russian sieged Erivan, the capital of Armenia, a 
Persian territory. The Shah sent an urgent plea for help to Britain. In the context of European power 
politics, however, Russia and Britain were allies in 1804 fighting against Napoleon’s forces in 
Europe. Thus, unfortunately for the Persian ruler, Britain prioritized its security interest in Europe 
in a changing geopolitical condition chose to ignore the Shah’s plea for help against Russian 
incursion.3 The Shah was left alone to face the mighty Russia.     
Having alliances with weaker powers can be beneficial for great powers. Asymmetric 
alliances had a prominent role in great powers’ foreign policy during the Cold War. Both the 
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United States and the Soviet Union fiercely competed for small state allies in order to outbid each 
other in the Third World. For the United States, alliances with the newly independent weaker 
countries in Asia and Africa provided useful complementary resources to its strategic objective. 
As historian Robert J. McMahon summarizes the prevailing views in the Eisenhower 
administration about the role of alliances in the periphery: “They [alliances] enabled the United 
States to encircled the Soviet Union with nations formally committed to the West; they provided 
for the commitment of local manpower if a global or regional conflict erupted, thus promising to 
save American lives; they offered great deterrent power by erecting an American security shield 
that might discourage Soviet or Chinese aggression against any state aligned with the United 
States; and they provided a psychological boost to nations sympathetic to or aligned with the 
United States by demonstrating that history and momentum lay with the West.”4 Despite having 
potential benefits, great powers have to be worried about the risk of entanglement in the weaker 
ally’s regional conflicts; a great power may also become complicit in weaker ally’s domestic 
abuses. Hilton Root calls these risks as “the commitment trap.”5 David Newsom, a Carter 
administration official summarized the dilemma in dealing with Ferdinand Marcos of the 
Philippines, an American ally: 
“In seeking to achieve our current goals and objectives in the Philippines, we face a serious 
but not unique dilemma. We have certain specific national security objectives, namely, the retention 
of our military bases, which we can only achieve by reaching agreement with a leadership 
considered by many in the United States—and in the Philippines—to be in violation of accepted 
norms of human rights.” 6 
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Knowing these risks and in some cases having divergent interests, why do great powers 
and small states form asymmetric alliances? How do they maintain these alliances? This study 
probes these questions. It promotes a trade-off theory of asymmetric alliances. The theory posit 
that asymmetric alliances are a result of strategic bargaining between great powers and small states 
in which side payments, a function of the degree of interest divergence between the parties, are 
used by great powers to filled the deficit in gains felt by weaker powers. The parties use the trade-
off, in which the weaker power make some autonomy concessions in exchange for side payments 
from the great power, to ameliorate the risks of alignment. The theory argues that domestic 
political survival is a primary motivation as to why small state leaders form alliances with great 
powers.  The theory contributes to our understanding of under what circumstances foreign aid can 
be used as side payments in security relations between states.  
This concluding chapter is organized as follows. The following two sections focus on the 
formation and maintenance of asymmetric alliances respectively. These sections provide a detailed 
summary of the findings derived from quantitative analysis and case studies used to test the 
hypotheses. The last section then inquires into the theoretical and policy implications of the theory. 
FORMATION OF ASYMMETRIC ALLIANCES 
The Trade-Off theory of asymmetric alliances articulates a model about the formation and 
maintenance of alliances between great powers and weaker states. It contends that leaders in small 
states are motivated to form alliances with great powers to enhance their potentials for political 
survival in difficult domestic political settings. Side payments play a major role in both the 
formation and maintenance phases of asymmetric alliances. This section explains the findings 
related to the formation of asymmetric alliances.   




The Role of Side Payments in Alliance bargaining    
The theory proposes that having divergent interests between prospective allies increases 
the likelihood that great powers use side payments to form the alliance. The amount of side 
payments a great power is willing to pay is a function of having divergent interests between the 
parties. Great powers and small states may want to form alliances for different reasons, not 
necessarily driven by a mutual interest in deterring a common enemy. Different motivations for 
alliances are often a result of the disparity in power capabilities between great powers and small 
states. Whereas a great power may use an alliance as a tool for power projection, a small state 
leader may want to form an alliance with a great power to enhance his chances of political survival.  
In forming an asymmetric alliance, the autonomy-security trade-off alone cannot improve 
the net gain for the weaker side. Such a trade-off can generate a deficit in gain for the weaker 
power. The use of side payments fill the gap and make the trade-off mutually beneficial. Given 
that the great power is likely to be considerably wealthier than the small power, the marginal cost 
of sacrificing some resources (side payments) to the small power is relatively a small cost for the 
great power and a large gain for the small, poorer power who values the marginal gain in external 
resources more highly. Hence, it is possible to find an appropriate compensation scheme since the 
utility gain from the side payment is large for the small power relative to the big power and so at 
a small utility cost to the great power a deficit in utility can be bought off for the small power when 
it grants a difficult policy concession. Side payments, thus, provide a compensation mechanism 
that make an alliance agreement mutually beneficial. According to this arrangement, the small 
state offers concessions (such as changes in its internal policies or granting military bases that 
allow the projection of military forces) to the great power ally. In return, The great power can offer 
the leader of a potential ally an increase in security by providing side payments, such as military 




equipment, arms or other logistical support. This strategic trade-off enhances the great power’s 
freedom of action and enables it to project power in distant regions.  
The quantitative analysis in chapter three found evidence that all else equal, the odds of 
using side payments increase when there are divergent interests between allies. The hypothesis is 
tested in two case studies—the U.S.-Pakistan alliance (chapter four) and the U.S.-Philippines 
alliance (chapter five). The findings in both cases are consistent with the hypothesis. I summarize 
the findings from these cases below.  
The United States and Pakistan had different objectives in forming an alliance. Pakistan 
wanted an alignment with the U.S. to check the Indian threat (an external motivation) and to 
counter various centripetal and irredentist forces (an internal security motivation). Pakistani 
leaders sought to resolve these concerns by strengthening Pakistan’s military and its economy by 
gaining access to external economic and military resources. The United States, however, sought 
an alliance with Pakistan as a vehicle in the ensuing Cold War by utilizing Pakistan’s geostrategic 
location in U.S. maneuvers and potential war fighting capabilities against the Soviet Union. For 
American strategists, chronic instability in the Middle East, the region’s vulnerability to external 
aggression, and the need to defend its oil wealth (against the Soviet penetration) provided added 
impetus to have a strategic presence in South Asia. American policymakers rated Pakistan’s base 
facilities highly and considered that having access to these facilities could become a strategic asset 
if a global war should erupt.7 The United States, however, did not share Pakistan’s concern about 
India and was unwilling to offer any security guarantee against India.  Thus, whereas Pakistan was 
concerned about India rather than any menace from the communist powers, the United States saw 
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a possible security accord as directed strictly against the communist threat and was wary of 
becoming entangled in Pakistan’s dispute with India.8 These divergent interests did not stop the 
United States and Pakistan from striking an alliance agreement: the offer of side payments by the 
United States provided a compensation mechanism that made the alliance mutually beneficial. 
Pakistan’s willingness to host key U.S. intelligence operations substantially increased the value of 
the alliance for the United States. In return for side payments, the United States gained strategic 
bases that it judged to be of great importance for U.S. national security. In addition to the base 
facilities, one has to add Pakistan’s autonomy loss in terms of the opportunity costs of the alliance 
(such as the option of maintaining neutrality or having an alliance with the Soviet Union, etc.) as 
part of its utility loss. The Pakistani leaders expected that these autonomy losses and liabilities on 
the state’s foreign policy would be compensated by side payments from the United States. Indeed, 
the side payments made the alliance agreement possible even though the parties had interest 
divergence and in some cases conflicting objectives.    
 The U.S.-Philippines alliance negotiations were proceeded under different 
circumstances. The trade-off theory predicts that when parties have a low level of divergent 
interests, a small amount of side payments is needed to compensate for the small state’s autonomy 
concessions. Whereas there was a high degree of divergent interests between the United States and 
Pakistan, the United States and the Philippines had very little interest divergence in forming the 
alliance. The United States was relatively indifferent toward establishing bases in the Philippines 
in the late 1940s. American policymakers, however, were open to a cheap deal. The Philippine 
leaders (Roxas and his predecessors) had expressed their willingness, both in private and in public, 
to host American bases in the Philippines. Although the Philippine leaders objected to certain 
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American demands during the negotiation process, such objections were mitigated by their strong 
desire to form the alliance as a means to protect their political power in a threatening domestic 
political environment. By portraying the Huks insurgency as a part of world-wide communist 
conspiracy, the Philippine ruling elites successfully delegitimized the organization and the root 
causes of insurgency. In the context of the Cold War tension, the characterization of the Huks as a 
communist insurgency prompted the United States to help the Philippine ruling elite and the 
political establishment.9 In addition, the elite class had economic interests in the alignment. The 
Philippine elites benefitted enormously from their trade relations with the United States during the 
colonial eras. Having an alliance with the United States after independence and granting the bases 
to U.S. the Philippine elites ensured the continuation of profitable economic relations.10 Thus, in 
the absence of any external threat the desire to protect the Philippine political establishment against 
domestic insurgency was consistent with both parties’ interest. As the prospective allies had very 
little divergent interests (the parties had several important shared interests including protecting the 
Philippine political establishment from domestic threats), the United States did not need to provide 
a large amount of side payments to Philippines to cement the alliance. A low degree of divergent 
interests between the parties diminished the Philippine leaders bargaining leverage and adversely 
affected their ability to extract large amounts of side payments from the United States in exchange 
for the bases. 
I illustrated in the case studies that having varying degree of interest divergence during the 
formative stage of the alliances with the Philippines and Pakistan caused the United States to incur 
different levels of cost (in terms of side payments). Even though the Philippines granted the United 
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States extensive basing rights than did Pakistan,  Pakistan received more side payments (foreign 
aid used as a proxy for side payments) than the Philippines did. This outcome is consistent with 
the hypothesis. The Bases Agreement granted the United States basing rights in the Philippines 
free of rent. In the first decade (after the alliance was formed in 1947), the Joint United States 
Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), which was created as a result of the MBA, spent $169.3 
million to support and reorganize the Philippine Constabulary, and to train and equip the Philippine 
military. Indeed, much of American military aid in the 1950s was used to boost Philippine internal 
security.11 This military aid figure is indeed small compare to American military aid commitment 
to Pakistan, which formed an alliance with the U.S. in 1954. During the first few years of the 
alliance, according to the Pentagon, the U.S. military aid commitment to Pakistan amounted to 
$505 million by the end of the 1950s.12  
 The theory predicts that the amount of side payments a small state leader needs as a 
compensation for his policy concessions also depend on political institutions and constraints the 
leader faces in domestic politics. Political institutions affect the bargains leaders are willing to 
make. The theory contends that the amount of side payments needed to compensate for policy 
concessions is likely to be smaller for small coalition leaders (usually seen in autocracies)  than it 
is for large coalition leaders (typically seen in democracies ). This is due to different types of 
political constraints leaders face in domestic politics. Since a small coalition leader relies on a 
small number of core supporters, it is easier for him to satisfy these supporters than it is for their 
large coalition counterparts. Side payments a small coalition leader gain from the great power ally 
enable him to remain in office through rent seeking and rewarding their supporters with private 
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goods. Large coalition leaders, on the other hand, require a large amount of side payments for 
policy concessions. They need to compensate their coalition members with public goods that are 
often more expensive than rewarding few supporters with private goods. The quantitative analysis 
found robust evidence in support of the hypothesis. The regression results suggest that autocratic 
small states are likely to receive a smaller amount of aid than their democratic counterparts.  
  
Domestic Politics Imperatives and Alliance Formation  
The theory predicts that domestic politics imperatives provide a powerful motivation for 
small state leaders to form alliances with great powers. It makes two specific predictions: first, 
politically unstable small states are more likely to form asymmetric alliances than do politically 
stable small states; and second, threats to leaders’ political survival in small states increase the 
likelihood that they form asymmetric alliances.  The two hypotheses project changes in domestic 
politics as key factors in explaining leaders’ need for external alliances.  
Domestic political factors and the calculus for political survival can play a crucial role in a 
small state leader’s alignment choices. When faced with threats to his political survival,  the leader 
must decide whether to deal with the threat by internal means which involves extraction of scarce 
societal resources or by external means by forging an alliance with a powerful state that is capable 
and willing to supply resources that satisfy the leader’s’ needs. Given that domestic extraction (for 
example, taxation) is costly, forming an alliance is an attractive option that will help the leader to 
rely less on expensive extraction from the society and to alleviate risky guns-and-butter trade-off 
in domestic distribution of resources. Side payments, which the leader gain by making autonomy 
concessions to the great power ally, help him to ameliorate a critical potential dilemma in domestic 
resource allocation and maintain the loyalty of his core domestic political coalitions. A key 




argument of the theory, thus, threats to leaders’ political power and calculation of their own 
political survival increase the likelihood that they form asymmetric alliances.  
Domestic political instability may affect leaders’ chances of political survival. It is possible 
that the presence of persistent political instability in a small state increases threats to the leader’s 
hold on power.  However, this may not always be the case. Even during the episodes of political 
instability and violence a leader’s hold on power may be secured as long as he can maintain the 
loyalty of key groups or actors (for example, the military or other security organizations). I test the 
hypotheses separately in quantitative analysis. Empirical evidence, in both quantitative analyses 
and case studies, are consistent with predictions about the domestic politics imperatives for 
alliance formation. As explained in quantitative analysis in chapter three, using the total 
magnitudes of societal and external violence as a proxy for political instability, I found that more 
violence prone small states are more likely to form external alliances than do small states with 
fewer episodes of political violence. Also, the regression results support the hypothesis that small 
state leaders are likely to form alliances when they face threats to their political survival. I tested 
the latter proposition using case studies and the results show convincing evidence in line the 
prediction.      
In the early years of the state (prior to the formation of the U.S.-Pakistan alliance) the 
Pakistani leaders faced several challenges that threatened to weaken the power of the dominant 
party (the Muslim League) and its leadership. The perception of India as an existential threat to 
Pakistan put serious pressure on the leadership to counter “the Indian threat” with military means 
and to achieve a favorable solution to the Kashmir dispute. Any sign of weakness (vis-à-vis India) 
or any hint of compromise would certainly have delegitimized the leadership and its political 
survival. It was not surprising that the new state, which was severely strained by the lack of a 




resource base, had prioritized defense spending at the expense of social and economic 
development. Moreover, soon after independence, Pakistan’s leaders faced the daunting tasks of 
state-building. If the new state was to survive as a viable political unit, it had to create a new 
administrative structure for the central government, resettle millions of refugees, establish an 
industrial infrastructure, and modernize its defense forces and the Pakistani leaders had to 
undertake these strenuous and difficult tasks without adequate financial resources.13 Political 
infighting, an increasing chasm between the center and the provinces, and the lack of a broad-
based national political organization made it difficult to establish a clear authority structure. The 
deputy commander-in-chief of the Pakistan army, lieutenant general Nazir Ali confided to an 
American official in 1952 that he was “more worried. . . over the actions of politicians than he was 
of the Indian army.”14 Facing these multitude of internal and external challenges, Pakistan’s ruling 
elites needed a strong security apparatus and a functioning economy. They sought a powerful 
external ally (the United States) who could provide them with military and economic aid. The 
United States was willing to provide much needed resources in exchange for certain concessions 
(such as supporting the American Cold War agenda, granting bases etc.). Thanks to the successful 
bargaining, Pakistan gained economic and military aid that helped the Pakistani ruling elites to 
strengthen their potentials for political survival in a precarious domestic political environment. 
Whereas the Pakistani leadership faced a threatening political environment short of an 
armed insurrection in the early years of the state, the Philippine leaders had to deal with a violent 
uprising against the very existence of the political establishment. For the Philippine leaders, the 
primary concern in the post-independence years was internal security threats. In the immediate 
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aftermath of World War II the Philippines did not face any external enemies. The Philippine elites, 
however, had to counter serious economic, social and political unrest that posed threats to their 
political power.  As the war-ravaged economy suffered, clashes between the armed forces and Huk 
guerillas raised the spectre of revolution against the weak regime in Manila.15 These political and 
economic conditions threatened the survival of the Philippine political elite class and its leaders 
sought to continue their privileged position in the post-independent Philippines as they did during 
the commonwealth period.  The Philippine leaders, after the Island’s independence, needed to 
reengage the United States in the Islands to counter domestic threats to their political survival. 
They sought an alignment with the United States. America’s strategic interests in the Islands had 
evolved from a relative indifference in the late 1940s to a useful strategic assets in the early 1950s. 
The Philippine bases were envisioned to have important purposes in the emerging Cold War 
regional politics. The United States had strategic interests in protecting the Philippine political 
establishment (as mentioned previously) and thus, the alliance served the mutual interests of both 
parties. 
The trade-off theory does not claim that small state leaders do not face external threats. 
The theory posit that there is an intertwining relationship between external and internal threats that 
shape leaders’ understanding of threats to their political survival. While the Pakistani leaders face 
external challenges (primarily, from India), domestic political factors were as important as external 
factors in shaping their alliance decision. The line between internal and external threats was blurry 
at best for the Pakistani ruling elites.  The Philippine leaders faced no clear external threats, but 
they encountered powerful domestic challenges to their political survival. As illustrated in this 
section, empirical evidence is consistent with the hypotheses concerning the formation of 
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asymmetric alliances. The theory stipulates that domestic political imperatives, importantly, 
threats to leaders’ political survival motivate small state leaders to form asymmetric alliances. 
Regarding alliance bargaining, the theory suggests that the presence of interest divergence 
increases the likelihood that side payments will be used to compensate for the deficit in benefit for 
small state, which is likely to arise in a strategic trade-off between asymmetric powers.  
     
MAINTENANCE OF ASYMMETRIC ALLIANCES 
The maintenance and management of an asymmetric alliance requires concerted efforts on the part 
of the allies. During the maintenance phase of the alliance, the parties continue to engage in 
bargaining to maintain the flow of benefits from the alignment and to minimize the costs and risks 
associated with the alliance commitments. As in the formation phase, side payments play an 
important role in the maintenance phase of an asymmetric alliance. This section summarizes the 
hypotheses concerning alliance maintenance and empirical findings.  
Divergent interests, Side Payments and Intra-alliance Cooperation  
The trade-off theory suggests that as the degree of divergent interests varies during the 
maintenance phase, so does the amount of side payments a small state receives for its cooperation 
with the great power ally. When the allies have very little interest divergence (that is, when parties 
share similar interests), the small state is likely to receive a small amount of side payments. Since 
the parties already share a high degree of shared interests, large amounts of side payments are not 
necessary to make new or to maintain the existing security arrangements. The great power can 
obtain policy concessions and cooperation on important issues from the small state for a cheaper 
price. When the degree of divergent interests is very high, two outcomes are possible. First, 




negotiations for new arrangements or for ongoing cooperation may fail and very little or no side 
payments are expected. As a result of a high level of divergent interests, the great power may find 
the small state’s demands too expensive to obtain desired policy concessions. Second, if the great 
power considers the small state’s cooperation important to its foreign policy objectives, it may be 
willing to pay a higher price for the small state’s concessions. In this case, a successful negotiation 
is possible. The small state’s chances of gaining large amounts of side payments are higher when 
the degree of interest divergence is in the medium range. The figure below shows the expected 
relationship between the level of divergent interests and the amounts of side payments. I put the 
hypothesis to test using two case studies. 
 




 The U.S.-Pakistan alliance experienced many ups and downs since its inception. The 
alliance experienced a high degree of divergent interests during the most part of its existence. As 
interest divergence grew between the allies, whether because of Pakistan’s effort to diversify its 
foreign policy or because of changes in U.S. strategic interests in South Asia, maintaining the 
alliance cohesion became challenging for both parties. The variation in side payments that Pakistan 
received was a function of the varying degree of interest divergence.  From 1965 to 1978, one of 
the difficult phases of the bilateral relations, divergent interests in the alliance caused parties to 
have different expectations about their obligations toward each other. The United States expected 
Pakistan to behave like a reliable ally: American policymakers wanted Pakistan to limit its 
relations with China (until 1971) and expected tangible contribution from Pakistan (i.e. sending 
troops) in America’s anti-communist wars in Asia (such as in Vietnam and Laos).16 The Pakistani 
leaders, however, declined to make any concrete commitments to the American demands but they 
were open to such possibilities if the United States provided Pakistan with more military aid and 
equipment. Moreover, the Pakistani leaders emphasized that as an ally, Pakistan deserved 
unrivaled U.S. support in its dispute with India on the Kashmir Issue, which the United States 
refused to do.17  For the Pakistanis, the United States betrayed Pakistan by providing economic 
and military aid to India and by imposing an arms embargo in Pakistan’s time of need.18 The 
Pakistan leaders in turn attempted to reduce the state’s reliance on the United States by warming 
up relations with the Soviet Union and by cultivating a close relationship with Communist China. 
These strains adversely affected the alliance cohesion. From the mid-1970s on, Pakistan’s nuclear 
program has remained a source of tensions between the allies. Thus, from the mid-1960s to the 
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early 1980s, Pakistan received significantly lower amounts of side payment due to a high degree 
of divergent interests. At a time when Pakistan urgently needed U.S. military aid, the United States 
imposed a decade-long arms embargo on Pakistan in 1965.  
Since the 1980s the U.S.-Pakistan alliance went through more ups and downs and the 
amounts of side payments responded to these variations accordingly. During the early 1980s 
Pakistan became a frontline ally in the fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The degree 
of divergent interests between the allies in prosecuting the Afghan War was medium and the parties 
were able to strike a successful bargain. Pakistan received a large amount of side payments in 
exchange for its cooperation in the war. This is in line with the prediction that when the degree of 
divergent interests is in the medium range, the amounts of side payments are expected to be large. 
As the Cold War and the war in Afghanistan came to an end, interest divergence in the US-Pakistan 
relations was on the rise again. For the United States, Pakistan was no longer considered 
strategically important; rather, it became a nuclear troublemaker and a source of regional 
instability.  American ambivalence toward Pakistan ended after the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the United States. As the United States commenced on the War on Terror in Afghanistan 
where the Al-Qaeda leadership had been under the protection of the Taliban regime, Pakistan 
became an important frontline state once again. The degree of divergent interests between the allies 
in pursuing the War on Terror was high. The United States sought Pakistan’s cooperation in 
defeating the Taliban regime and Al-Qaeda fighters, but Pakistan did not want the Taliban defeated 
in Afghanistan. However, the Pakistani leaders calculated that the state’s broader strategic interests 
in Afghanistan and Kashmir could best be protected by joining the U.S.-led coalition. Moreover, 




the United States was willing to pay a high price for Pakistan’s cooperation. Between 2002 and 
2012, Pakistan received a total of $25 billion in aid and reimbursement.19 
The U.S.-Philippines alliance, for the most part, experienced little interest divergence and 
remained largely cohesive. This allowed The United States to obtain extensive concessions for 
relatively lower amounts of side payments. From the mid-1950s to 1972 the U.S-Philippines 
alliance experienced no discernible degree of interest divergence. As a result,  the United States 
had little incentives to increase the amount of side payments for the Philippines’ concession on the 
bases and cooperation with U.S. foreign policy goals. Repeated requests by the Philippine leaders 
during the 1950s and 1960s for raising aid amount yielded no positive outcome.  American 
policymakers saw no need to pay more when the Philippines was securely in the American fold. 
The Philippines remained a loyal American ally and participated in several American covert and 
overt operations in Southeast Asia during the height of the Cold war. The Philippines’ bargaining 
leverage improved as American involvement in the Vietnam War intensified. The Philippine 
leader, Ferdinand Marcos, was aware of the elevated importance of the Philippine bases to the 
United States and as long as the United States was in Vietnam, Marcos could bargain for more aid 
in exchange for his support for the war.20  
The U.S-Philippine alliance experienced a medium level of interest divergence during the 
Marcos’ martial law regime that lasted from 1973 to 1986. Although the United States was not 
prepared to leave the Philippine bases altogether as the Vietnam War was winding down, the 
strategic importance of the alliance as well as the bases diminished somewhat. The Philippine 
leader highlighted divergence of interests between the allies when America’s commitment to the 
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Philippines was uncertain in a changed political environment in Southeast Asia. The Filipinos 
questioned the merit of hosting U.S. bases in the Islands and raised concern about American 
commitment to the security of the Philippines. Facing uncertainties about U.S. commitment, 
Marcos kept his options open: he warmed up diplomatic relations with communist countries 
including the Soviet Union, which caused some concerns in Washington. In addition, he hinted 
the willingness to let third parties use the bases in order to maximize the compensation amounts. 
In the end, the Philippine leader masterfully negotiated deals that ensured higher payments for the 
bases. The 1978 bases agreement resulted in American commitment to provide the Philippines 
$500 million in military aid for five-year period (in addition to other provisions of economic aid). 
The 1983 compensation agreement made a significant increase in compensation from $500 million 
(for a five-year period) to $900 million for five years.21  
The degree of interest divergence remained at the medium level after the regime change in 
1986. The Philippine leader Benigno Aquino and the Reagan administration had disagreement on  
how to handle and defeat rebel groups in the Philippines. Moreover, a major source of diverging 
interests was the understanding among the Filipinos that the alliance no longer served Philippine 
national interests. The Philippine leaders argued that the bases served only American (not 
Philippine) national interests since the Philippines did not confront any credible external security 
threat. They demanded large amounts of compensation for the bases. The United States, however, 
was unwilling to raise the aid amount and pressed on the Philippines to allow the United States to 
have access to the bases after 1991 (when the bases agreement was scheduled to expire). President 
Aquino, however, was unwilling to make such a pledge.22 A new base agreement was signed in 
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June 1991 that stipulated that the United States would phase out Clark and Subic bases over ten 
years and in return, the Philippines would receive $203 million annually in compensation for the 
bases.23 The Philippine Senate, however, rejected the treaty on September 16, 1991. The decision 
forced the U.S. to withdraw from the bases by the end of 1992.24 The United States, as expected, 
reduced economic and military aid to the Philippines by 60 percent for the fiscal year 1992.25 The 
alliance was revived after the Philippines joined the U.S.-coalition against the War on Terror. Since 
joining the U.S. War on Terror, the Philippines received increasing level of economic and military 
aid from the United States. U.S. aid to Philippines increased tenfold from $1.9 million in 2001 to 
$19 million in fiscal year 2002.26  
Thus, the case analyses show that the variation in the magnitude of side payments Pakistan 
and the Philippines received during the maintenance phases of the alliance was a function of their 
degree of interest divergence with the United States. The Pakistani leaders found it difficult to 
obtain large amounts of side payments when the alliance was experiencing a high degree of interest 
divergence until the United States considered Pakistan’s cooperation necessary in conducting 
covert and over military operations in the 1980s and the 2000s. For the Philippine leaders, it was 
a low level of interest divergence that limited their ability to bargain large volumes of side 
payments during the most phases of the alliance. These dynamic changes within cases are 
consistent with the theory’s prediction. 
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The Effects of Domestic Political Change  
Important domestic political changes in small states, such as changes in the existing 
political regime or leadership may affect the state’s alliance policies.  The theory predicts that, all 
else equal, a regime change in small states will cause one of the following outcomes: a) the new 
regime may terminate the existing alliance or b) the alliance remains intact in exchange for an 
increased amount of side payments. After a regime change, the new leadership may terminate the 
existing alliance if the new winning coalition prefers non-alignment or realignment with another 
great power. It is also possible that the new regime maintains the existing alliance but demands a 
higher price (i.e. a higher amount of side payments) for the state’s concessions on autonomy. In 
this case, the continuation of an asymmetric alliance will depend on the extent to which the great 
power values the alliance. If the great power assigns a higher importance to the alliance, it will 
survive albeit for a higher price; otherwise, the alliance will be terminated. 
The trade-off theory also predicts that leadership change alone, both in democratic and 
non-democratic small states, should have minimal impacts on the continuation of asymmetric 
alliances. Because most democratic leaders are accountable to various democratic institutions and 
they need to work with officials representing different sections of society, any drastic change in 
foreign policy becomes difficult. Thus, an asymmetric alliance is likely to survive, at least in the 
short run, after a leadership change in a democratic small state. For small coalition leaders, 
surviving the initial period in office is particularly challenging because of the certainties about the 
loyalty of the coalition members and leader’s ability to figure out a resource base to reward key 
supporters with private goods. In the absence of any alternative great powers, small coalition 
leaders have incentives to continue the existing alliances, at least in the short run, which can 
provide them access to much needed external resources, such as military and economic aid. These 




resources enhance the new leader’s ability to produce private goods and to keep his coalition 
members loyal. Thus, all else equal, small coalition leaders have incentives to maintain the alliance 
in the short run. 
Evidence from the case studies are consistent with the prediction that leadership change in 
small states has minimal or no effects on the continuity of the alliance. Several leadership changes 
in Pakistan, most of which occurred through military coups that installed military rulers in power 
without fundamentally altering important institutions of the government, had minimal effects on 
the continuation of the alliance. Side payments from the United States enormously benefited the 
military. All new leaders relied on American aid to consolidate the support of their respective 
winning coalitions. They needed military aid, for which the United States has been the largest 
provider, to demonstrate strength against India. Similarly, leadership changes in the Philippines 
had few or no effects on the continuity and tightness of the alliance. Throughout the 1950s and the 
1960s, regular changes in leadership in the Philippines did not harm the alliance tightness.  
As for regime change, the findings from case studies are mixed. In the case of Pakistan, 
neither of the predicted outcomes—termination of the alliance or a higher price for the 
maintenance of the alliance—was present. This finding is inconsistent with the hypothesis. Most 
regime changes in Pakistan occurred at times when the alliance was suffering from severe strains 
and when U.S. strategic interests in South Asia was declining. As a result, the Pakistan leaders like 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto, who assumed power in the post-military regimes, had 
little bargaining leverage to extract large amounts of side payments from the United States. Despite 
having severely strained relations with the United States, why didn’t regime change cause the 
termination of the alliance?  An important explanation as to why the Pakistani leaders declined to 
sever the alliance with the United States was the praetorian nature of the state’s political structure. 




A regime change, as defined in this study, implies a complete change in the state’s political 
institutions as well as a change in leadership. The elaborate role of the military in Pakistan’s 
politics and decision-making process, however, inhibited the emergence of a regime detached from 
the interests of the military leaders. The military has always had a central role in shaping the state’s 
foreign policy and national security agenda.27 The perceived threat from India made the military 
more prominent than other domestic players and defined Pakistan as a state that viewed its 
existence in terms of its hostile relations with India.28 As the military becomes a stakeholder in 
Pakistan’s politics, it expanded its economic interests as well, such as the expansion of an extensive 
network of economic organizations run by the military and its retired personnel. For the Pakistani 
leaders, civilian or non-civilian, the military has been a crucial part of their winning coalitions. 
Political survival requires the leaders to fulfill the military’s demands and to promote the military’s 
preferred foreign policies, including a strong-tie with the United States, which has remained the 
largest source of external resources for the Pakistani leaders. The infusion of these external 
resources has enabled the leaders to provide rewards to the member of their winning coalitions, 
importantly, the military, and keep them loyal. As the military maintained its powerful presence 
in the important institutions of the government and in the decision making process, civilian 
leadership must give priority to the military’s preferences on important foreign policy and national 
security issues. It is then very likely that some critical aspects of Pakistan’s foreign policy (fiercely 
anti-Indian stance, maintaining strategic interests in Afghanistan, and the continuation of strategic 
alliance with the United States) will remain intact irrespective of regime change.  
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The two instances of regime change in the Philippines did not end the alliance with the 
United States, but these changes led to demands for more side payments.  The alliance remained 
steady after the first regime change in 1972 when Marcos imposed martial law. Marcos raised the 
price for hosting the bases and demanded more for the maintenance of the alliance. Fortunately for 
Marcos, the United States attached a high level of importance to the bases. He successfully used 
American strategic needs and renegotiated the bases agreement twice (1979 and 1983), each time 
for a significantly higher price than the last one. Even before the negotiations, the martial law 
regime received more aid than before. Following the second regime change in 1987 (when the 
Philippines returned to democratic institutions), the new regime sought renegotiations for the 
existing bases agreements and demanded more for the bases. The U.S. offer (compensation) for 
the bases was considered inadequate. President Aquino, who, unlike Marcos, relied on a large 
coalition, had to give in to the nationalist sentiment that opposed the continuation of the U.S. bases. 
For the United States, the Philippine demands, including more compensation for the bases, was 
deemed too costly. The Philippine Senate rejected a renegotiated bases agreement which then 
forced the United States to leave the Philippine bases. Although the decision caused strains in the 
bilateral relations, it did not terminate the alliance. The alliance became a moribund affair between 
the United States and the Philippines. 
Regime change in Somalia and Ethiopia had very different results. The regime change in 
Somalia in 1969 had little adverse effects on the state’s existing alignment with the Soviet Union. 
The new regime under Mohammed Siad Barre, who seized power in a military coup in 1969, 
strengthened Somalia’s ties with the Soviet Union.29 The bilateral relationship reached it height 
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when both parties signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1974 and Somalia started to 
receive more Soviet arms and equipment than ever before. Ethiopia experienced a regime change 
in 1974 when the Derg and subsequently Major Mengistu Haile Mariam came to power. The 
political change in Ethiopia, contrary to the effects of political change on Somalia-USSR 
alignment, weakened Ethiopia’s alliance with the United States.  In the absence of a reliable 
alternative, Mengistu needed American aid to counter various internal and external threats to his 
political power. Indeed, U.S. aid to Ethiopia increased in the early years of the Derg regime. 
Mengistu, however, demanded more aid, which for the United States was too costly a price for 
Ethiopia’s strategic worth—a disagreement that severely strained the alliance. As I argue in 
chapter six, regime change in Ethiopia was not directly responsible for the eventual termination of 
the U.S.-Ethiopian alliance. It was disagreements about the appropriate costs of alliance 
maintenance and the availability of the Soviet Union as a possible prospective ally that explain 
Ethiopia’s decision to terminate alliance with the United States.      
The case analyses show mixed results for the hypothesis. In two instances—the Philippines 
and Ethiopia—regime change had some qualitative effects on the alliance. In both cases the new 
regimes demanded a higher amount of aid (which is in line with the hypothesis), but the demands 
were considered too costly for the United States. While Ethiopia terminated the alliance, the 
Philippines ended basing rights in the Islands, which adversely affected the alliance relations. In 
Somalia regime change strengthened the alliance and the new regime was able to extract more side 
payments (than before) from the Soviet Union. Lastly, there was no clear effects of the regime 
change on the U.S.-Pakistan alliance. I argue that the strong presence of the military in the decision 
making process (especially in the foreign policy realm) ensure the maintenance of the alliance 
irrespective of leadership change or regime change in Pakistan.       




Incentives for Realignment  
The value of an existing alliance to small state leaders depends on the continued receipt of 
alliance benefit, which in asymmetric alliances I characterize as side payments. Any drastic change 
in the flow of side payments, combined with available great power alternatives (to replace the 
existing one) encourages the small state to consider the possibility of realignment. An asymmetric 
alliance is likely to be more durable when there are no drastic changes in the flow of side payments 
and small states do not have great power alternatives to replace the existing ally. If there are 
substitute great powers who are willing to offer more (or the same volume) side payments than the 
small state is getting from the existing alliance and the expected costs for small states are equal to 
(or less than) the existing level, then the net value of realignment with another great power will 
increase. The small state leader, then, has an incentive to realign with another great power. I 
hypothesize that small state leaders are likely to realign when they expect a higher payoff of net 
value from the new alliance than they receive or expected to receive from the existing alliance.  
 The cases of realignment in Ethiopia and Somalia provide support to the hypothesis. The 
leaders of both countries decided to terminate their existing alliance and to realign with competing 
great powers in order to gain a more beneficial arrangements and to improve the net gain from 
alignment. In Ethiopia Mengistu’s hold on power by 1977 was precarious in the face of a prolong 
war in Eritrea, multiple secessionist insurrections, rising discontents in the capital and in other 
parts of the country. The Derg leadership needed more military aid to resolve the Eritrean rebellion 
by force, to suppress the domestic dissidents, and to respond to Somalia’s growing military 
strength. The Ethiopian leaders were frustrated by American wait-and-see response to Ethiopia’s 
urgent requests for aid. Put simply, the amount of side payments that the Ethiopian leaders received 
and expected to receive in the future was not enough for the regime’s political survival. For the 




United States, however, the Derg’s demands were too costly for American strategic interests in the 
Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s decision to realign demonstrated rational calculations on the part of 
Derg’s leaders as to which superpower was willing to supply more side payments for a cheaper 
price. While Mengistu opened negotiations with the USSR for an alliance, he worked out new 
plans for military support from the United States. As the negotiation with the USSR progressed, 
the Ethiopian leader rejected at least two Soviet offers because they were too small and limited30. 
Finally, in 1977 Moscow agreed to offer a more extensive aid package that satisfied the Ethiopian 
leader.31 In a matter of months Ethiopia was transformed into a client state of the Soviet Union, 
became dependent on its new patron from defense against the Somalian force that the USSR had 
built up for a decade.32  
Somalia, like Ethiopia, realigned to improve its net gain from alignment. After assuming 
power Barre strengthen Somalia’s ties with the Soviet Union in the hope of gaining necessary 
military aid to pursue the state’s irredentist claims over territories in the neighboring countries 
inhabited by ethnic Somalis. From 1967 to 1976 Somalia saw an infusion of Soviet economic and 
military aid in exchange for granting the Soviet Union access to the Somalian base facilities. In 
the wake of the Ogaden War the Somalian leadership was presented with two choices: first, accept 
the Soviet peace plan that would have implied surrendering Somalia’s historic claims to territories 
inhabited by ethnic Somalis in exchange for a resumption of Soviet military aid; and second, sever 
ties with the Soviet Union and pursue a promising negotiation with the United States for a long-
term relationship. It is not surprising that Barre opted for the second option since accepting the 
Soviet offer would have been very costly and would likely to have led to his ouster. Somalia signed 
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an agreement with the United States in August 1980 without incurring added costs of surrendering 
the state’s territorial claims and capitulating to the enemies (as the Soviet plan would have 
implied). Somalia received a total of almost $300 million in American security assistance between 
1980 and 1986.33 Domestic politics played a critical role in Mengistu and Barre’s realignment 
decisions. They bargained with great powers to attain a more beneficial arrangement than what 
they had expected to gain from the existing allies. They reconciled between domestic politics 
imperatives (political survival) and external pressures and, alike any leaders would be expected to 
do, use foreign policy, alliance policy to be specific, as a tool to maximize their survival potential. 
Table 7.1 below summarizes the major findings and their consistency with the hypotheses. 
 
 












1) Having divergent interests between a 
great power and a small state increases 
the likelihood that the great power uses 
side payments to cement an alliance.  
 - Quantitative:  
 The odds of using side payments increase 
when allies have divergent interests. 
 
 - Pakistan:  
 U.S. and Pakistan had divergent interests 
in the formative years of the alliance; U.S. 
paid large amounts of side payments to 
cement the alliance. 
  
 - The Philippines:  
 U.S. and the Philippines had very little 
interest divergence in the formative years 
of the alliance; U.S. paid a small amount 
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2) All else equal, the amount of side 
payments needed to compensate for 
policy concessions is likely to be 
smaller for small coalition leaders 
than it is for large coalition leaders. 
- Quantitative:  
 Non-democratic small states received 
smaller amounts of foreign aid from the 
United States than do democratic small 
states. 




3) All else equal, politically unstable 
small states are more likely to form 
asymmetric alliances than are 
politically stable small states.  
-Quantitative:  
 Small states that experience a higher 
magnitude of political violence are more 
likely to form alliances with the United 
States than do small states with a lower 
magnitude of political violence. 
 





4) Threats to leaders’ political survival 
in small states increase the likelihood 
that they form asymmetric alliances.  
 
- Quantitative:  
 A higher degree of political threats 
increases the likelihood that leaders form 
alliances with the United States.  
  
 - Pakistan:  
 The Pakistani leaders formed an alliance 
with the United States to secure their 
hold on power threatened by internal and 
external challenges. 
 
   
 - The Philippines: 
 Rising domestic threats to their political 
survival was a crucial factor that led the 
Philippine leaders to form an alliance 











5) All else equal, the amount of side 
payments used to maintain the alliance 
depends on the level of divergent between 
the allies:  
a) When the level of divergent 
interests is very low, small amounts 
of side payments are necessary to 
maintain the alliance;  
b) When the level of divergent 
interests is very high, very large 
amounts of side payments (for a 
successful negotiation) or no side 
payments (for an unsuccessful 
negotiation) are expected; and 
 c) When the level of divergent 
interests is in the medium range, 
parties can bargain policy 
concessions in exchange for large 
amounts of side payments.   
 
  
 - Pakistan: 
 Having a high level of divergent interests 
made it difficult for Pakistan to obtain 
side payments; in some instances 
however, when the United States valued 
Pakistan’s cooperation in regional 
conflicts highly, successful negotiations 
made it possible for Pakistan to gain very 
large amounts of side payments.  
 Having a medium level of divergent 
interests made it easier for Pakistan to 
obtain large amounts of side payments 
from the United States. 
 The U.S.-Pakistan alliance rarely 
experienced a low degree of interest 
divergence 
 
- The Philippines: 
 A low level of divergent interests 
adversely affected the Philippine 
leaders’ ability to extract higher 
  























amounts of side payments from the 
United States. 
 The Philippine leaders were successful in 
gaining large amounts of side payments 
when the parties had a medium level of 
divergent interests.  
 The U.S.-Philippines alliance rarely 
experienced a high degree of interest 
divergence. 
 
6) A small state will be likely to 
realign if the expected net gain from 
realignment outweighs the expected 
gain from the existing alliance. 
 
-The Horn of Africa: 
 Both the Ethiopian and Somalin leaders 
chose to realign that would allow them 
to gain more aid (than possible from the 
existing alliances) and would be least 







7) All else equal, regime changes in 
small states increase the likelihood 
that a) the alliance will be 
terminated, or b) the amountl of side 
payments received will increase. 
 
- Pakistan: 
 Regime change had no noticeable effect 
on the alliance  
 
- The Philippines: 
 The Philippine leader gained more 
side payments after a regime change 
in 1972; the alliance remained intact. 
 An unsuccessful negotiation for the 
bases weakened the alliance—the 
United States withdrew from the 
bases—after a second regime change 
in 1986. 
 
- The Horn of Africa:  
 A regime change in Ethiopia in 1974 was 
not responsible for the termination of 
the U.S.-Ethiopian alliance; rather, the 
Ethiopian leaders’ dissatisfaction about 
the amount of aid led them to realign 
with the Soviet Union. 
 A regime change in Somalia in 1969 
strengthened the state’s alignment with 















8) In the short run, leadership 
changes in small states will be less 
likely to effect the continuation of 
asymmetric alliances.   
 
- Pakistan: 
 Leadership changes had not effects on the 
continuation of the alliance. 
 - The Philippines: 
 Leadership changes had no effects on the 














THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The dissertation makes important contributions in the international relations scholarship. 
First, it presents a systematic study of alliance relations between asymmetric powers that focuses 
on leaders’ domestic political survival in weaker states countries as a primary motivation for 
alliance formation with stronger states. This focus on domestic politics departs from some 
prominent theories that suggest that the formation and maintenance of alliances are determined 
primarily by states’ perception of external threats. An overemphasis on external threat—found in 
the balance of power theory and the balance of threat theory—by alliance theorists projects a 
narrow focus on the purpose and scope of alliances. External threat oriented theories (the balance 
of threat theory, for example) stipulate a dichotomous pattern of alliances, balancing and 
bandwagoning, caused by states’ perception of external threat and their relative power capabilities. 
In the balancing-bandwagoning paradigm weaker states have only one option: capitulating to 
threatening powers (bandwagoning). The trade-off theory makes useful contribution to the alliance 
literature by breaking out of the balancing-bandwagoning paradigm and by expanding the scope 
of alliances. The theory focuses on leadership survival as the primary motivation of alliance 
formation. In doing so the theory emphasizes that external threats are often enmesh with domestic 
political factors that shape leaders’ assessment of threat to their political survival. A broader 
approach to security, which recognizes the intertwining nature of internal and external security 
threats as the trade-off theory does, is more pertinent to advance our understanding of the 
alignment strategies of developing countries in the Third World than does an exclusive focus on 




external threats. Moreover, by focusing on domestic political factors, such as domestic political 
institutions and leaders’ survival in domestic political settings, the current study helps us 
understand the interrelationship between domestic and international politics and offers a bridge 
between international relations and comparative politics literature.   
    Second, contrary to the existing theories of alliances in the literature, the dissertation 
shows that various forms of foreign aid, which I term side payments in the context of alliance 
bargaining, play an important role in the formation and maintenance of asymmetric alliances. The 
trade-off theory stipulates that alliance bargaining involves trade-offs that sometimes generate 
deficit in utility for one party (usually the weaker party). The more capable and stronger party uses 
foreign aid as side payments to obtain policy concessions and cooperation from weaker parties. 
While the use of foreign aid as side payments is not new to the literature, the use of foreign aid as 
a bargaining tool in alliance relations is a novel addition to the alliance literature. 
    Third, the dissertation offers a dynamic and process oriented approach that emphasizes 
that alliance agreements and accompanying security arrangements between strong and weak states 
are a result of bargaining processes. The trade-off theory is a process-oriented theory that probes 
not only why asymmetric alliances are formed but also how they are maintained. The theory 
underscores domestic political processes shaping small state leaders’ perception of threat and 
dynamic bargaining between prospective allies. Once an alliance is formed, it traces changes in 
alliance relations over time in response to changing strategic interests of allies. The theory 
maintains that the likelihood that the weaker party receives side payments is a function of the 
degree of interest divergence between the allies. Furthermore, it predicts that small state leaders 
have incentives to realign when the expected net gains from realignment outweigh the gains from 
the existing alliance—a projection based on leaders’ expectations about future gains. These 




dynamic hypotheses, most of which highlights alliance relations as a result of bargaining outcomes 
between states, are potentially novel contribution to the alliance literature.  
By focusing on the alignment strategy of weaker states and their bargaining with great 
powers, the dissertation advances our understanding of the patterns of alliances between unequal 
powers. This is an improvement on the alliance literature since the literature has largely ignored 
the patterns of alliances and alignments in weaker states. This lack of attention to small state 
alignment is a product of a general trend in the international relations scholarship that downplays 
the relevance of small and weaker states to international security. Even during the Cold War, when 
it was well-recognized that superpowers’ involvement in the Third World was driven by their 
strategic concerns for allies and influence, some prominent scholars argued that the United States 
wasted its scarce resources on the secondary and tertiary interests in the peripheral regions in the 
Third World.34  The end of the Cold War removed, according to this view, whatever strategic 
imperatives the United States may had in the Third World.35 Indeed, some neorealist scholars have 
predicted that the focus of international politics will move back to Europe after the end of the Cold 
War as European states would renew their geopolitical rivalries paralleling the nineteenth century 
power politics.36 Contrary to this prediction, the sources of insecurity and instability in the 
contemporary world politics have been more decentralized than before acquiring transnational and 
transregional characteristics. The end of the Cold War did not bring stability to the periphery, nor 
has it ushered in a new international order. Today’s international politics simply does not fit into 
any preconceived categories of international order (usually characterized by the distribution of 
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36 See for example, Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War." 




power), such as multipolarity, bipolarity, or unipolarity. The rise of transnational terrorism has 
placed developing countries at the center of international attention. Many weaker states have 
become frontline states in the War on Terror. It is more likely that the West will continue to feel 
the effects of political instability and conflicts in the Third World.  Just as policymakers in the 
West cannot afford to ignore conflicts and instability in the Third World, international relations 
scholars cannot disregard small states without putting their theories at the risk of being irrelevant 
to today’s international context. 
 Both in quantitative analysis and in case studies, most of the empirical data used in this 
study to test the hypotheses involved U.S.-led asymmetric alliances. A reasonable question then 
becomes: how generalizable are these findings across other asymmetric alliance dyads?  I argue 
that the findings are not necessarily specific to the United States; they are generalizable to all great 
powers seeking autonomy concessions from a potential ally. For example, in the context of Cold 
War rivalry, both superpowers used similar strategies (the use of foreign aid as side payments to 
provide incentives to potential allies) to court prospective allies in the Third World.  
An important determinant of American foreign aid during the Cold War to less-developed 
countries was the perceived threat of communism. As section 2 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 
provided the framework for the United States aid program: “The Congress declares it to be the 
purpose of this act to maintain the security and to promote the foreign policy of the United States 
by authorizing military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly countries to the free world, 
to develop their resources in the interest of their security and independence and the national interest 
of the United States. . .”37 The United States used economic and military aid to obtain basing rights, 
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to shore up support for anti-Soviet policy abroad, and to build military security infrastructure in 
recipient countries to deter the threat of communism. Foreign aid, thus, can be seen as a basic 
instrument which the United States used to achieve its foreign policy objectives in the Third World. 
Similarly, the Soviet Union used foreign aid to influence less developed countries in the Third 
World.  Soviet economic and military assistance was intended to affect foreign policy position of 
the Third World.38  The Soviet Union competed with the United States in the Third World for 
bases, allies, and influence. In doing so, the Soviet leadership used various aid programs to 
outcompete American influence in the Third World. Thus, like the United States, Soviet aid was 
in large part motivated in large part by the desire to exert direct political influence of various forms 
on Third World countries. 
 
The trade-off theory has policy implications for both great powers and weaker states. The 
findings in this study have potential relevance for the United States. If the end of the Cold War 
offered a relative respite for the United States in its pursuit of asymmetric alliances, it did not last 
very long. The start of the War on Terror gave new urgencies for complementary resources, 
supporting bases, and allies in small developing countries. In this ambitious war against terrorism 
small states have become frontline states again who are expected to play a vital role in defeating 
entrenched terrorist networks. Recognizing the importance of America’s alliances with small 
states, U.S. National Security Strategy since 2002 emphasize U.S. security commitments to allies 
in South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia-Pacific. While the United States no longer faces 
great power competition, at least not to the extent that it did during the Cold War, foreign aid 
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remains a bargaining tool as it was during the Cold war, a means to induce support from weaker 
developing countries for the War on Terror. 
 One conclusion of this study is that it is perhaps easier and cost effective to deal with 
autocratic leaders than with democratic leaders, at least in short run. This is due to the variation in 
domestic political institutions. One might find it an unsavory inference that a security arrangement 
with a small coalition state (autocratic state) will be more cost effective. It is not hard to understand 
why great powers (like the United States) prefer to maximize utility in seeking cost efficient 
security arrangements with weaker powers. Qualms about dealing with unsavory leaders never 
stopped the United States from making security arrangements during the Cold War or in the War 
on Terror. In addition, as the Selectorate model suggests, cost efficient arrangements abroad make 
it easier for American presidents to provide national security, a public good, more effectively to 
domestic constituents.39 It should be noted, however, that cost efficiency in the short run does not 
necessarily generate effective foreign policy. As the Cold War history suggests, such alliances 
sometimes trapped the United States into supporting brutal dictators and had adverse effects on 
the U.S. foreign policy interests in the long run.    
Another implication of this study is that a great power should find it preferable to strike a 
deal with state with which it has a low or medium level of interest divergence. In such an 
agreement, both parties will have some shared interests that could help to maintain the security 
arrangement for a longer period of time. If a successful negotiation produces an arrangement in 
which parties have a high degree of interest divergence, such an alliance will be very costly to the 
great power (since it has to compensate the partner with large amounts of side payments). In 
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addition, such alliances can be precarious with the potentials to have unintended consequences for 
both parties.  
 For weaker powers, whose leaders desire to maximize benefits from making a security 
arrangement with a great power, maintaining a high level of affinity with the great power may not 
an effective way to extract side payments. Empirical analyses in this study shows that small and 
weaker powers can deal with great powers to maximize gains from alliances. In a bargaining 
context the trade-off theory suggests that as long as the weaker power can maintain at least some 
level of interest divergence, it can play the game of “play for pay” very effectively. The challenge 
for small state leaders is to recognize the level of interest divergence that would be optimal, which 
is different for each country, for a successful bargaining with great powers. Egyptian President 
Gamal Nasser, according to Mohamed Heikal, sketched out a manual consisted of a set of advice 
for Third World leaders wished to negotiate with the Soviet Union. One of the advices was that 
Third World leaders should avoid long protracted quarrel with the Soviet leadership. This is 
because, as Nasser elaborated: “When differences arise between the Soviet leaders and the leaders 
of country which has enjoyed category A status, they are, to begin with, anxious to play these 
differences down as far as possible . . . But if the quarrel persists, and they come to the conclusion 
that there is nothing to be looked for from the leader with whom they are dealing, they will 
eventually give the signal that he is to be regarded as an enemy.”40 For a small state leader, thus, 
an important objective should be to avoid being perceived as hostile such that the great power finds 
his demands too costly.  
                                                          
40 According to Heikal, countries that enjoyed a category A status were those that the Soviet Union regarded as most 
favored nations and rated highly for their strategic importance. See Mohamed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar: 
The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East (New York, San Francisco, London: Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1978). Pp. 22-31  




Although I used small states and the Third World political context to explain and to test 
the theory, the application of the trade-off theory is not necessarily limited to the Third World. The 
theory’s focus on the bargaining process can equally be useful in analyzing any interstate 
negotiations for security arrangements. The theory posit that when  states are asked to make 
security concessions that are sometimes not in the country’s leadership’s interest, the leadership 
then demands side payments to make up the deficit in utility from a security arrangement, such as 
alliances. Side payments serve as a compensation mechanism that fill the deficit. The magnitude 
of side payments needed to cement an agreement or obtain cooperation, according to the theory, 
depends on the degree of interest divergence between the parties, domestic political constraints a 
leader (who is making the concessions) faces, and the importance the state (who is asking for 
concessions) attaches to the agreement. These parameters of the theory are not necessarily specific 
to small states in the Third World, but general enough that they can be applied to any interstate 
security bargaining. The theory, thus, provides a useful theoretical framework for the future 
research on interstate negotiations for security arrangements.  
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